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This study aims to address the core research question, are institutional barriers and 
voids in extremely uncertain environments perceived as disincentives and/or opportunities? 
The emphasis in the extant entrepreneurship literature is mainly on the separate and negative 
influence of institutional barriers, voids and violence. The present study is the first to analyse 
the cumulative impact of all these negative challenges and consider their possible positive 
as well as negative influences. Another research gap here is that the exact role that 
uncertainty plays in stimulating and/or obstructing entrepreneurial action has remained 
obscure. The study integrates the institution-based view (IBV) and the subjectivist view of 
entrepreneurship to address these two research gaps better capture the nuances of extreme 
institutional challenges in relation to their effects on the firm’s survival as well as on the 
entrepreneurial processes. 
The study adopted a qualitative case study approach and sampled two ‘polar’ cases 
- one indigenous firm and one MNE - that represented the population of mobile phone 
providers in Palestine. A thematic analysis of thirty-one semi-structured Skype interviews 
was used. This study treated institutional challenges and uncertainty separately, but evidence 
from the two case studies shows that they were related and reported many similar relations. 
The indigenous firm and the MNE faced extreme institutional challenges, which 
were perceived as opportunities/incentives and disincentives. The results show that the three 
types of uncertainty (state, effect and response) can indeed be a source of both positive and 
negative impacts for entrepreneurial processes and action. The aggregate level of uncertainty 
may motivate entrepreneurial processes and action, particularly opportunity exploitation, to 
a maximum level, beyond which any further increase in uncertainty may be associated with 
declines, involving what this study labels as ‘uncertainty overload’. The analysis also 
demonstrates that the attributes of managers, together with their emotions aroused by levels 
of uncertainty, may play a crucial part in both stimulating and obstructing opportunity 
exploitation. 
The two firms each employed three strategic responses to institutional challenges: 
acceptance, adaptation and influence. The analysis further finds that a wide variety of factors 
influenced opportunity-related processes and entrepreneurial action, which were broadly 
related to the manager’s personality, prior knowledge and social networks, institutional 




opportunity identification options (recognition, discovery and creation) and developed a set 
of different actions, beyond immediate opportunity exploitation.  
This study may enrich and complement the main argument of the IBV literature by 
confirming the binary effects (as benefits and disbenefits) of institutional challenges on the 
two firms. It also may contribute to the IBV literature through providing a blend of three 
strategic responses that employed by the indigenous firm and MNE to navigate and shape 
their institutional environment. The study provides an integrated framework that may portray 
a fuller view pertaining to entrepreneurial processes and action within the Palestinian 
uncertain environment. It suggests a revision to the current entrepreneurship literature in 
relation to how uncertainty affects entrepreneurship by confirming an ambiguous impact (as 
incentive and/or disincentive) of extreme uncertainty on the two firms and emphasising the 
significant influence that emotions and personal attributes of the entrepreneur may exert on 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the thesis, providing a background and 
theoretical underpinnings. The chapter explains the chosen research setting and specifies the 
research objective and questions. It also briefly discusses the methodology and its claimed 
contributions and outlines the structure of thesis. 
1.2 Research Background 
A seminal book (Khanna  & Palepu, 2010) stimulated a decade of research into 
negative institutional environments. Subsequent investigations covered institutional barriers 
(Chang & Wu, 2014; Oliveira et al., 2018; Skiti, 2020) institutional voids (Doh et al., 2017; 
Gao et al., 2017) violent conflict (Hiatt & Sine, 2014), and combined voids and conflicts 
(Parente et al., 2019). The emphasis in these studies was mainly on the separate and negative 
impact of barriers, voids and violence, e.g. ‘… political and civil violence decreases firm 
survival’ (Hiatt & Sine, 2014, p. 773). Firms facing institutional voids find it difficult to 
respond to shocks without the cushion of specialist intermediary institutions, and thus, ‘… 
failure rates are high’ (Gao et al., 2017, p. 2147). However, another stream (e.g. Doh et al., 
2017; Moulick et al., 2019; Smallbone & Welter, 2008; Sydow et al., 2020; Tracy & Phillips, 
2011) acknowledged that a challenging business environment may create some distinctive 
opportunities for firms. Doh et al. (2017, p. 296) reported that ‘… institutional voids may 
help to create monopolistic advantages for some firms … and in some emerging markets it 
is possible to find foreign firms absorbing costs of absent institutions’. 
Accordingly, entrepreneurship studies to date have offered inconsistent empirical 
findings on the influences of institutional barriers and voids, but has been dominated by the 
‘negative’ and has mainly overlooked the ‘positive’ outcomes related to institutional 
challenges. I therefore adopt an open-minded perspective (i.e. barriers and voids may 
generate positive as well as negative influences) which may explain, even in the most 
propitious circumstances for negative responses, an apparent inconsistency in the extant 
literature (Doh et al., 2017). I also consider the institution-based view (IBV) of the firm 
(Peng et al., 2009) that focuses on the mutual interaction between institutions and firms as a 




institutional pressures, as constraints and/or opportunities (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Yiu 
et al., 2014). Chowdhury et al. (2019, p. 35) also emphasised that ‘… institutions and 
entrepreneurial activities tend to have a bidirectional relationship’. 
Besides this general presumption of a negative impact of institutional challenges, the 
extant literature (with the exception of voids and violent conflicts combined in Parente et 
al., 2019) has analysed individual sources of uncertainty without recognising the cumulative 
impact of uncertainty generated by institutional barriers, voids and violence together. Rather 
than analyse individual barriers, voids and conflicts in isolation, it is argued that they may 
fruitfully be studied collectively, since Aidis (2005, p. 314) noted the inter-relatedness of 
different business barriers, besides voids and conflicts. These cumulative institutional 
barriers, voids and conflict may be expected to intensify any negative impact of uncertainty. 
Interestingly, the role that uncertainty plays in hindering and/or motivating 
entrepreneurial processes and action remains a matter of recent debate (e.g. Bylund & 
McCaffrey, 2017; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Townsend et al., 2018). Furthermore, 
explanations of the conditions under which uncertainty may impede and/or promote 
entrepreneurship are elusive (McKelvie et al., 2011). A ‘barriers’ perspective (e.g. Bylund 
& McCaffrey, 2017; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Kirzner, 1979; Mahnke et al., 2007) suggested 
that greater uncertainty creates barriers to entrepreneurial action, especially opportunity 
exploitation, and ‘… across all fields of management research, uncertainty is largely 
considered an aversive state that people and organizations cope with unwillingly and 
generally aim to avoid’ (Griffin & Grote, in press, 2020). As entrepreneurial action is made 
more uncertain in unstable institutional contexts - e.g. in many emerging markets - 
opportunities for entrepreneurship may be inhibited (Baron et al., 2018; Chowdhury et al., 
2019; Luthans & Ibraveva, 2006; Manolova et al., 2008). 
However, another perspective (e.g. Knight, 1921; McKelvie et al., 2011; Tracey & 
Phillips, 2011; Webb et al., 2020; Zhou, 2013, 2017) has contended that entrepreneurial 
opportunities are likely to be greatest when market conditions are furthest from equilibrium 
and competitive perfection, e.g. when they are volatile, unpredictable and uncertain. Folta 
(2007, p. 98) went further and declared that: ‘for opportunities that create the most value, 
uncertainty rules the day’ (italicised emphasis in the original). Institutional barriers and 
voids are key sources of volatility and uncertainty that may create significant opportunities 




voids did not hold back the entrepreneurs but, rather, encouraged them to ‘bloom where 
planted’ (Moulick et al., 2019, p. 7). This perspective coincides with Claire et al. (2019) and 
Shepherd et al. (2007), who suggested that hostile and rapidly changing environments may 
stimulate entrepreneurship. 
I suggest that to some extent, these two competing views may be attributed to the 
subjective perception, interpretation and judgement of uncertainty in a ‘state of 
unknowingness’ (Townsend et al., 2018, p. 670) among individual entrepreneurs. Packard 
et al. (2017, p. 846) commented that ‘[entrepreneurial] decisions, in the end, depend on how 
the decision maker perceives the relevant uncertainties…’, i.e. a subjective, judgement-
based view of uncertainty echoed in Foss and Klein (2012), McKelvie et al. (2011), and 
Teece and Leih (2016). This view explains the heterogeneity of entrepreneurial actions even 
in the same uncertain environmental context (McKelvie et al., 2011; Shepherd et al., 2015). 
Drawing on this subjective view of entrepreneurship, this study synthesises the two facets 
(negative and positive) of the role of uncertainty in the entrepreneurship processes. 
The phenomenon of entrepreneurship is largely centred around the individual-
opportunity nexus (Shane, 2003). Therefore, unsurprisingly, a wide variety of individual 
factors influence the processes of opportunity identification, development, evaluation, and 
exploitation (Cox et al., 2018). Even though scholars of personality and the psychology of 
the entrepreneur are united in their understanding of the importance of opportunity, 
judgement, and uncertainty to entrepreneurial processes and action (Packard et al., 2017; 
Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016), they vary considerably in how entrepreneurs conceptualise the 
process and its enablers (McMullen et al., 2020). Personality and psychology have both been 
identified as key components in explaining how and why entrepreneurs act, however, 
questions remain about what different factors lead to entrepreneurial process and action as 
well as the role that these factors have in the process (Cox et al., 2018).  
This study fills the aforementioned gaps in the literature by focusing on the combined 
influence of institutional barriers, voids and conflict and investigating whether the 
indigenous and MNE operators in the Palestinian mobile phone sector perceive these 
institutional challenges in an extremely uncertain environment as disincentives and/or 
opportunities. I propose that the integration of the IBV and the subjectivist view of 





1.3 Research Setting 
The choice of empirical location corresponded with the focus of this research 
investigating the circumstances in which the negative influences of uncertainty, according 
to the ‘barriers’ perspective, may be expected to dominate. It was therefore decided to study 
the impact of extreme uncertainty in a very hostile environment. This methodological choice 
effectively amplified the impact of institutions on firms and biased this study purposely 
against the probability of finding positive impacts, thus underlining the significance of any 
positive impact that is nevertheless found. This enabled me to claim a contribution to both 
institutional and entrepreneurship theories by investigating how extreme uncertainty in the 
Palestinian mobile phone sector may have influenced an indigenous firm and an MNE 
provider’s decision to act on an entrepreneurial opportunity. 
The Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) refers to the geographical area occupied 
by Israel since 1967. The OPT comprises the West Bank (WB, including East Jerusalem) 
and the Gaza Strip (GS), and is controlled by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) after 
the Oslo Accords in 1993 (International Labour Organization, 2018). The OPT has been 
scored with the highest national level of commercial risks from political and trading events, 
and an apparently unfavourable, negative and unstable business climate (COFACE, 2019; 
CREDENDO, 2019). The Palestinian mobile phone sector was chosen as the setting for this 
research because it operates in arguably the most restrictive institutional environment in the 
world, regulated by three different governments (PNA, Hamas and Israel) (Rossotto et al., 
2016), because the industry’s market structure is unique, comprising only one established 
incumbent and a relative newcomer MNE. Furthermore, eight Israeli mobile operators cover 
the WB with mobile signals, offering illegal and unregulated services (Grimoud et al., 2015; 
Rossotto et al., 2016). Many of these institutional barriers are imposed by a neighbouring 
country (Israel) and this creates a unique and extreme institutional environment (c.f. Alvi et 
al. 2019) within which firms must struggle to operate and survive (Parente et al., 2019).  
Despite these challenges in the past decade, the indigenous and MNE operators have 
each achieved significant growth, introduced innovative services, generated reasonable 
profits, contributed significantly to the Palestinian economy, and fostered the creation of 
new mobile phone-related businesses. For example, the indigenous operator attained a 
twofold increase in mobile subscribers from 1.5 million in 2009 to over 3 million in 2018; 




growth rate of 27% in its customer base and 17% in revenue. In 2018 the MNE launched 3G 
services in WB as part of its network modernisation strategy and declared its intention to 
invest millions of dollars in its infrastructure (Gulf Times, 2018; Reuters, 2017).  
In these circumstances, the long-term survival and development of the two 
Palestinian operators and their commitment to continuously invest in upgrading and 
innovation in such a turbulent environment indicate the importance of these two polar cases 
to the research questions addressed by this study (Patton, 2015; Yin, 2009). 
1.4 Research Objective and Questions 
This study aims to build on recent developments in entrepreneurship and institutional 
theories in order to investigate and understand how an indigenous and an MNE operator in 
the Palestinian mobile phone sector perceive and respond to uncertainties and contradictions 
in their institutional environment. 
Much of the existing entrepreneurship literature provides conflicting evidence on the 
positive or negative influences of institutional barriers and voids, and it mainly suggests that 
institutional challenges have a negative impact on a firm’s survival and growth. This study 
underscores the need for entrepreneurship research in extreme contexts to capture the 
nuances of extreme institutional challenges in relation to their effects on the firm’s survival 
as well as on the entrepreneurial processes. Therefore, the core research question is: Are 
institutional barriers and voids in extremely uncertain environments perceived as 
disincentives and/or opportunities? Based on this central research question, this study 
addresses the following main research sub-questions:  
1- What are the main institutional barriers and voids faced by Palestinian mobile phone 
operators? 
2- How do firms respond to institutional barriers and voids?  
3- What are the antecedents of entrepreneurial processes and action in an extremely 
uncertain environment at a firm-level? 
4- How are opportunities identified, developed, evaluated, and exploited within an 





1.5 Research Methodology 
This research adopted a qualitative case study approach to examine the role of 
uncertainty in entrepreneurial processes and action and understand how firms perceive and 
respond to institutional barriers and voids.  This research design was suitable for addressing 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, understanding the phenomenon of firm survival and growth in 
an extremely uncertain context from the perspective of those studied (informants), reporting 
differences in perspectives among informants and examining and articulating processes 
(Pratt, 2009). The study theoretically sampled two ‘polar, rich, deep’ cases (Dyer & Wilkins, 
1991; Patton, 2015) - comprising one indigenous firm and one MNE – that constituted the 
population of Palestinian mobile phone operators. 
The informants (senior and middle managers) were purposively selected from the 
indigenous firm and the MNE. They were qualified (highly educated and experienced) to 
report on how they perceived institutional barriers and voids, and how uncertainty affected 
their decisions regarding entrepreneurial processes and action. Thirty-one semi-structured 
Skype interviews were conducted (16 with 12 senior and middle managers in the indigenous 
firm and 15 with 11 senior and middle managers in the MNE). Thematic analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006) was used to identify, analyse and report patterns (themes) within the data. 
Within each case, the systematic approach of Gioia et al. (2012) was followed to develop 
existing theory and new concepts. Both the within-case and cross-case analysis were 
achieved and shown in matrices and tables. The details of the methodology are outlined in 
Chapter 3. 
1.6 Claimed Contributions 
This study claims to make four main contributions (detailed contributions and 
implications are discussed in Chapter 7) as follows:  
a) It enriches and complements the main argument of the IBV and institutional void 
literatures (advocating mainly the deleterious impact of institutional challenges) 
by confirming the binary effect of institutional barriers and voids – as benefits 




b) It may contribute to the IBV literature through providing a blend of three strategic 
responses, namely acceptance, adaptation, and influence, that the two firms adopt 
to navigate and shape an institutional environment. 
c) It provides an integrated framework, which incorporates the underpinnings of the 
IBV and the subjectivist view of entrepreneurship, that may portray a fuller view 
pertaining to entrepreneurial processes and action within a Palestinian uncertain 
environment. 
d) It informs and expands the current entrepreneurship literature in relation to how 
uncertainty affects entrepreneurship by confirming an ambiguous impact - as 
incentive and/or disincentive - of extreme uncertainty on both the indigenous and 
MNE operators, proposing a tentative concept of ‘uncertainty overload’ that 
needs further investigation may be through quantitative studies,  and emphasising 
the subjective effects of emotions, together with the attributes of entrepreneurs, 
on entrepreneurial processes and action. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured in seven chapters, references and appendices, as follows: 
 Chapter Two reviews the existing literature and articulates research gaps.  
 Chapter Three explains the research methodology.  
 Chapter Four presents the within-case findings.  
 Chapter Five presents the cross-case findings.  
 Chapter Six discusses the findings.  








Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This study is situated in entrepreneurship theory synthesised with institutional 
theory. It therefore provides an overview of previous research on entrepreneurship, 
entrepreneurial processes, institutions, uncertainty and entrepreneurial opportunity. The 
literature review is divided into four sections. The first presents definitions and dimensions 
of entrepreneurship, perspectives and approaches of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial 
processes, with emphasis on the subjectivist view of entrepreneurship. The second section 
discusses institutional theory, definitions and dimensions of institutions, the IBV, and 
institutions as enabling and constraining forces for entrepreneurial behaviour. Moreover, it 
reviews institutional barriers and voids in uncertain contexts within the entrepreneurship 
field and strategic responses to institutional challenges. The third section explains the 
concepts of uncertainty and risk and highlights the major differences between them. It also 
reviews the concept of entrepreneurial opportunity and its sources, the core entrepreneurial 
processes and action and its antecedents and discusses whether uncertainty creates or 
obstructs entrepreneurial opportunity. Finally, based on this review of the extant literature, 
in the fourth section, three research gaps are identified as the focus of the current study and 
the main research question is presented. 
2.2 Entrepreneurship Theory 
The entrepreneurial phenomenon is broad and has many facets. Steyaert and Hjorth 
(2003, p. 5) explained that ‘… there are many entrepreneurships in terms of focus, 
definitions, scope and paradigms’, and thus may be understood and interpreted from 
different disciplines representing a variety of research traditions, perspectives, and methods 
(Carlsson et al., 2013). Among several perspectives in the entrepreneurship literature 
describing entrepreneurial process, the subjectivist perspective on entrepreneurship views 
opportunities as being created by individuals and emerging from the subjective cognitions 
of the entrepreneur (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2010; Chiles et al., 2010). From this 
perspective, perceptions and personal knowledge are the starting points for understanding 
entrepreneurship (Foss et al., 2008). This section therefore discusses definitions and 
dimensions of entrepreneurship, perspectives and approaches of entrepreneurship, 




2.2.1 Definitions and Dimensions of Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship, as differently perceived and widely understood, is too broad to be 
confined in a single, universal classification (Alvarez & Barney, 2020; Anderson et al., 
2012). Entrepreneurship is broadly described as a ‘handy disturber of order’ (Hjorth, 2004, 
p. 417) or a ‘malleable panacea’ (Dodd & Anderson, 2001, p. 24). Steyaert and Katz (2004, 
p. 182) went further and explained that entrepreneurship as ‘a model for introducing 
innovative thinking, reorganising the established and crafting the new across a broad range 
of settings and spaces.’ Baron and Shane (2008) asserted that definitions are always tricky, 
and for a field as new as entrepreneurship, the task is even more complex. It is not surprising, 
then, that currently, there is no single agreed-upon definition of entrepreneurship either as a 
field of study in business or as activity in which people engage. Accordingly, 
entrepreneurship as a concept has multiple meanings that are both contingent and contextual 
and open to a range of definitions (Anderson et al., 2012). Table 2-1 provides selected 
definitions developed in chronological order. 
Table 2-1: A Chronological Development of Selected Definitions of Entrepreneurship 
Author(s) Definition 
Kirzner (1973, p. 19) ‘The competitive behaviours that drive the market process’ 
Gartner (1985, p. 
697) 
‘The creation of new organizations’ 
Timmons (1989, p. 1) 
 
‘The ability to create and build something from practically nothing. It is initiating, 
doing, achieving, and building an enterprise or organization, rather than just 
watching, analysing or describing one. It is the knack for sensing an opportunity 
where others see chaos, contradiction and confusion’ 
Stevenson & Jarillo 
(1990, p. 23) 
‘The process by which individuals – either on their own or inside organizations – 
pursue opportunities without regard to the resources they currently control’ 
Wennekers & Thurik 
(1999, p. 46) 
‘The manifest ability and willingness of individuals, on their own, in teams, within 
and outside existing organizations, to perceive and create new economic 
opportunities (new products, new production methods, new organizational schemes 
and new product-market combinations) and to introduce their ideas in the market, in 
the face of uncertainty and other obstacles, by making decisions on location, form 
and the use of resources and institutions’ 
Sarasvathy (1999, p. 
2) 





‘A field of business, seeks to understand how opportunities to create something new 
(e.g. new product or services, new markets, new production processes or new 
materials, new ways of organizing existing technologies) arise and are discovered or 
created by specific individuals, who then use various means to exploit or develop 
them, thus producing a wide range of effects’ 
Hisrich & Peters 
(2002, p. 10) 
 
‘The process of creating something new of value by devoting the necessary time and 
effort, assuming the accompanying financial, psychic and social risks, and receiving 
the resulting rewards of monetary and personal satisfaction and independence’ 
Davidsson (2003, p. 
47) 
 
‘The synthesis of behaviours, processes and outcomes – or the behaviours undertaken 





The definition of entrepreneurship presented by Shane and Venkataraman (2000) has 
gained widespread acceptance in the field of entrepreneurship (Baron & Shane, 2008). The 
broad definition offered by Shane and Venkataraman (2000) is applicable to the scholarly 
examination of what, by whom, and with what affects opportunities to create future goods 
and services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited. This definition denotes a wide variety 
of entrepreneurial operations and more importantly multiple levels of analysis from founder-
focused, individual and dyadic levels up to field and international environment contexts 
(Jennings et al., 2013).  
Later, McMullen and Shepherd (2006) extended the concept of entrepreneurship to 
involve two key activities (opportunity recognition and opportunity evaluation). First, 
potential entrepreneurs can use their existing knowledge and personal strategies for 
obtaining new knowledge that help them to recognise that an opportunity exists which can 
be developed either by themselves or others. Second, they evaluate this opportunity to 
Table 2-1: (Continued) 
Shane (2003, p. 4) 
 
‘An activity that involves the discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities 
to introduce new goods and services, ways of organizing markets, processes and raw 
materials through organizing efforts that previously had not existed’ 
Timmons & Spinelli 
(2004, p. 47) 
‘A way of thinking, reasoning and acting that is opportunity based, holistic in 
approach and leadership balanced … It results in the creation, enhancement, 
realisation and renewal of value not just for the owners but for all participants and 
stakeholders’ 
Ma & Tan (2006, p. 
707) 
 
‘The process in which pioneers, innovators or champions of innovation, immersed in 
and guided by the creativity-oriented perspective, engage in the practice of creation 
and innovation driven activities, which lead to a certain level of performance as 
indicated by the realized creation and innovation’ 
Lambing & Kuehl 
(2007, p. 16) 
‘A process activity. It generally involves the following inputs: an opportunity; one or 
more proactive individuals; an organizational context; risk; innovation; and 
resources. It can produce the following outcomes: a new venture or enterprise; value; 
new products or processes; profit or personal benefit; and growth’ 
Stokes et al. (2010, p. 
8) 
 
‘A societal phenomenon or process of change, comprising the following three 
behavioural components: the identification, evaluation, and exploitation of an 
opportunity; the management of a new or transformed organization so as to facilitate 
the production and consumption of new goods and services; and the creation of value 
through the successful exploitation of a new idea (i.e. innovation)’ 
Carlsson et al. (2013, 
p. 914) 
 
‘An economic function that is carried out by individuals, entrepreneurs, acting 
independently or within organizations, to perceive and create new opportunities and 
to introduce their ideas into the market, under uncertainty, by making decisions about 
location, product design, resource use, institutions, and reward systems’ 
Mishra & Zachary 
(2014, p. 5) 
 
‘The entrepreneurial process driven by entrepreneurial intention and a desire for 
entrepreneurial reward, the process that involves from identifying an entrepreneurial 
opportunity to build an entrepreneurial competence to finally appropriating the 
entrepreneurial reward’ 
Rae (2015, p. 5) ‘The ability to turn ideas into actions; the subject of enterprise and entrepreneurs, 
encompassing both practical and conceptual knowledge, skills and techniques used 
in being an entrepreneur’ 




determine whether potential entrepreneurs have the knowledge and skills needed to actually 
develop it.  
Another widely cited definition of entrepreneurship concerns new firm and 
organisation formation (Klyver et al., 2008; Reynolds, 2009; Spencer et al., 2008). However, 
Shane (2012) emphasised that the entrepreneurial processes of opportunity identification, 
evaluation and exploitation may not only occur through firm formation but also can be 
undertaken by people in established firms and/or through market mechanisms (also c.f. 
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). This explanation is relevant to ‘corporate entrepreneurship’, 
which is discussed in 2.2.3.   
In sum, Shane (2012, p. 13) stated that ‘I believe the appropriate way to define 
entrepreneurship is to incorporate everything that shares the dimensions researchers consider 
unique to the field and to exclude everything that does not share these common dimensions.’ 
The current study therefore adopts the definitions offered by Shane and Venkataraman 
(2000) and Shane (2003) while taking into consideration the clarifications of McMullen and 
Shepherd (2006), as this study needs a definition that is not restricted to new firm foundation. 
2.2.2 Perspectives and Approaches of Entrepreneurship Theory 
Scholars (e.g. Blundel & Lockett, 2011; Fayolle, 2007; Nielson et al., 2012; 
Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990) investigated the entrepreneurial phenomenon from multiple 
disciplinary perspectives and approaches, and this plethora of studies on entrepreneurship 
led to it being categorised differently. Apart from these different classifications, there are 
four dominant perspectives on entrepreneurship (Cope, 2005; Fayolle, 2007; Stevenson & 
Sahlman, 1989; Stokes et al., 2010), as follows: 
1- The functional/economic perspective: The main objective here was to define the 
‘entrepreneurial function’ (Casson, 1982), which one might think of as including 
activities (behaviours) and characteristics of entrepreneurship. This perspective 
seeks to understand what the entrepreneur actually does (Stokes et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, Landstrom (1998) identified four fundamental roles that the 
entrepreneur can play in the economic system: ‘risk-taker/risk-manager’ (Cantillon, 
1730; Knight, 1921), ‘innovator’ (Schumpeter, 1934, 1943), ‘alert seeker of 
opportunities’ (Hayek, 1937, 1945; Kirzner, 1973), and ‘coordinator of limited 




entrepreneurship research (Blundel & Lockett, 2011). First, a more theoretical and 
inward-looking strand tries to specify the function of the entrepreneurial actor within 
conventional economic frameworks. Second, a more policy-oriented and outward-
looking strand examines the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and 
achieving greater economic growth. 
2- The personality/individual-based perspective: The focus recently shifted to the 
entrepreneur, with research aimed at identifying so-called ‘entrepreneurial traits’ 
(Stokes et al., 2010). This perspective aims at a better understanding of the 
entrepreneur’s psychological and social background, personality traits, motivations 
and behaviours (Fayolle, 2007). This trait-based perspective is regularly subject to 
heavy criticism (Fayolle, 2007; Stokes et al., 2010). Much of this criticism has 
focused on the static nature of this perspective to understanding entrepreneurs, giving 
little or no room for the individuals concerned to develop, learn and change as they 
undertake their entrepreneurial activities (Stokes et al., 2010). This realisation is 
gradually gaining currency and causing researchers to refocus on entrepreneurial 
processes (Fayolle, 2007).  
3- The behavioural/process-based perspective: The emergence of this research 
perspective is partly a response to the criticism raised above (Stokes et al., 2010). It 
is also linked to the increasingly widespread recognition of a great variety of 
entrepreneurial situations and a different new venture creation (Fayolle, 2007). This 
perspective focuses on what entrepreneurs do, rather than on who they are (Gartner, 
1988). The primary objective of this perspective is, then, to explain ‘the functions, 
activities, and actions associated with the perceiving of opportunities and the creation 
of organizations to pursue them’ (Bygrave & Hofer, 1991, p. 14). Entrepreneurship 
researchers decided to focus on the process primarily because it enabled them to 
overcome the limitations of previous visions, which were narrow and limited, centred 
on one single facet, one human trait or economic function, whereas this complex 
phenomenon should be considered as a whole (Fayolle, 2007). 
4- The dynamic learning perspective: While the behavioural perspective has the 
advantage of joining up entrepreneurial behaviours with influences from the 
environment, there remain concerns that this perspective fails to take into account 
the ability of entrepreneurs to learn and adapt once the business is established (Cope, 
2005). Gartner (1988) recognised that entrepreneurship involves a process of 




organisation creation. Reuber and Fischer (1999, p. 33) also emphasised that 
‘founders continue to learn, and ... studying the venture’s stream of experience can 
provide a better understanding of this learning process’. Therefore, this perspective 
goes beyond the start-up phase to consider the complex ways in which entrepreneurs 
learn to adapt as their enterprises grow. This perspective has important implications 
for the role of entrepreneurship particularly in established and larger firms (Stokes et 
al., 2010). 
In short, each perspective introduces some contributions to our understanding of 
entrepreneurship. It is also important to acknowledge that many of the most interesting 
studies of recent years have been multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary. There are many 
overlaps and ‘grey areas’ within and between disciplines, contributing to occasional 
intellectual disputes concerning issues such as the most appropriate methods, theoretical 
frameworks and terminology in use (Blundel & Lockett, 2011). Entrepreneurship is a 
dynamic process centred on the emergence and pursuit of opportunities (McMullen & 
Dimov, 2013). Therefore, entrepreneurship unfolds as enterprising individuals move 
through distinct ‘phases’ of opportunity identification, development, evaluation and 
exploitation (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Many activities 
associated with opportunity pursuit, judgements and decisions have been documented as 
fundamental to the process (Grégoire et al., 2011; Wood & McKelvie, 2015). This 
understanding of entrepreneurship highlights the cognitive and future-focused nature of 
opportunity-related process as well as the personality characteristics of entrepreneur. 
Integrating insights from both the personality/individual-based and the behavioural/process-
based perspectives in this study may advance our understanding of the dynamic of 
opportunity-related process (i.e. aspects of functions, activities and actions associated with 
entrepreneurial opportunity as well as the personality and the psychology of the 
entrepreneur).  
2.2.3 Entrepreneurial Process 
Entrepreneurship can be broadly understood as ‘a process that can take place in 
various environments and in various configurations’ (Fayolle, 2007, p. 5). More specifically, 
given that the current study is set in two established firms, Sharma and Chrisman (1999, p. 
18) also conceptualised corporate entrepreneurship as ‘the process whereby an individual or 




organization or instigates renewal or innovation within that organization.’ In other words, 
corporate entrepreneurship often highlights a vision-directed behaviour that purposefully 
and continuously rejuvenates a firm and reshapes the scope of its operations through the 
identification and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities (Ireland et al., 2009).     
The standpoint here that entrepreneurship is a process rather than a single event is 
definitely not new or unique. On the other hand, there is a growing consensus in considering 
entrepreneurship as process which grows over time and which moves through distinct but 
closely interrelated phases (Baron & Shane, 2008). The entrepreneurial processes will be 
discussed in detail in Section 2.4.4. 
2.2.4 The Subjectivist View of Entrepreneurship 
The subjectivist view of entrepreneurship focuses on the interrelationships among 
persons, knowledge, and perceived economic opportunities (Mahoney & Michael, 2005). It 
deals constructively with both individual creativity, surprise and learning in the process of 
opportunity discovery and the non-deterministic nature of dynamic capabilities and 
entrepreneurial activities (Kor et al., 2007; Mahoney & Michael, 2005). This view is built 
on the fact that individuals who hold different preferences, knowledge, and expectations 
have different subjective perceptions (An et al., 2017; Boettke, 2002; Mahoney & Michael, 
2005; Penrose, 1959).  
The subjective perceptions and personal knowledge of entrepreneurs shape their own 
visions about the possible uses of a specific resource (Kor, 2003), as well as different 
combinations of resources (Penrose, 1959) and the business opportunities resulting from 
such resources and combinations (Chiles et al., 2010). The entrepreneur also actively creates 
and recreates the social world through actions and interactions, which are necessary and 
functional because of uncertainty in environmental conditions (Lachmann, 1976; Shackle, 
1979). From this perceptive, entrepreneurs are considered formulators of mental images or 
mental constructs in the process of conceiving new opportunities and they not only respond 
to changes in the business environment, but also create change (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; 
Bechky, 2011; Goel & Karri, 2020). In other words, individuals vary in their capacity to deal 
with or control the institutional environment they face (Voronov & Yorks, 2015). 
Beyond individuals, the subjectivist view of entrepreneurship also conceives 




and personal knowledge interact to create a collective perception and configure resources to 
produce a collective output (Foss et al., 2008; Kor, 2003). The heterogeneity of perceptions 
and personal knowledge (e.g. experience, skills, capabilities) in entrepreneurial teams may 
increase task-related diversity and boost the likelihood of entrepreneurial success (Foss et 
al., 2008).  
Finally, both opportunities and individuals (or firms) are embedded in an institutional 
environment (Goel & Karri, 2020; Jack & Anderson, 2002; Williams & Wood, 2015). 
Entrepreneurs thus represent actors who create opportunities through expectations of an 
imagined future (Chiles et al., 2007), and/or innovative manipulation and configuration of 
institutions (Brinkerink & Rondi, 2020), and exploit opportunities through continuous 
resource combination and recombination (Chiles et al., 2007). The institutional environment 
in which firms operate may have an important impact on entrepreneurial opportunities and 
processes (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Barney et al., 2001), the strategies they pursue (Oliver, 
1997) and resources allocation (Peng, 2001). Accordingly, it is important to understand the 
wider institutional context and the institutional characteristics that may determine the nature 
of entrepreneurial processes and action (Zahra & Wright, 2011). This study therefore 
considers, and focuses on, the institutional environment and its impact on entrepreneurship, 
discussed in detail below.  
2.3 Institutional Theory and Institutional Challenges 
Institutional theory has gained momentum in entrepreneurship research. Many recent 
studies (e.g. Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2019; Bjerregaard & Lauring, 2012; Bruton et al., 
2008; Desa, 2011; Hörisch et al., 2017; Liedong et al., 2020; Myer & Thein, 2014; Parente 
et al., 2019) have documented the importance of institutions for entrepreneurial activity. This 
seems to be particularly true in emerging economies where the institutional framework is 
often weak, ambiguous and turbulent, generating major uncertainties for firms (Ahlstrom & 
Bruton, 2010; Puffer et al., 2009; Tran, 2019; Welter & Smallbone, 2011). 
Institutions can be generally defined as formal and informal constraints [and 
incentives] devised by humans that structure social, political and economic interaction 
(North, 1990). Such institutions may significantly influence the nature, pace of development 
and extent of entrepreneurship as well as the way entrepreneurs behave (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 




Hoppmann & Vermeer, 2020; Welter & Smallbone, 2011). However, definitions of 
institutions are problematic and more nuanced definitions will be considered later.  
Regarding the impact of institutions on entrepreneurship, a dominant view in the 
entrepreneurship literature emphasised that a well-functioning institutional environment 
facilitates entrepreneurship and provides individuals with entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Bylund & McCaffery, 2017; Estrin et al., 2013), but weak institutions featuring institutional 
barriers and voids prevent opportunities and set boundaries for entrepreneurial action (Aidis, 
2005; Banalieva et al., 2015; Bruton et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2017; Luthans & Ibrayeva, 2006; 
Manolova et al., 2008; Oliveria et al., 2018; Skiti, 2020; Welter & Smallbone, 2011). 
Nonetheless, another strand of research (e.g. Doh et al., 2017; Henrekson & Sanandaji, 2011; 
Moulick et al., 2019; Shepherd et al., 2007; Smallbone & Welter, 2008; Sydow et al., 2020; 
Tracey & Phillips, 2011) acknowledged that a challenging business environment may create 
distinctive opportunities for firms.  
The next section discusses institutional theory, definitions and dimensions of 
institutions, the IBV, and institutions as enabling and constraining forces for entrepreneurial 
behaviour. Moreover, it reviews institutional barriers and voids in uncertain contexts within 
the entrepreneurship field. Finally, this section presents some strategic responses to 
institutional challenges. 
2.3.1 Institutions and the Entrepreneurial Environment  
The terms ‘institutions’ or ‘institutional environment’ have different meanings and 
dimensions within the institutional literature. Scott (1995, p. 235) commented that ‘there is 
no single and universally agreed definition of an “institution” in the institutional school of 
thought’. This may be attributed to the major differences between the two main streams of 
research: institutional economics and socio-psychological/institutional sociology. The 
institutional economics stream focuses exclusively on the ‘rules of the game’ that define and 
limit the set of choices and preferences of individuals (North, 1990, 1991; Williamson, 
1975). However, the sociology stream typically examines informal institutions and questions 
whether ‘... individual choices and preferences can be understood apart from a cultural 
framework in which they are embedded’ (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 10). Nevertheless, 
institutional theorists in other research domains such as industrial organisation, 




of formal and informal institutions (Carney et al., 2009; North, 2005). The consideration of 
each of these streams of research (i.e. economic and sociological) results in the recently 
articulated IBV proposed by Peng et al. (2008, 2009) and Meyer and Peng (2016). The 
current study derives theoretical inspiration from the IBV and it will be reviewed in detail 
in the next section. Table 2-2 shows selected definitions of institutions developed in 
chronological order.  
Table 2-2: A Chronological Development of Selected Definitions of Institutions or Institutional 
Environment 
Author(s) Definition 
Veblen (1914, p. 49) 
Veblen (1919, p. 191) 
‘Institutions are settled habits of thought common to the generality of individuals 
which include usage, customs, canons of conduct, principles of right and propriety’ 
Giddens (1984, p. 24) ‘Institutions are the more enduring features of social life ... giving ‘solidarity’ to 
social system across time and space’ 
North (1986, p. 231) ‘Institutions are regularities in repetitive interactions ... rules that provide a set of 
incentive and disincentives for individuals’ 
Neale (1987, p. 1186) ‘Institutions are a way of thought or action of some prevalence or permanence, 
embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people (Hamilton, 1932), and 
mental constructs, common rules governing sets of activities’ 
Meyer et al. (1987, p. 
10) 
‘Institutions as cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to particular 
entities and activities, integrating them into the larger schemes’ 
North (1989, p. 1321) ‘Institutions are rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behaviour 
that structure repeated human interaction’ 
North (1990, p. 3) ‘Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction’ 
Ostrom (1990, p. 51) ‘Institutions can be defined as the sets of working rules that are used to determine 
who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what decisions are allowed or 
constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be 
followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be 
assigned to individuals dependent on their action’ 
Friedland & Alford 
(1991, p. 232) 
‘Institutions as both supra-organisational patterns of activity through which humans 
conduct their material life in time and space, and symbolic systems through which 
they categorise that activity and infuse it with meaning’ 
Jepperson (1991, p. 
145) 
‘Institution represents a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or 
property’ 
Scott & Meyer (1991, 
p. 123) 
‘Institutional environments are those characterized by the elaboration of rules and 
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive 
support and legitimacy from the environment’  
Powell & DiMaggio 
(1991, p. 8) 
‘Institutions are the products of human design, the outcomes of purposive actions 
by instrumentally oriented individuals’, but neo-institutionalism in organisation 
theory stated that ‘institutions are certainly the result of human activity; they are not 
necessarily the products of conscious design’ 
North (1991, p. 97) ‘Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic 
and social interaction’ 
Scott & Meyer (1994, 
p. 68) 
‘Institutions are symbolic and behavioural systems containing representational, 
constitutive, and normative rules together with regulatory mechanisms that define 
a system and give rise to distinctive actors and action routine’ 
Scott (1995, p. 33) ‘Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by 
various carriers - cultures, structures, and routines - and they operate at multiple 




Table 2-2: (Continued) 
Scott (2008, p. 48) ‘Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements 
that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning 
to social life’ 
Jennings et al. (2013, 
p. 2) 
‘Institutions are the routinized, taken for granted sets of ideas, beliefs and actions 
used in society, which includes both formal and informal institutions, and macro 
and micro institutional patterns’ 
Furusten (2013, p. 12) ‘Institutional environment is a label for the legal, social and mental structures that 
individual organizations are embedded in’ 
Stephan et al. (2015, 
p. 309) 
‘Institutions refer to deep aspects of social structure, which act as authoritative 
guidelines and constraints for behavior (North, 1991, 2005; Scott, 2005). 
Institutions are taken-for-granted rules that can be explicit and consciously 
perceived by individuals, or can act as implicit guidelines for individuals’ actions 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991)’ 
Hörisch et al. (2017, 
p. 48) 
‘Institutions are ‘deep aspects of social structures which can take the form of 
authoritative guidelines’ (North 1991; Stephan et al. 2015) or of rather implicit 
‘values, norms, rules, beliefs, and taken-for-granted assumptions’ (Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997: 93)’ 
Source: Author  
Given the definitions of institutions in the extant literature, institutions operate at 
various levels, from the world system to localised interpersonal relationships (Scott, 2008, 
p. 48). They also impose restrictions by defining legal, moral and cultural boundaries, 
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate activities (Scott, 2008, p. 50), but they also enable 
behaviour. The existence of rules implies constraints; however, such constraints can open 
up possibilities, choices and actions that otherwise would not exist (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2). 
Therefore, institutions are related to rules, norms and habits, which control social, political 
and economic interactions, and provide stability and meaning to social life.  
North (1990) and Welter (2010) proposed that institutional context draws on the 
concept of formal and informal institutions as ‘rules of the game’. Formal institutions are a 
tangible, political, legal and economic–related framework, bureaucratic and administrative 
procedures, and rules and regulations (North, 1990). They are erected mainly by the 
government to regulate the individual and organisational actions and create or restrict 
opportunity for entrepreneurship (Bruton et al., 2010; Dheer, 2017; Scott, 2008; Welter, 
2010). On the other hand, informal institutions refer to intangible, slowly changing, 
culturally transmitted and socially-constructed institutions such as norms, attitudes, values, 
and codes of behaviour and conventions (Hörisch et al., 2017; Stephan et al., 2015). Informal 
institutions also influence opportunity recognition by (potential) entrepreneurs as well as 
opportunity exploitation and access to resources (Welter, 2010). This classification of 
institutions could be seen as a bridge between the economist’s and the socio-psychologist’s 




despite their conceptual distinctiveness (i.e. formal and informal institutions), these elements 
operate in conjunction with each other (Crnogaj & Hojnik, 2016; Dheer, 2017; North, 1991; 
Williamson, 2000). 
Scott (2008, 1995) went further and differentiated two types of informal institutions, 
namely normative and cultural-cognitive, arguably corresponding to the concepts of cultural 
values and practices in cross-cultural research (Javidan et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2015). 
He then categorised formal and informal institutions more finely into three institutional 
pillars: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. With particular reference to the 
entrepreneurship literature, the following explanations may broaden our understanding of 
these pillars:  
1- The regulative dimension consists of laws, regulations and government policies that 
provide support for new businesses, reduce risks and uncertainty, and facilitate 
entrepreneurs’ efforts to acquire resources and exploit opportunities (Busenitz et al., 
2000; Urbano & Alvarez, 2014). Government intervention can therefore either 
promote and/or inhibit entrepreneurial action (Urbano & Alvarez, 2014). 
2- The normative dimension measures the degree to which a country’s residents admire 
entrepreneurial activity and value creative and innovative thinking (Busenitz et al., 
2000; Dana, 1987; Urbano & Alvarez, 2014). Societal feelings toward 
entrepreneurial activities are critical to entrepreneurship. In order for an individual 
to act upon an entrepreneurial opportunity, the entrepreneur must feel supported to 
engage in entrepreneurial activity (Valdez & Richardson, 2013; Wennekers et al., 
2002). 
3- The cultural-cognitive dimension consists of the knowledge and skills possessed by 
potential entrepreneurs in a country that affect their engagement in entrepreneurial 
action (Busenitz et al., 2000; Urbano & Alvarez, 2014). The subjective perceptions 
and beliefs of individuals also have a significant influence on entrepreneurial activity 
(Arenius & Minniti, 2005). For example, perceptions of knowledge and skills have 
an impact on opportunity recognition and exploitation (Kirzner, 1973; Shane, 2003). 
While terms and labels may ostensibly differ, Peng et al. (2009) noted that North’s 
classification of institutions are complementary to Scott’s categorisation of the three 
supportive pillars (see Figure 2-1). To identify institutions which are important in the context 




(1990) into formal and informal institutions. In fact, whatever the classification of 
institutional factors, these institutional factors can be incentives to act entrepreneurially 
(Baumol et al., 2009; Hoogendoorn et al., 2019) and/or barriers and challenges that hamper 
entrepreneurial process (Hoogendoorn et al., 2019; Soto, 2000). 
Figure 2-1: Dimensions of Institutions 





Formal Institutions Law, regulations, rules Regulative 
Informal Institutions Norms, culture, ethics Normative and Cultural-
Cognitive 
Source: Peng (2016, p. 37); Peng et al. (2009, p. 64) 
2.3.2 The Institution-Based View 
Starting with the proposition that ‘institutions matter’, the IBV has emerged to 
become a leading theoretical perspective in the strategy literature (Meyer & Peng, 2016). 
The IBV brings together several distinct lines of research (institutional economics and 
institutional sociology) with a shared interest in the interaction between economic actors and 
institutional environments at different levels of analysis (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Peng 
et al. 2008).  It was first developed in relation to emerging economies (Peng et al., 2008) 
because of dissatisfaction with using just firm-level (from the Resource-Based View), and 
industry-level variables (from Corporate Strategy) in explaining firm strategies and 
ultimately performance. These variables were described as a ‘strategy tripod’ (Peng et al., 
2008, p. 920) with institutions providing the third leg. 
Scholars of the IBV have argued that institutional conditions to a large degree 
determine which strategic choices are most feasible and effective, and ultimately, most likely 
to lead to business success and survival (Oliver, 1997; Peng et al., 2009). The IBV suggests 
that firms continuously adapt their routines to the institutional framework through ‘an 
endogenous, experience-based process’ (Knudsen, 1995, p. 203). It further conceives 
strategic choices as the result of the mutual interaction between organisations and the formal 
and informal institutional environment (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Peng, 2002; Yiu et al., 
2014).  
The recognition of the relevance of institutions for entrepreneurship (Brinkerink & 
Rondi, 2020; Lee et al., 2011; Makhmadshoev et al., 2015; Sadeghi et al., 2019) is important, 




The key premise of IBV is that institutions set the context and the boundaries for doing 
business (North, 1990). As a result, institutional environments of countries can create 
conditions that either facilitate or hinder the economic behaviour firms (Sadeghi et al., 2019; 
Meyer, 2001). Accordingly, the next section discusses how institutions act as enabling 
and/or constraining forces for entrepreneurial behaviour. 
2.3.3 The Influence of Institutions on Entrepreneurial Activity 
The influence of institutions on entrepreneurship has served as a focus for significant 
research (Webb et al., 2020). The quality of the institutional environment may influence an 
entrepreneur’s attitudes, motives and the ability to mobilise resources (Reynolds, 2010; 
Schoar, 2010), and a firm’s entry, survival and growth (Tran, 2019). When there is greater 
stability and efficacy of formal institutions (Clemens & Cook, 1999), these institutions are 
better equipped to support entrepreneurial activity (Bosma et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2010; 
Jennings et al., 2013). Alongside formal institutions, informal ones reflect whether a society 
tolerates and accepts entrepreneurship, which in turn influences entrepreneurial responses 
(Thornton et al., 2011). It seems plausible that together the formal and informal institutions 
shape the ‘rules of the game’, which in turn affect whether or not individuals/firms decide 
to pursue entrepreneurial activity (Aidis et al., 2008; Belitski et al., 2016; Gomez-Haro et 
al., 2011; Hoppmann & Vermeer, 2020; Stenholm et al., 2013; Welter & Smallbone, 2011; 
Williams & Vorley, 2015) and the quality of entrepreneurship (Chowdhury et al., 2019; 
McMullen et al., 2008).  
Extant empirical research (e.g.  Aidis et al., 2008; Alvi et al., 2019; Gao et al., 2017; 
Khoury & Prasad, 2016; Puffer et al., 2009; Tonoyan et al., 2010; Williams & Vorley, 2015) 
has suggested that institutions in emerging economies may impose formal institutional 
challenges on firms, increasing uncertainty as well as the operating and transactions costs of 
firms. However, emerging economies are often characterised by informal institutions which 
have substituted rather than complemented changes in the formal institutional environment 
(Estrin & Prevezer, 2011; Guseva, 2007; Puffer et al., 2010). Entrepreneurial activity is also 
typically guided and governed by informal ‘codes of conduct’ within environments featuring 
highly uncertain outcomes and weak formal institutions (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2002; Mair et 




A long-standing assumption is that ‘a functional business environment provides 
positive incentives for entrepreneurs while a weak one is likely to be deleterious’ (Estrin et 
al., 2013, p. 566). Several studies (e.g. Banalieva et al., 2015; Bylund & McCaffery, 2017; 
Ge et al., 2019) caution that weak or absent institutions may hinder entrepreneurship to the 
point that, when entrepreneurs face formal and informal constraints at the same time, they 
may be expected to abandon growth goals and focus more on survival (Webb et al., 2020). 
Nonetheless, recent empirical studies (e.g. Moulick et al., 2019; Su et al., 2016; Sydow et 
al., 2020; Welter & Smallbone, 2011; Zhou, 2013, 2017), especially those on emerging 
economies, have found that even with deficient formal institutions many economies have 
high levels of entrepreneurial activity and investment. The next section discusses in detail 
these institutional deficiencies and challenges in terms of institutional barriers and voids. 
2.3.4 Institutional Barriers and Voids 
In the entrepreneurship literature, barriers are commonly defined as those factors or 
conditions that constrain entrepreneurial behaviour (Kouriloff, 2000) or the antecedents of 
these obstructions (Krueger & Brazeal, 1994). Chang and Wu (2014, p. 1104) defined 
institutional barriers as ‘… the hindrance in the institutional environment that prevent the 
market selection mechanism from functioning properly’. Institutional barriers can result 
from inadequate institutional infrastructure, such as poorly specified property rights and 
contract laws (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Nee, 1992). They can also be a result of 
institutional voids such as underdeveloped labour and capital markets (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997) or institutional susceptibility/obstacles such as excessive regulatory requirements and 
requests for bribery (Luo & Junkunc, 2008; Tybout, 2000). In fact, weak property rights 
generate uncertainty that makes long-term investment risky and destroys the ‘transactional 
trust’ that is essential to entrepreneurship (Fogel et al., 2008). Ambiguous and redundant 
amounts of legislation also increase transaction costs and decrease operating efficiency. 
Cumbersome regulation and excessive government intervention raise the threat of arbitrary 
expropriation and generate additional costs of new business operations (Estrin et al., 2013). 
This study focuses on institutional barriers and voids in relation to opportunity. 
Institutional barriers vary greatly from region to region and from time to time, even within 
the same country (Chang & Wu, 2014). However, several distinctive institutional barriers 
and challenges faced by entrepreneurs and firms operating in emerging economies can be 




to provide illustrative examples of institutional barriers. The current study adopts the broad 
classification of Peng (2000) for institutional barriers into formal and informal institutional 
constraints. 
Table 2-3: A Summary of Institutional Barriers in Selected Entrepreneurship Studies 
Author(s) Institutional Barriers 
Peng (2000) Formal institutional constraints such as a lack of credible legal frameworks, lack 
of stable political structures and of strategic factor markets; and Informal 
institutional constraints such as the prominence of deeply embedded networks 
and personalised exchanges.  
Robinson & 
McDougall (2001); 
Lutz et al. (2010) 
Economies of scale, capital requirements, product differentiation, access to 
distribution channels, government rules and regulations, research and development, 
and advertising. 
Mambula (2002); 
Cavusgil et al. (2002) 
Lack of financing, poor infrastructure (e.g. roads, telecommunications, sanitation 
and power), difficulty getting machines and spare parts, difficulty getting raw 
materials, high levels of corruption, and government policies and attitudes of public 
officials, especially the harsh economic policy. 
Aidis (2005) Formal barriers (e.g. high level of taxes, frequent changes to tax policies, 
ambiguity of tax policies, business legislation, general regulatory environment); 
Informal barriers (e.g. implementation of business regulations, too many tax 
inspections, national governmental corruption, regional governmental corruption, 
unfair competition from the large informal economy, time spent negotiating with 
local officials and inspectors, tax inspector corruption, Mafia, racketeering); 
Environmental barriers (e.g. low purchasing power, lack of funds for business 
investment, competition from illegal businesses, lack of information, competition 
from legal businesses, lack of qualified workers, late payment by client);  
Skill-based barriers (e.g. lack of business-related skill development, inability to 
grow into new markets, management problems). 
Robson & Obeng 
(2008) 
Financial (e.g. inadequate access to debt finance, inadequate access to equity 
finance, interest rates too high, do not have collateral to secure bank loan, difficult 
to meet lean criteria, inadequate family finance); Market (e.g. inadequate demand, 
too many competing firms, competition from imported goods, high advertising 
costs, inadequate market research); Managerial or technical know-how (e.g. 
shortage of skilled labour, high wages for skilled labour, access to new technology, 
inadequate financial skills, inadequate management  skills, inadequate marketing  
skills, inadequate technical skills); Input (e.g. high cost of local raw materials, high 
cost of imported raw materials, outmoded equipment, high cost of replacing old 
equipment, difficulty in finding appropriate equipment, poor quality of local raw 
materials, poor quality of imported raw materials); Economic or regulatory (e.g. 
high rate of inflation, high depreciation of the currency, high tax and import duties, 
registration/licensing/red tape, corruption); Infrastructure (e.g. high cost of utility 
charges, lack of industrial sites, high transport costs, low quality of electricity/ water 
supply, poor telecommunication networks); and Socio-cultural (e.g. use of 
business resources to support family). 
Doern & Goss (2011) Formal barriers (e.g. lack of access to capital, too much bureaucracy, high 
competition, low skilled labour); and Social barriers (e.g. social exclusion, acts of 
discrimination, corrupt practices relating to entry or growth, conflicts of 
interpersonal relationships). 
Rahman et al. (2017) Economic barriers such as political instability, legal procedural barriers, lack of 
express service, inadequate legal supports and corruption; and Social barriers 
which includes different languages, different social approaches, different socio-
cultural traits, verbal and non-verbal language differences, different habits and 





Table 2-3: (Continued) 
D’Este et al. (2012) 
 
Revealed barriers reflect the degree of difficulty of the innovation process and the 
learning experience consequent on the firm engaging in innovation activity (i.e. 
increases consciousness and knowledge of the factors constraining innovation 
through the ‘disclosing’ or ‘learning’ outcome of direct experience), although it 
does not prevent them from engaging in innovation activities or being successful 
innovators; and Deterring barriers encompass the obstacles that prevent firms 
from committing to innovation (i.e. it is related to the perception of the impediments 
to innovation by firms that otherwise would be keen to engage in this activity. 
Firms’ engagement in innovation activities is therefore significantly reduced or 
discouraged by the presence of obstacles). 
Hulbert et al. (2013) Limited access to finance, lack of experience, shortage of skill, competition, 
inability to use advanced technology, improper record keeping and lack of 
knowledge. 
Source: Author 
It has been argued that without supporting institutions, entrepreneurship can be 
unproductive or even destructive, thereby impairing economic performance and growth 
(Baumol, 1990; Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017). A notable characteristic of emerging 
economies for entrepreneurs is that the institutional structures which underpin them are often 
rapidly changing, unstable, underdeveloped, malfunctioning and deficient (Puffer et al., 
2009; Smallbone & Welter, 2012; Tracey & Phillips, 2011). The profound nature of these 
barriers and challenges suggests that the outcomes of entrepreneurship in emerging 
economies are often highly uncertain (Douhan & Henrekson, 2010; Tracey & Phillips, 2011; 
Zahra, 1993). In part, this is because ‘… rapid and often hostile ... political, economic and 
social changes ... are placing unprecedented demands on entrepreneurial functioning’ 
(Luthans & Ibrayeva, 2006, p. 93–94) in emerging economies. In such environments, 
entrepreneurs/firms have to deal with high volatility, risk and uncertainty that have 
significant impacts on their behaviour (Ge et al., 2017; Peng, 2003; Peng & Heath, 1996).  
In developed economies, a range of specialised intermediaries provides the necessary 
information and contract enforcement needed to complete transactions. In contrast, emerging 
markets are characterised by situations where institutional arrangements that support 
markets are either absent, weak or fail to accomplish the role expected of them (Easterly, 
2006; Mair & Marti, 2009). They also suffer from structural impediments such as unreliable 
formal institutions and widespread ‘market imperfections, inadequate information flows, 
and fragile legal and financial framework’ (Ge et al., 2019, p. 3). These situations often 
generate great uncertainty and create ‘institutional voids’ (Doh et al., 2017; Khanna & 
Palepu, 2010; Narooz & Child, 2017; Puffer et al., 2009; Webb et al., 2020), which refer to 
‘… the absence of specialized intermediaries, regulatory systems, and contract-enforcing 




refer to ‘the lacunae created by the absence of such market intermediaries’ (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2010, p. 14). Later, absent or ill-enforced formal institutions were conceptualised by 
Webb et al. (2020) as formal institutional voids. 
In addition to formal institutional voids, Webb et al. (2020, p. 505) defined ‘informal 
institutional voids’ as ‘the inability of norms, values, and beliefs and their localized 
representations to facilitate stable, efficient, and effective transactions and enterprise 
processes that contribute to the development of productive markets’. This conceptualisation 
of informal institutional voids does not suggest an inherent lack of a society’s norms, values, 
and beliefs. Instead, it refers to settings in which there is a lack, suppression, or limited 
manifestation of the specific informal institutions that can support efficient and effective 
market transactions at a level that fosters developmental progress (Webb et al., 2020). 
These voids may indeed prevent an efficient functioning of markets, increase the 
probability of instability and unrest, generate higher transaction costs and uncertainty, and 
impose more constraints and operating challenges on firms (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). They 
also increase the likelihood of opportunism (including corruption), generate excessive rents 
and grant market power for a few actors (Doh et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2017). 
Institutional barriers and voids - whether in the form of missing or malfunctioning 
institutions and either formal or informal - can be the root cause underlying inefficient 
market transactions and a lack of growth (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Krasniqi & Desai, 2016; 
Sutter et al., 2013). Nevertheless, they may also offer opportunities and competitive 
advantage to those firms that have the skills and resources to address them (Doh et al., 2017; 
Sydow et al., 2020). Some firms perceive these deficiencies differently and employ different 
institutional arrangements and strategic responses to deal with them (Bjerregaard & Lauring, 
2012; Cao & Shi, 2020; Ge et al., 2019; Mair & Marti, 2009; Sutter et al., 2013).  
Recent research in management continues to uncritically deploy the notion of 
institutional voids and promote imitation of Western market and corporate governance 
institutions (Bothello et al., 2019). However, I believe in ‘relativist conception’ of 
institutional voids and support Bothello et al. (2019) in criticising the idealisation of Western 
systems, a narrow view of institutional voids and their broad application to non-western 
countries. It is argued that even Western countries may have institutional voids and 
alternative orders may have value insofar as they can support the emergence of a market 




oriented institutional arrangements as not an ideal end-state, but as one possible permutation 
of a broad array of institutional building blocks. The next section presents and discusses 
some strategic responses to institutional barriers and voids. 
2.3.5 Strategic Responses to Institutional Challenges 
Considering that the influence of institutional barriers and voids are highly salient 
for market exchanges, business transactions, and business success and growth, it could be 
worthwhile to consider how firms respond to them according to the IBV. Extant studies 
mainly build on Oliver’s (1991) early typology of five generic strategic responses to 
institutional challenges, i.e. to acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate. 
Accordingly, researchers have identified some strategies to deal with institutional challenges 
(see Table 2-4). In a review paper, Marquis and Raynald (2015) referred to these tactics and 
actions as ‘institutional strategies’, which are defined as ‘the comprehensive set of plans and 
actions directed at leveraging and shaping socio-political and cultural institutions to obtain 
or retain competitive advantage’ (p. 291). 
The five strategic responses in Table 2-4 based on Oliver (1991) represent a 
sequential escalation of firms’ efforts in coping and/or dealing with prevailing institutional 
conditions. As institutions are multifaceted and dynamic (Scott, 2008), firms may deploy a 
mix of institutional strategies in any one context (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017). Therefore, 
exploring these strategic responses to institutional barriers and voids is important because it 
provides a clearer understanding of impediments to entrepreneurial activity in uncertain 
markets. It also provides insights which may lead to helpful policies in such environments 
to address institutional challenges that face entrepreneurs/firms. Firms may respond 
differently, designing more active and dynamic strategies to navigate and/or thrive on, 
institutional pressures. In other words, they may not simply take environmental conditions 
as a given, but rather may look to alter aspects of institutions in creating their response 
(Sutter et al., 2013). This understanding corresponds with the IBV by assuming that 
individuals, especially entrepreneurs, are not only influenced by prevailing institutions but 
they may themselves also influence (both intentionally and unintentionally) institutional 






Table 2-4: Summary of Strategic Responses to Institutional Challenges 
Firm’s intentions 
towards institutions 
Responses (Oliver, 1991) Strategies 
Accept 
No intention to 
manipulate or change 
institutional norms but 
take them for granted. 
 
Acquiescence: adhering 
to institutional norms. It 
may take alternative 
forms: habit, imitation, 
and compliance. 
 Adapt business models to comply (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2010; Sutter et al., 2013; Welter & 
Smallbone, 2011) 
 Abiding (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017) 
 Internalisation of activities (Doh et al., 2017; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000; Kim & Song, 
2017) 
 Bricolage (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Desa, 2011; 
Phillips & Tracey 2007) 
 Prospecting (Welter & Smallbone, 2011) 
 Financial bootstrapping (Welter & Smallbone, 
2011) 
 Hybridisation of goals (Sydow et al., 2020) 
Compromise: negotiating 




and internal organisational 
objectives related to 
efficiency or autonomy. 
Firms may attempt to 
balance, pacify, or bargain 
with external constituents. 
 Spanning institutional voids (Jayanti & 
Raghunath, 2018; Tracey & Phillips, 2011) 
 Institutional brokering (Bjerregaard & Lauring, 
2012; Jayanti & Raghunath, 2018; Tracey & 
Phillips, 2011) 
 Bridging institutional distance (Jayanti & 
Raghunath, 2018; Tracey & Phillips, 2011) 
 A market-based strategy (Peng, 2003) 
 Nonmarket or Political strategies/tactics 
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Cantwell et al., 
2010; Child et al., 2012; Dang et al., 2020; Li et 
al., 2013; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014; 
Ramamurti, 2005)  
 Relationship/network-based strategies 
(Narayanan & Fahey, 2005; Khanna & Palepu, 
2010; Narooz & Child, 2017; Parente et al., 2019; 
Peng, 2003; Teegen et al., 2004; Welter & 
Smallbone, 2011) 
 Reputation building (El Ghoul et al., 2017; 
Gao et al., 2017; Kim & Song, 2017; Marono 
et al., 2017) 
 Strategic orchestration of business relationships 
(Sydow et al., 2020) 
Avoidance: evading the 
need to conform to 
institutional pressures 
through buffering, 
concealment, or escape. 
 Circumvent/Evade (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017)  
 Non-entry/Exit (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2010) 
 Evasion (Welter & Smallbone, 2011) 
 Waiting to enter a particular industry (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2010)  
Resist 
No intention to accept 
or change existing 
institutional 









pressures. Defiance is a 
more active form of 
resistance to institutional 
processes. The three 
tactics of defiance in order 
of increasing active 
resistance are dismissal, 




 Attack institutions, which may include informal 
ones, e.g. using violence against violence (Sutter 











Table 2-4: (Continued) 
Change 
There is a clear 
intention to influence 
and change existing 
institutional 
arrangements, and 
even to create new 
institutions.  
Manipulation: the most 
active response to 
institutional pressures: a 
purposeful and 
opportunistic attempt to 
co-opt, influence, or 
control institutional 
pressures. 
 Diversification and portfolio entrepreneurship 
(Welter & Smallbone, 2011) 
 Market redefining (Mair et al., 2012) 
 Borrowing better developed international 
institutions (Kingsley & Graham, 2017; Pinkham 
& Peng, 2017) 
 Substituting institutional information (Kingsley 
& Graham, 2017; Pinkham & Peng, 2017) 
 Corporate political strategies (e.g. lobbying) 
(Bylund & McCaffery, 2017; Liedong et al., 
2020) 
 Cross-bracing of the institutional infrastructure 
(Sydow et al., 2020) 
 Geographical clustering to create favourable 
institutional conditions at microcosmic level 
(Lundan, 2012) 
 Creating intermediary-based businesses (Khanna 
& Palepu, 2010) 
  Infrastructure building (Amankwah-Amoah et 
al., 2019) 
 Creating new institutions (Regnér & Edman, 
2014; Tracey & Phillips, 2011) 
Source: Author 
Recognising that institutional barriers and voids may provide a counter-intuitive 
source of new opportunities for value creation through deploying different strategies and 
tactics (Sydow et al., 2020; also c.f. George et al. 2016), there is a need to understand the 
opportunity-related processes in the presence of uncertainty (Townsend et al., 2018) since 
barriers and voids may also exacerbate uncertainty (c.f. Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017). The 
next section therefore argues the role of high uncertainty in perceiving opportunity and 
stimulating and/or obstructing entrepreneurial action. 
2.4 Uncertainty and Entrepreneurial Opportunity 
Uncertainty, institutions and opportunity are inherently vital concepts in 
entrepreneurship research (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017; Mair & Marti, 2009; Shane, 2003). 
Nonetheless, little work has been done to integrate them into a conceptual framework for 
investigating and understanding the dynamic aspects of entrepreneurial action, uncertainty 
and institutional change (Bjerregaard & Lauring, 2012; Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017). Even 
entrepreneurship studies that considered the role of institutions have paid little or no 
attention to opportunities (Mair & Marti, 2009; Phillips & Tracey, 2007). Most 
entrepreneurship studies have indeed assumed that opportunities simply ‘exist out there’ and 
ignore the fact that opportunities are dependent on the institutional environment of the firm 




Without uncertainty, it could be argued that there would be no opportunity for 
entrepreneurs (McMullen et al., 2007) since entrepreneurial decisions are at least subject to 
some degree of uncertainty due to the futurity of markets (Fisher et al., 2020; Foss & Klein, 
2020; McGrath, 1999; Packard et al., 2017). However, the role that uncertainty plays in 
motivating and/or hindering entrepreneurial processes and action remains a matter of recent 
debate (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Townsend et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, explanations of the conditions under which uncertainty may impede and/or 
promote entrepreneurship are elusive (McKelvie et al., 2011). 
This section discusses the concepts of uncertainty and risk and highlights the major 
differences between them. It also reviews the concept of entrepreneurial opportunity and its 
sources, the core entrepreneurial processes and action, its antecedents and discusses whether 
uncertainty creates or obstructs entrepreneurial opportunity. 
2.4.1 Uncertainty in Entrepreneurship Research  
In many entrepreneurship studies, ‘uncertainty and risk’ are not distinguished. ‘Risk 
and uncertainty are treated as if they were synonyms’ (Alvarez & Barney, 2005, p. 778). 
Nonetheless, managers do consider uncertainty and risk as ‘distinct constructs’ that have 
different impacts, individually and jointly on the decision-making process (Alessandri et al., 
2004, p. 755). Indeed, the distinction between uncertainty and risk is essential for any fine-
grained understanding of how these elements affect entrepreneurial processes and action and 
decision-making process (Koudstaal et al., 2016; Liesch et al., 2011). 
Knight (1921) distinguished pure (subsequently ‘Knightian’) uncertainty from risk, 
defining an informational setting as being risky where the decision makers face uncertain 
outcomes but can estimate probability distributions for them. On the other hand, Knight 
(1921) defined pure uncertainty as where the decision makers do not and cannot quantify 
possible outcomes or their probabilities. Uncertainty is therefore present because certain 
knowledge is unknown, perhaps unknowable (Shackle, 1979).  
Knightian uncertainty is crucial to understanding and explaining the nature of 
competition, profit, and entrepreneurship (Alvarez & Barney, 2020; Knight, 1921; Miller, 
2007). Such uncertainty determines whether or not an opportunity exists, the actions required 
to identify and exploit that opportunity, the entrepreneurial skills required to develop and 




(Burns et al., 2016). Entrepreneurs are often identified as uncertainty-bearers with relatively 
low loss-aversion (Knight, 1921; Marshall, 1930). By Knight’s reasoning, only under 
uncertainty, rather than risk, can entrepreneurs exceed the normal profits associated with 
equilibrium in competitive markets (Miller, 2007). In other words, uncertainty and risk are 
not synonymous.  It must be conceded, however, that in practice uncertainty and risk are not 
mutually exclusive and that uncertainty can evolve into situations of risk and vice-versa. 
Accordingly, uncertainty and risk can be viewed as belonging on a continuum (Hmieleski et 
al., 2015) and involving different degrees of judgement ‘ranging from straightforward to 
impossible’ (Miller, 2007, p. 58). 
There are two main sources of uncertainty: endogenous and exogenous (Gregorio, 
2005). In contrast with uncertainty inside the firm or individuals themselves, exogenous 
uncertainty can be associated with price changes, technological innovation and competitors’ 
actions. However, this distinction may become blurred in concepts such as perceived 
uncertainty (Downey & Slocum, 1975), which defines and measures exogenous uncertainty 
in terms of subjective judgements (Downey & Slocum, 1975; Gartner & Liao, 2012; Griffin 
& Grote, 2020; Milliken, 1987). 
Scholars have increasingly recognised the need to distinguish different types of 
uncertainty (Packard et al., 2017), because ‘the type of uncertainty matters’ (McKelvie et 
al., 2011, p. 274) for a nuanced understanding of its impact, and explanations of different 
action. In a seminal article, Milliken (1987) differentiated subsets of Knightian uncertainty 
(state, effect, and response) that the current study adopts here in a subjectivist view of 
entrepreneurship, where ‘the source of the uncertainty is specified as being the 
organizational environment’ (p.136). Each of these three types of environmental uncertainty 
may be associated with a specific type of information about a condition (i.e. a specific locus 
of uncertainty) that an individual perceives to be lacking. State uncertainty is experienced 
when ‘[administrators of an organisation] perceive the organizational environment, or a 
particular component of that environment, to be unpredictable’ (p.136). Effect uncertainty 
refers to ‘an inability to predict what the nature of the impact of a future state of the 
environment or environmental change will be on the organization’ (p.137). Finally, response 
uncertainty refers to ‘a lack of knowledge of response options and/or an inability to predict 
the likely consequences of a response choice’ (Milliken, 1987, p.137).  Each of these three 
types of environmental uncertainty may be associated with a distinctive impact on 




The existence of deep uncertainty does not mean that action is impossible, or results 
are random (Foss & Klein, 2020). Therefore, managing these types of uncertainty is crucial 
to entrepreneurship, where uncertainty must be dealt with not only in the firm or project’s 
foundation phases, but throughout its entire life cycle. Knight’s theory of rational 
entrepreneurship highlights individuals’ differences and abilities in moving from pure 
uncertainty towards risk, or possibly avoiding investment altogether. Packard et al. (2017), 
for example, showed that entrepreneurs can reduce uncertainty either by selecting from a 
narrow set of means and anticipating all the possible ends of those means, or focusing on a 
few target outcomes and being more open about potential means. Individuals may at times 
also actively create uncertainty that is functional and adaptive for themselves and others 
(Griffin & Grote, 2020). This may reveal new opportunities for those entrepreneurial firms 
that are able to discover and/or create, and exploit opportunities (Hitt et al, 2011). 
Accordingly, the next section considers whether uncertainty creates or obstructs 
entrepreneurial opportunity. 
2.4.2 Does Uncertainty Create Entrepreneurial Opportunity?  
Since Shane and Venkataraman’s (2000) ground-breaking paper, much of the field 
of entrepreneurship has focused on opportunities - where they come from and how they are 
exploited (Alvarez & Barney, 2020). For example, Shane and Venkataraman (2000) 
themselves studied how alert entrepreneurs discover opportunities, Sarasvathy (2001) 
discussed the impact of cognitive biases on forming and exploiting opportunities, Baker and 
Nelson (2005) showed how opportunities can emerge out of the resources that entrepreneurs 
already control, and Alvarez and Barney (2007, 2013) emphasised how opportunities may 
be created through an iterative and path-dependent social construction process. While these 
theories vary on many dimensions, they all have one thing in common, focusing on 
opportunities.  
Nonetheless, a group of scholars (e.g. Davidsson, 2015; Davidsson et al., 2020; Foss 
& Klein, 2020) has recently begun to question whether the field of entrepreneurship should 
have committed itself so strongly to the study of the causes and consequences of 
opportunities. Davidsson (2015) and Davidsson et al. (2020) argued that the term is not 
defined in a uniform or consistent way, and Foss and Klein (2020) argued that the concept 
of opportunity is at best redundant and at worst misleading. In a response to these criticisms, 




that much work remains to be done to clarify and operationalise the concept of opportunity, 
but they also argued that opportunities will continue as a central concept in the field of 
entrepreneurship for some time. 
Indeed, debates about the definition of opportunities are reminiscent of the debates 
about the definition of entrepreneurship that plagued the field for many years (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2020). Shane and Venkataraman (2000, p. 220) defined entrepreneurial 
opportunities as ‘those situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, and 
organizing methods can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost of production’. 
Unlike other fields (e.g. Barney, 1991; Porter, 1980) that usually take the existence of market 
disequilibrium as given, prior work on opportunity (e.g. Alvarez & Barney, 2004, p. 622; 
see also Alvarez & Barney 2007, p. 13, 2013, p. 302) defined opportunities as ‘competitive 
imperfections exist in product or factor markets’. Theory hereby examines how these 
competitive imperfections are formed, and then sometimes exploited, by the actions of 
individuals (or groups). Alvarez and Barney (2020) themselves emphasised that creation 
theory definition of opportunities does not mean that that definition is, or should be, the only 
definition of opportunities in the field. This notion supported by Wood and McKinley (2020) 
suggesting that ‘opportunity’ is best characterised as a holistic and integrative umbrella 
construct that incorporates many meanings and competing and complementary theories. 
To date, scholars have been engaged in an ongoing debate - concerned with the 
ontological nature of opportunities and where do such phenomena come from? - that is still 
described as ‘opportunity wars’ (Wright & Phan, 2020). Two broad answers to this question 
have been proposed: (1) They are formed by exogenous shocks to pre-existing markets or 
industries (i.e. products of exogenous market gaps) (Shane, 2003), and (2) They are formed 
endogenously, by the actions of entrepreneurs themselves (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2013; 
Wood & McKinley, 2010). 
These two models of where opportunities come from have resulted in at least three 
prominent perspectives on the ontological nature of the phenomenon (Wood & McKinley, 
2020). The first, ‘discovery’ perspective (Kirzner, 1973) views opportunities as objective 
entities that exist independently of the perceptions of entrepreneurs (Shane, 2003) and their 
existence requires only differential alertness, or access to existing information (information 
asymmetry). Opportunities arise from market imperfections/disequilibrium and 




perspective (Schumpeter, 1934) suggests that, rather than restore equilibrium, entrepreneurs 
create disequilibrium with their changes in resource combinations, e.g. innovations. 
Subsequently, Kirzner (1982) addressed his fellow Austrian economists and supported the 
notions of Schumpeter, confirming that the entrepreneur may actively try to shape or create 
the future in favourable ways. The creation perspective (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Alvarez 
et al., 2013) views opportunities as a subjective and socially constructed by those who form 
and exploit them (Alvarez et al., 2017). The creation model suggest that the formation of 
opportunities is strongly path-dependent in nature (Alvarez et al., 2015; Wood & McKinley, 
2010). The third, more recently developed perspective, called ‘actualisation’ perspective, 
seeks a middle ground between the discovery and creation approaches. This perspective 
conceptualises opportunities as clearly external to the entrepreneur but cannot be known or 
accessed prior to their actualisation into profits. Therefore, it considers opportunities as 
propensities that reside outside the consciousness of the entrepreneur (Ramoglou & Tsang, 
2016). Opportunities are real but cannot be objectively measured or detected because they 
exist as latent market demand, which can be accessed only through the imagination or belief 
of the entrepreneur (Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016). Thus, the subjectivity of ‘opportunity 
perception’ can be meaningfully conceptualised in parallel with the objectivity of 
‘opportunity existence’ within the actualisation perspective (Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016: 
p.424). 
Alvarez and Barney (2007) argued that ‘discovery’ theory is more relevant to ‘risk’ 
and ‘creation’ theory to ‘uncertainty’, and Alvarez et al. (2013) further suggested that the 
entrepreneur not only discovers existing opportunities, but also builds new landscapes for 
action that create uncertainties for themselves and others. Indeed, some critics have 
maintained that the actualisation approach is meta-theoretically and practically 
unsatisfactory, in part because it is overly deterministic (Berglund & Korsgaard, 2017) and 
depends on ‘unobservable generative mechanisms’ (Berglund & Korsgaard, 2017, p. 730) 
that truncate possibilities for empirical research (Davidsson, 2017). Alvarez et al. (2017) 
also criticised how the actualisation approach radically misrepresents the modern 
constructivist perspective. Nonetheless, some of these criticisms have been refuted by 
Ramoglou and Tsang (2017a, 2017b). For example, Ramoglou and Tsang (2017b) argued 
against Berglund and Korsgaard’s (2017) position by noting that propensities are not 
deterministic factors that inevitably lead to the actualisation of opportunities into successful 




One of the insights from work, on where opportunities come from, is that 
opportunities can emerge in very different informational settings (uncertain and risk 
contexts). In this way, some work on opportunities has emphasised the role of Knightian 
uncertainty in entrepreneurship (Alvarez & Barney, 2005), particularly in models of 
endogenous opportunity formation and exploitation (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2013; 
Sarasvathy, 2001). Indeed, Knightian uncertainty plays an important role in the opportunity 
formation process; therefore, different entrepreneurs are more likely to make different 
decisions, which leads to the formation of different opportunities and the creation of 
heterogeneous resources and capabilities (Alvarez & Barney, 2020). Foss and Klein (2020, 
p. 370) further noted the emerging consensus among entrepreneurship scholars, concluding 
that Knightian uncertainty should be ‘front and center’ in the entrepreneurship literature.  
One strand of research (e.g. Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Kirzner, 1979; Mahnke et al., 
2007) suggested that greater uncertainty creates barriers to entrepreneurial action, especially 
opportunity exploitation, and ‘… across all fields of management research, uncertainty is 
largely considered an aversive state that people and organizations cope with unwillingly and 
generally aim to avoid’ (Griffin & Grote, in press, 2020). As entrepreneurial action is made 
more uncertain in unstable institutional contexts - e.g. in many emerging markets - 
opportunities for entrepreneurship may be inhibited (Luthans & Ibraveva, 2006; Manolova 
et al., 2008). This lack of entrepreneurial action under great uncertainty is often seen as the 
consequence of a lack of alertness, unperceived opportunities (Kirzner, 1982) and/or 
suboptimal market coordination (Kirzner, 1973). 
However, another strand (e.g. Doh et al., 2017; Knight, 1921; McKelvie et al., 2011; 
Tracey & Phillips, 2011) has contended that entrepreneurial opportunities are likely to be 
greatest when market conditions are furthest from equilibrium and competitive perfection, 
e.g. when they are volatile, unpredictable and uncertain. Folta (2007, p. 98) went further and 
declared that: ‘for opportunities that create the most value, uncertainty rules the day’ 
(italicised emphasis in the original). Institutional barriers and voids are key sources of 
volatility and uncertainty that may create significant opportunities for some entrepreneurs 
(Tracey & Phillips, 2011). Moulick et al. (2019, p. 2) also argued that ‘… entrepreneurs are 
increasingly working around weak institutions to develop viable ventures often in 




It seems that uncertain contexts may facilitate and/or impede the generation of new 
entrepreneurial opportunities. As ‘entrepreneurial opportunities do not simply jump out in a 
final, ready-made form but emerge in an iterative process of shaping and development’ 
(Dimov, 2007, p. 561), the next two sections review the core entrepreneurial processes, 
action and antecedents and discuss whether uncertainty motivates or obstructs 
entrepreneurial processes and action. 
2.4.3 Antecedents of Core Entrepreneurial Processes and Action   
For an opportunity to be meaningful, it must be recognised, discovered, and/or 
created and thus, scholars have also debated how to define the processes related to 
opportunities (Hansen et al., 2011). Scholars have different views of the opportunity-related 
processes and action. For example, a group of scholars argued it as a cognitive process 
(Baron, 2006) that can involve a mental simulation and counterfactual thinking (Gaglio & 
Katz, 2001), a heuristics-based logic (Baron, 2004), or maybe an effectuation process of 
forming, shaping, creating, or enacting an opportunity that emerges from within the 
entrepreneur (Sarasvathy, 2001). Another group considered it as a creative process (Dimov, 
2007), involving creativity (Hansen & Hills, 2004), or even as a special case of problem-
solving (Harper, 2008). Foss and Klein (2020) recently offered a judgement-based approach 
to entrepreneurship and operationalised the entrepreneurial processes in the beliefs-actions-
results (BAR) framework.   
It should also be noted that access to, and effective utilisation of, information are not 
the only behavioural and cognitive factors that have been found to play a role in opportunity-
related processes and action (Baron, 2007). In addition, seven others have received major 
attention. Given that the current study aims to explore deeper and elaborate more on these 
factors that are related to entrepreneurial process and action, Figure 2-2 summarises the 
antecedents of core entrepreneurial processes and action and portrays the interactions and 










Figure 2-2: Antecedents of Core Entrepreneurial Processes and Action   
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Source: Author, developed from (Ardichvili et al., 2003; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Phillips & Tracey, 
2007; Shane, 2003) concerning (individual attributes); (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Baron, 2007; Ellis, 2011; 
Phillips & Tracey, 2007) concerning (social networks); (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Arentz et al., 2013; Grégoire 
et al., 2010a; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Phillips & Tracey, 2007; Shane, 2003; Shepherd & DeTienne, 
2005) concerning (prior knowledge); (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Kirzner, 1973, 1979, 
1997; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Tang et al., 2012) concerning (entrepreneurial alertness); (Fiet, 2007; 
Fiet et al., 2005) concerning (systematic search); (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Ardichvili et al., 2003; Miller, 
2007) concerning (opportunity identification: recognition, discovery, creation); (Ardichvili et al., 2003) 
concerning (opportunity development); (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Haynie et al., 2009; Hisrich et al., 2013) 
concerning (opportunity evaluation); (Alvarez & Barney, 2013; Gartner, 1985; Miller, 2007; Shane, 2003; 
Tang, 2010; Webb et al., 2011) concerning (institutional environment); (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Shane, 2003; 
Smith et al., 2009) concerning (type of opportunity); and (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2013; McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006; Miller, 2007) concerning (entrepreneurial action). 
 
Further details of these factors can be explained as follows:  
1- Individual attributes: Creativity (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Baron, 2006; Shane & 
Nicolaou, 2015), optimism and self-efficacy (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Baron, 2006; 
Schmitt et al., 2018), risk-taking (Baron, 2006; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shane, 






and locus of control (Shane, 2003) have been discussed as being important personal 
attributes for successful opportunity recognition. Other scholars have shown that 
high levels of intelligence and creativity are essential for identifying a niche 
opportunity (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Nicolaou et al., 2009). Curiosity, imagination 
and open-mindedness are also essential qualities (Shane et al., 2010). 
2- Prior knowledge: This influences entrepreneurs’ ability to comprehend, extrapolate, 
interpret and apply new information in ways that those lacking that prior information 
cannot replicate (Roberts, 1991; Shane, 2000). This may provide them with the 
capacity to identify certain opportunities (Shane, 2000; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005; 
Venkataraman, 1997). Prior knowledge has been considered to be the cognitive 
resource of an individual and a cornerstone of the opportunity identification process 
(Ardichvili et al., 2003; Arentz et al., 2013; Grégoire et al., 2010a; Shepherd & 
DeTienne, 2005). For example, Grégoire et al. (2010a) indicated that prior 
knowledge fosters the consideration of structural relationships. It also creates ‘richer 
mental representations’ and ‘opportunistic-assimilation’ which facilitate the noticing 
of structural parallels between new information and a relevant context, even in the 
superficial absence of correspondence between the two. 
3- Social networks: They may provide an access to a wide range of both tangible and 
intangible resources (Baron, 2007). These ties may also allow a greater diversity of 
ideas, increased prospects for innovation, and possibly more rapid decision making 
(Cooper, 2007). Indeed, entrepreneurs who connect with people from different fields 
and locations can use pattern recognition and peripheral vision to spot opportunities 
in unlikely situations (Tang, 2010). The social networks may influence a person’s 
access to information that facilitates opportunity identification (Baron, 2007; Shane, 
2003). In this regard, entrepreneurs utilise information provided not only by personal 
contacts (i.e. informal social networks), but also information attained in professional 
forums (e.g. conventions, meetings) and from mentors (i.e. more experienced 
individuals) who share their knowledge and wisdom with them (Baron, 2007). 
Although important, several dichotomies exist in the literature related to the 
importance of networks and their effect on opportunity identification. One stream 
(e.g. Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Ardichvili et al., 2003; Arenius & De Clercq, 2005; 
Granovetter, 1973; Hills et al., 1997; Kontinen & Ojala, 2011) argued that 




(including casual acquaintances) than they do when interacting with strong ties 
(including friends and family). Another stream (e.g. Ellis, 2011; Granovetter, 1992; 
Hite, 2005; Hmieleski et al., 2015) emphasised that strong (relationally embedded) 
ties provide critical strategic opportunities and resources for entrepreneurs. 
4- Entrepreneurial alertness: It was a critical element of Kirzner’s (1973, 1979, 
1985,1997) theory of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial alertness is defined as ‘the 
ability to notice without search opportunities that have hitherto been overlooked’ 
(Kirzner, 1979, p. 48) or as ‘a motivated propensity of man to formulate an image of 
the future’ (Kirzner, 1985, p. 56). Kirzner (1973, 1997) argued that entrepreneurs 
have a natural alertness (i.e. antenna) to signals about possible opportunities and they 
are at all times spontaneously on the lookout (i.e. unique preparedness) for hitherto 
unnoticed features on the environment (present or future) which might inspire new 
activity. Gaglio and Katz (2001), Kirzner (1979) and Shane (2003) asserted that the 
mental representations and interpretations of entrepreneurs do indeed differ because 
they are driven by entrepreneurial alertness, a distinctive set of perceptual and 
cognitive processing skills that direct the opportunity identification process. Since 
then, individuals with a higher level of alertness (i.e. heightened alertness to 
information) are more likely to identify opportunities even without actively searching 
for them or by simply observing phenomena (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Gaglio & Katz, 
2001; Renko et al., 2012; Tang et al., 2012). 
5- Systematic search: The alertness perspective’s primary limitation is that it offers 
practically no guidance to aspiring entrepreneurs regarding opportunity discovery 
and creation other than to advise them to stay alert (Baumol, 1993; Fiet, 2007). 
Alertness also is problematic for wealth creation because it can only provide for 
discovery rather than creation (Fiet, 2007; Ricketts, 1993). Therefore, Fiet et al. 
(2005) and Zahra et al. (2009) stated that the systematic search, discovering 
opportunities by actively searching for them from a known information domain, 
helps individuals discover opportunities. Constrained, systematic search 
accommodates concerns of alertness advocates by replacing the search for unknown 
venture ideas with the search of known information sources. The basic rationale for 
this approach is that entrepreneurial discovery depends on a fit between an 
entrepreneur’s specific knowledge and a particular venture idea, which may be 




systematic search is not always the opposite of alertness but can be a supplement or 
complement. He emphasised that extensive search and serendipity (i.e. alertness) 
reflects situations in which deliberate actions contribute to an opportunity and yet 
leave a substantial portion of it undetermined. Therefore, entrepreneurs may need to 
be alert and conduct systematic research to identify entrepreneurial opportunities. 
6- Institutional/External environment: Environmental factors broadly encompass a 
society’s economic growth, social and political contexts, geographical location, and 
cultural values. For further details about institutional environments, see 2.3.1. In fact, 
institutional or environmental conditions can positively and negatively influence 
entrepreneurial processes and action. For further details regarding the influence of 
institutions on entrepreneurial activity, see 2.3.3. 
7- Type of opportunity: The characteristics of opportunities themselves influence the 
willingness of entrepreneurs to identify and exploit them. Entrepreneurial 
opportunities vary on several dimensions, which influences their expected value 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Ardichvili et al. (2003) believed that the process of 
opportunity development may differ among four types of opportunities defined by 
the matrix in Figure 2-3. 
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Source: Ardichvili et al. (2003, p. 117). 
This matrix differentiates between opportunities based on their origin and degree of 
development. In this matrix, value sought may represent problems and value creation 
capability may represent solutions. The upper left cell (I), where value sought is 
unidentified and value creation capability undefined (i.e. problems and solutions both 
unknown), may represent some kind of creativity. The upper right cell (II), where 




problem solving, including information search, occur (e.g. design a specific 
product/service to match an expressed market need). The lower left cell (III), where 
problems are unknown, but solutions or capabilities are available, includes what 
usually identified as ‘technology transfer’ challenges (e.g. search for applications 
rather than product/service development). In the lower right cell (IV), where both 
problems and solutions are known, entrepreneurs match known resources and needs 
to form businesses that can create and deliver value (Ardichvili et al., 2003). The 
situations in cell (I) and cell (III) are more associated with opportunity creation, and 
the situations in cell (II) and cell (IV) are more associated with opportunity 
discovery. 
Smith et al. (2009) also proposed that there are two different types of opportunities - 
codified and tacit - and that the type of opportunity influences the identification of 
the opportunity. A codified opportunity is a ‘well-documented, articulated or 
communicated profit-seeking situation in which a person seeks to exploit market 
inefficiency in a less-than-saturated market’ (Smith et al., 2009, p. 44). A codified 
opportunity is more likely to focus on imitated or moderate improvements of 
products, services, raw materials, or organising methods. In contrast, a tacit 
opportunity is ‘a profit-seeking situation that is difficult to codify, articulate or 
communicate, in which a person seeks to exploit market inefficiency in a less than- 
saturated market’ (Smith et al., 2009, p. 44). A tacit opportunity is therefore more 
likely to focus on major improvements or new innovations of products, services, raw 
materials, or organising methods.  In addition, the market is likely to be severely 
underexploited or completely new (i.e. previously non-existent). 
In summary, the literature provides support for the role of seven key factors in the 
opportunity identification, development and evaluation processes and entrepreneurial action: 
(1) individual attributes, (2) prior knowledge of a market, industry, or customers, (3) the 
extent, breadth, and quality of entrepreneurs’ social networks - their connections with others, 
(4) alertness to opportunities (the capacity to recognise them when they emerge), (5) 
engaging in an active search for opportunities, (6) institutional environment, and (7) types 
of opportunity. This research focuses on the importance of the institutional environment and 
how entrepreneurs perceive and interact with it within the Palestinian context. Therefore, the 
next section will focus on the core entrepreneurial processes and entrepreneurial action 




2.4.4 Core Entrepreneurial Processes and Entrepreneurial Action 
The entrepreneurship literature has heavily investigated entrepreneurial 
opportunities for more than two decades. However, opportunities remain a phenomenon of 
interest, as they hold promise for both the academic field of entrepreneurship and the 
practical pursuit of entrepreneurial gains (Alvarez & Barney, 2020; Dimov, 2020; Welter & 
Alvarez, 2015; Wood & McKinley, 2020). Furthermore, opportunity identification, 
development, evaluation, and entrepreneurial action are at the heart of modern theories of 
entrepreneurship (Autio et al., 2013; Kirzner, 1973, 1997; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; 
Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Therefore, entrepreneurship research focused on questions 
that relate to ‘how, by whom, and with what consequence opportunities to produce future 
goods and services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited’ (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, 
p. 220). Accordingly, the remainder of this section discusses, in detail, opportunity 
identification, development, evaluation and entrepreneurial action, and investigates in 
particular the role that uncertainty plays in stimulating and/or obstructing entrepreneurial 
processes and action. 
2.4.4.1 Opportunity Recognition 
The recognition of new opportunities is important for entrepreneurs, managers, and 
executives alike. Indeed, recognising high-potential opportunities can lead to significant 
gains in survival, profit, growth, and/or competitive positioning (Grégoire et al., 2010b). 
Opportunity recognition can be defined as ‘… the ability to identify situations in which new 
goods, services, raw materials, markets and organizing methods can be introduced through 
the formation of new means, ends, or means–ends relationships’ (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003, 
p. 336). Grégoire at al. (2010a, p. 415) further described the process of recognising 
opportunities as ‘… efforts to make sense of signals of change (e.g. new information about 
new conditions) to form beliefs regarding whether or not enacting a course of action to 
address this change could lead to net benefits.’  
Individuals (i.e. entrepreneurs) differ in the opportunity recognition process due to 
the heterogeneity in individuals’ sensitivity to opportunities for creation and delivery of new 
value (Grégoire at al., 2010a). Some entrepreneurs can identify possibilities for new products 
or solutions simply by observing their environment, but this sensitivity does not necessarily 
extend to the generation of ideas for solutions to the problems. Other entrepreneurs may be 




be able to define particular uses or users for which the resources could create value 
(Ardichvili et al., 2003). The outcome of this process lies in those subjective ex-ante beliefs 
that an opportunity exists, or not. This is separate from the evaluation of whether one 
particular individual or firm should attempt to exploit the opportunity (Shepherd et al., 
2007). 
Grégoire at al. (2010b) proposed that opportunity-recognition beliefs are reflected in 
indicators relating to three perceptual dimensions: (a) perceptions of alignment between an 
opportunity-specific means of supply and a target market/demand, (b) the general feasibility 
of introducing this new/improved supply-demand combination, and (c) the general 
desirability of doing so (i.e. whether an idea to introduce new/improved goods and services 
is seen as something useful and necessary, and/or as something that would bring economic 
value and other benefits to the parties involved in such transactions). Entrepreneurs with a 
higher perception of alignment between supply and demand, general feasibility, and general 
desirability, are more certain about their beliefs in regard to constituting an opportunity 
(Grégoire at al., 2010b). Opportunities therefore ‘… are enacted, on the basis of the 
entrepreneur’s perception, interpretation, and understanding of environmental forces’ (Dutta 
& Crossan, 2005, p. 426). Opportunity recognition rests on the subjective perception and 
interpretation of objective realities (Grégoire at al., 2010b). 
Opportunity recognition requires foresightful attention to alternative states and their 
performance implications. The fundamental action of the entrepreneur is to value investment 
opportunities. This is done through forward-look valuations based on a logic of arbitrage 
(Miller, 2007). Rational entrepreneurs may seek to improve allocative efficiency through 
obtaining information and assurances that overcome information asymmetry and mitigate 
the risks of entering into transactions with unpredictable outcomes (Darby & Karni, 1973). 
They may also seek to control or hedge contingencies that affect firm performance, through 
operational (e.g. improving quality and safety, increasing operational flexibility) and 
strategic hedging (e.g. gaining control over key contingencies, changing product-market 
portfolios, increasing organisational flexibility - Miller, 2007).  
In addition, Miller (2007), and Trigeorgis and Reuer (2017) suggested real option 
analysis as a tool to evaluate the determinants of the payoffs to investments from operational 
and strategic flexibility and, where possible, place a forward-looking value on such 




resolve endogenous uncertainty. Each additional stage may disclose new information and 
incrementally gain knowledge that can be used in a subsequent decision-making process 
(Ahsan & Musteen, 2011). Conversely, exogenous uncertainty can be resolved through 
passive observation since it may be prudent for firms to defer investment before incurring 
irreversible investments under conditions of exogenous uncertainty (Chi & Seth, 2002). 
2.4.4.2 Opportunity Discovery 
The discovery theory of opportunity stems from realist assumptions (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2007). Accordingly, opportunities are objective and thus, in principle, observable 
but unexplored phenomena - at least for the particular entrepreneur undertaking the search - 
that exist independent of the actions or perceptions of the entrepreneurs (Alvarez & Barney, 
2007, 2013). In the discovery view, the competitive imperfections that may constitute 
opportunities are formed by exogenous shocks to existing markets (Shane, 2003). These 
opportunities constitute Kirznerian (1973) opportunities that do not require new information 
(only access to information). The nature of these opportunities is less innovative, common 
and limited to discovery. For further information about this discovery perspective, see 2.4.2.  
Opportunity discovery starts either from a known supply, and proceeds in search of 
an unknown demand, or from a known demand that motivates search for an unknown supply. 
Once the missing side of the transaction is discovered, the market opportunity can be 
exploited. Discovery theory assumes that entrepreneurs who discover opportunities are 
significantly different from others in their ability to either see opportunities (i.e. alertness) 
or, once they are seen, to exploit these opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Kirzner, 
1973; Shane, 2003). Their ability to make these discoveries depends on their subjective 
perceptions (Kirzner, 1979), cognitive abilities (Baron, 2004) and capacity for bisociative 
thinking (Ko & Butler, 2006). It also depends on their ability to estimate the potential net 
gains that result from disequilibrium (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003; Kirzner, 1973), the networks 
they belong to (Arenius & De Clercq, 2005), their openness to new options (Burmeister & 
Schade, 2007) and prior knowledge.  
Any of these attributes, or any combination of these attributes, might lead some 
entrepreneurs to become aware and see different opportunities in similar institutional 
context, while others may remain ignorant of them. Arentz et al. (2013) identified at least 
four steps in the entrepreneurial discovery process: (1) unnoticed entrepreneurial profit 




entrepreneurs exploit the noticed opportunity (which may generate new opportunities), and 
(4) entrepreneurs develop heuristics and accumulate knowledge that may help them identify 
new opportunities. 
The decision-making setting, in discovery theory, is risky because it assumes that 
opportunities are objective in nature. As objective (i.e. real) phenomena, entrepreneurs can 
use a variety of data collection and analytical techniques to understand the possible outcomes 
associated with an opportunity, along with the estimated probability of those outcomes 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2013). It may take some time and effort to complete these 
analyses, but, in principle, they can be done when an opportunity is objective in nature. For 
further information about the risky setting, see 2.4.1. 
Opportunity discovery replaces ex-ante ignorance with newly identified feasible 
possible outcomes and may estimate their probabilities, but it also involves searching under 
‘sheer ignorance’ (i.e. not knowing that we do not know) which can produce genuine 
surprises (Miller, 2007). Opportunity discovery therefore can be attributed to two main 
modes that facilitate this discovery. One is conducting a deliberate search for an opportunity 
using search tactics (for further details see factor number (5), above at 2.4.3). The other 
mode is serendipitous discoveries that have an element of surprise or ‘Eureka’ (Shane, 
2000). For further details see factor number (4), above at 2.4.3. 
Entrepreneurs may have limited ability to formulate expectations, so learning occurs 
by assessing discovered outcomes retrospectively and goals for the discovery process may 
be adapted, based on experience over time (Alvarez et al., 2017). They may select the area 
of the environment in which the search is to take place, and risk arises due to the inherently 
unknowable aspects of the search process, incomplete knowledge of potential outcomes and 
inherently ambiguous assigned probabilities to the possible outcomes. Subsequently, 
rationality can be articulated in exploratory search, learning from experiences, and 
attempting to achieve aspirations which are adapted, based on one’s own experience as well 
as the experiences of others in a relevant reference group (Alvarez & Barney, 2013). Indeed, 
search based on such partial knowledge is more informed than random trial-and-error search 
under complete ignorance, and search may involve finding a satisfactory, rather than an 




2.4.4.3 Opportunity Creation 
The creation theory of opportunity stems from evolutionary realist assumptions 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2007). It views opportunities as social constructions that do not exist 
independent of the entrepreneur’s perceptions (i.e. actors construct their own reality). 
However, when entrepreneurs act to exploit these socially constructed opportunities, they 
may interact with an environment - the market - that tests the veracity of their perceptions 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2013). In the creation view, entrepreneurs do not wait for exogenous 
shocks to form opportunities and then provide agency to those opportunities, they act, and 
in acting, they form opportunities that could not have been known without the actions taken 
by these entrepreneurs (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Alvarez et al., 2017). For further 
information about this creation perspective, see above at 2.4.2. 
Such Schumpeterian opportunities are created, endogenously, by the entrepreneurs 
through their actions, reactions, combinative capabilities, improvisation, enactment, and 
effectuation to explore ways to produce new products or services, without much involvement 
with a search process (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). Opportunity creation also involves 
redirecting or recombining of resources in order to create and deliver value superior to that 
currently available. It may even lead to dramatic restructuring of an existing business or 
‘radical innovation’ (Ardichvili et al., 2003).  
In creation theory, neither the supply nor demand exists prior to entrepreneurial 
action, and instead, entrepreneurs both create and exploit market imperfection (Alvarez et 
al., 2017). In this view, there is no ‘end’ until the creation process has unfolded. Therefore, 
the creation of opportunities is a path dependent process, emphasising the importance of 
knowledge and information generated in the iterative process of enacting opportunity. As 
that process evolves differently for different entrepreneurs, the opportunities that result may 
be heterogeneous in costly-to-copy, and costly-to-reverse ways (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). 
Alvarez and Barney (2007) broadly described the opportunity creation process in 
seven steps: (1) entrepreneur’s beliefs and social constructs are formed which guide their 
subsequent actions, (2) entrepreneurs act upon their initial beliefs about opportunity, (3) 
entrepreneurs observe the market (i.e. suppliers and customers) responses, (4) entrepreneurs’ 
beliefs are transformed reflecting the acquisition and creation of knowledge and information, 
(5) entrepreneurs are forced to develop new beliefs about opportunities reflecting what they 




happens, then entrepreneurs may be forced to rethink their beliefs, and (7) after several 
iterative actions, evaluations and reactions, if entrepreneurs realised that they misinterpreted 
the results of previous actions, they may decide to go back several sequences and start again 
or even completely give up the entire process. 
Creation theory assumes an uncertain decision-making context as opportunities do 
not exist until they are created (Hmieleski et al., 2015), see 2.4.1 above. Under uncertainty, 
even entrepreneurs with a great deal of time, or with outstanding analytical abilities, may 
not be able to forecast the relevant probabilities as the required information simply has not 
been created yet (Miller, 2007). This does not mean that entrepreneurs operating in creation 
settings will be unable to collect at least some information, ex-ante, about certain courses of 
action. Throughout the formation of opportunities, entrepreneurs may be able to collect and 
analyse information about opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). 
In opportunity creation, the context is controllable, but only to a limited extent, 
resulting in risk. The freedom of others to act creatively is a source of ‘irreducible 
uncertainty’ (Miller, 2007). To address these deeply uncertain settings, entrepreneurs can 
employ creativity which involves reinterpreting and seeing new possibilities for vague 
problems (Hatchuel, 2001). They also can apply ‘simple rules’ (Sull & Eisenhardt, 2012) or 
other rational heuristics (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011) to make sense of their context. 
Entrepreneurs can further proceed according to a logic of causation which involves selecting 
means to achieve chosen ends (Miller, 2007), or effectuation which starts with available 
means and chooses among feasible ends (Sarasvathy, 2001). Finally, March (1994) proposed 
a logic of appropriateness which applies rules that determine appropriate actions based on 
one’s identity and assessment of the situation faced rather than attempting to determine 
future consequences and preferences. Indeed, entrepreneurship arises not only from looking 
forward (anticipating future prospects) and looking backward (learning from experience), 
but also from looking inward (an implication of one’s sense of self) (Miller, 2007). 
In summary, Sarasvathy et al. (2003) acknowledged that opportunity recognition, 
discovery and creation are confounded in entrepreneurial practice. Whereas opportunity 
recognition presumably could occur by itself, opportunity discovery entails recognition at 





2.4.4.4 Opportunity Development 
Opportunities begin as simple and unclear ideas or concepts that become more 
elaborate as entrepreneurs develop them. Prior work on the entrepreneurial process has 
acknowledged that initially identified opportunities are further developed in dynamic social 
processes (Dimov, 2007), ‘through which insights are contemplated, new information is 
collected and considered, and knowledge is created over time’ (Lumpkin & Lichtenstein, 
2005, p. 457). Opportunities are developed when entrepreneurs shape their initial ideas and 
imaginations into full-blown business plans. Therefore, the process of opportunity 
development is conceptually distinct from opportunity identification (Ardichvili et al., 
2003). This process may include extensive proactive efforts as the developmental process 
may give rise to an entire economic activity, not just a limited action (Pavia, 1991). The 
development process is continuous, cyclical and iterative (Johanson & Vahlne, 2006) as 
entrepreneurs may conduct evaluations several times at different stages of development, and 
evaluation could also lead to recognition of either completely new or additional 
opportunities, or adjustments to the initial vision (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Dimov, 2007). 
2.4.4.5 Opportunity Evaluation 
Opportunities are evaluated at each stage of their development; however, the 
evaluation may be informal or even unarticulated (Timmons et al., 1987). Indeed, the process 
of evaluating entrepreneurial opportunities differs in significant ways from the typical 
evaluation process (Nielsen et al., 2012). Entrepreneurs may informally pursue 
investigations of presumed market needs or resources until concluding whether to abandon 
opportunity, with no need for further consideration, or to conduct more formal investigations 
and search of the possibility is appropriate. Viewing such gradual emergence alongside the 
acting entrepreneur, it becomes clear that the opportunity’s articulation evolves from a 
tentative idea prone to attracting scepticism to focused pitch, eliciting confidence and 
commitment, inviting evaluation and refinement (Nair et al., 2020). 
Opportunity evaluation can be defined as ‘a phase of the entrepreneurship process 
which culminates in a judgement about whether investing time, effort, money, and other 
resources into a specific opportunity is personally attractive to me or my firm’ (Scheaf et al., 
2020, p. 7). The purpose of evaluation, in entrepreneurship, is not to verify or adduce 
something that has already happened, but to assess the future potential of an idea. 




of ‘what will be’ to determine whether the idea can form the basis for a profitable, attractive 
and sustainable opportunity (Haynie et al., 2009, p. 337). Keh et al. (2002, p. 130) 
emphasised that ‘the entrepreneur … use intuitive judgement to gauge market potential’. 
This suggests that the entrepreneurial evaluation is, in essence, a cognitive and emotional 
process, meaning that it takes place in the minds of entrepreneurs, who may end up with 
different decisions within the same situation (Gruber et al., 2015; Williams & Wood, 2015; 
Wood & McKelvie, 2015). This makes the evaluation process more uncertain and complex 
(Nielsen et al., 2012). 
Ardichvili et al. (2003) suggested a ‘stage gate’ procedure as a popular evaluation 
procedure. This procedure may be adapted to a wide range of circumstances and explicitly 
calls for evaluation at each of several levels of development. Whether or not an opportunity 
will pass through each of the ‘gates’ depends, to a large extent, on a number of constraints 
commonly experienced by entrepreneurs. In the end, an opportunity may either successfully 
pass to implementation (i.e. exploitation) or fail to pass through a gate to the next stage of 
development or implementation, and may be revised or even abandoned. 
However, Ardichvili et al. (2003) emphasised the importance of an opportunity’s 
circumstances (i.e. a recognised, discovered, or created opportunity) that may require 
different opportunity evaluation procedures. In the case of opportunity creation, for example, 
the first formal evaluation may involve a feasibility analysis that addresses the question of 
whether the proposed combination of resources can actually deliver a specified value. In 
another example, Ardichvili et al. (2003) proposed ‘due diligence’ evaluation as appropriate 
for a new business, or for acquiring and restricting an existing business for which 
entrepreneurs can develop a full-blown business plan.  
Regardless of an opportunity’s circumstances, Hisrich et al. (2013) broadly identified 
four sections (two major, and two minor) for an opportunity assessment plan. The first major 
section develops the product or services idea, analysing the competitive products and 
companies and identifying the uniqueness of the idea in terms of its unique selling 
propositions. The second major section focuses on the market, analysing its needs, size, 
trends, characteristics and growth rate. The third section, a minor one, focuses on the 
entrepreneur and the management team in terms of their background, education, skills and 
experience. The final section develops a timeline indicating what steps need to be taken to 




Therefore, a favourable opportunity is generally considered to be a necessary antecedent of 
entrepreneurial action (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Wood et al., 2017). 
2.4.4.6 Entrepreneurial Action 
The identification of an opportunity is a necessary condition for entrepreneurship, 
but it is not sufficient (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000); therefore, entrepreneurship requires 
action (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). An entrepreneurial action can be defined as ‘any 
activity entrepreneurs might take to form and exploit opportunities’ (Shane, 2003, p. 4; also 
c.f. Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Entrepreneurs can take time and gather information to 
reduce uncertainties and build the firm’s resources and capabilities (i.e. wait or defer) before 
exploiting the opportunity or maybe revising or even aborting the opportunity (Hoogendoorn 
et al., 2019). Entrepreneurs can alternatively exploit the opportunity immediately to shorten 
their lead time (Choi & Shepherd, 2004). Accordingly, entrepreneurial action is not limited 
to opportunity exploitation, but opportunity exploitation is a necessary step to bring the 
entrepreneurial process to fruition. 
Opportunity exploitation refers to the set of new venture activities and investments 
through the building of efficient business systems for full-scale operations (i.e. acquire, 
bundle, and leverage resources) to create the value perceived in the opportunity (Choi & 
Shepherd, 2004; Webb et al., 2009). This stage is characterised by great uncertainty that 
stems from the inability to accurately predict market demand, changes in the institutional 
environment or competitor actions (Webb et al., 2009). Although uncertainty poses a critical 
challenge for an entrepreneur (Hirsh et al., 2012), entrepreneurs are known for their 
readiness to engage with the opportunities arising from uncertainty (Alvarez et al., 2015; 
Edelman & Yli-Renko, 2010). For instance, entrepreneurs high in self-efficacy are more 
likely to increase their exploration and identification of business opportunities in the face of 
uncertainty, respond favourably to dynamic changes in uncertainty, and embrace highly 
uncertain situations as challenges (Schmitt et al., 2018). 
However, McMullen and Shepherd (2006) tentatively investigated how uncertainty 
may deter entrepreneurial actions such as opportunity identification and exploitation. They 
suggested that perceived uncertainty and the willingness to bear uncertainty are decisive 
factors in influencing those who decide to act entrepreneurially and those who do not. 
Uncertainty for McMullen and Shepherd (2006) becomes a mental construct related to a 




entrepreneurship, Griffin and Grote (2020), Kirzner (2009) and Schmitt et al. (2018) 
considered that uncertainty is more than a mental construct, it is a factual characteristic of 
activity and process. 
It is suggested that an entrepreneur’s perceptions of uncertainty are likely to inform 
beliefs, which in turn affect the likelihood of action (Griffin & Grote, 2020). This supports 
the notion that belief formation helps an entrepreneur to escape ignorance, defined as ‘a lack 
of information or a lack of awareness that an opportunity exists within the environment’ 
(Shepherd et al., 2007, p. 77-78), and to avoid doubt that is created by entrepreneurial 
uncertainty and ambiguity. This is consistent with the suggestion by McKelvie et al. (2011) 
that entrepreneurs make different decisions with regard to exploitation depending on the type 
of uncertainty that they experience. This study therefore proposes to move beyond the single 
negative impact of uncertainty with its focus on hesitancy, indecisiveness and 
procrastination, toward its potential dual function involving exploration, creativity and 
proactive behaviours. 
2.4.5 Psychology and the Attributes of the Entrepreneur 
Psychology literally means ‘the science of the mind’. Psychological research 
examines ‘how individuals think, feel and behave’, and connects directly to key concepts of 
‘perception, learning and motivation’ (Bratton, 2015, p. 9). In correspondence with basic 
psychological domains, Omorede et al. (2015) and Shaver (2003) identified five substantive 
key areas of entrepreneurship psychology research, including personality, cognition, 
emotion, attitude, and self.  
Entrepreneurship scholars (e.g. Cacciotti et al., 2020; Hayton et al., 2013; Schmitt et 
al., 2018) have integrated the psychology and entrepreneurship literatures to offer an 
understanding of the dynamics of, and behavioural responses to, perceived environmental 
uncertainty. Some approaches suggested that perceived uncertainty may provide a suitable 
starting point for further exploration, refinement and search for alternatives, and may 
facilitate the identification of business opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Others 
suggest precisely the opposite. In other words, anxiety and doubt lead to reluctance and 
avoidance behaviours and consequently a decrease in exploration and opportunity 




There is indeed evidence that uncertainty can generate negative emotions, which may 
prevent opportunity identification and exploitation (Kollmann et al., 2017; Patzelt & 
Shepherd, 2011). Nonetheless, negative emotions triggered by an increase in uncertainty 
may stimulate alertness and perseverance (Baas et al., 2011; Schmitt et al., 2018; Shepherd 
et al., 2020). For instance, Cacciotti et al. (2020) and Hayton et al. (2013) criticised the broad 
assumption that fear of failure leads entrepreneurs to have a less positive attitude towards 
opportunities (Li, 2011; Welpe et al., 2012) and it is always and only an inhibitor of 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Deniz et al., 2011). This is in accordance with the assumption by 
Cacciotti et al. (2016) and Martin and Marsh (2003) that fear may stimulate greater striving. 
Entrepreneurs also respond differently to stress when it is perceived as a challenge, not a 
hindrance (Podsakoff et al., 2007), possibly underpinning more adaptive and positive 
responses (Hagtvedt et al., 2019). An increase in perceived uncertainty may result in anxiety 
as well, that may signal a need for more effort and active behaviour, and thus, may prompt 
entrepreneurs to engage in exploration and/or exploitation actions in order to better clarify 
and be in control of the situation (Angie et al., 2011; Schmitt et al., 2018).  
Uncertainty can also generate positive emotions under certain circumstances (Griffin 
& Grote, 2020), which may encourage entrepreneurial behaviour (Cardon et al., 2009). 
Wilson et al. (2005, p.5) described a ‘pleasure paradox’, especially when the uncertainty is 
connected to a generally positive event. It is also argued that some positive experiences seem 
to be intensified with greater uncertainties (Kurtz et al., 2007). The negative and positive 
experiences of perceived uncertainty may help entrepreneurs to develop their resilience 
(Bonanno, 2004; Shepherd, 2020) and self-efficacy (Schmitt et al., 2018). High resilience 
may help to maintain a relatively stable trajectory of psychological and physical functioning 
over time. Entrepreneurs with higher resilience and self-efficacy are more likely to 
intuitively anticipate the positive emotions and favourable outcomes that result from the 
exploration and potential discovery of new opportunities (Bullough et al., 2014).  
In short, a subjectivist perspective of both entrepreneurship and psychology may 
generate many ways in which uncertainty can have negative and positive impacts. This 
integration may enrich this study through providing tentative explanations of some aspects 
of the current study’s findings. The next section identifies three research gaps in the extant 




2.5 The Literature Gaps   
Based on this review of the extant literature, three major gaps are identified and 
positioned as the focus of this study as follows:  
Gap 1: Many issues regarding the origins of opportunity, its related processes, and 
the key factors that play an inevitable role in opportunity-related processes and 
entrepreneurial action, remain largely unanswered to the satisfaction of many 
entrepreneurship scholars. 
The question that has been driving entrepreneurial opportunity research is concerned 
with why, when, and how some individuals or teams can recognise opportunities whereas 
others cannot (Alvarez & Barney, 2020; Alvarez et al., 2017; Plummer et al., 2007; Shane 
& Venkataraman, 2000; Wood & McKinley, 2020). Researchers from distinct disciplines 
(e.g. Baron & Ensley, 2006; Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Choi & Shepherd, 2004; Corbett, 
2007; Grégoire et al., 2010a, 2010b; Shane, 2000; Welter et al., 2016) have attempted to 
address these questions, but have mostly provided insufficient understanding and 
explanation of many issues related to how entrepreneurs identify business opportunities, and 
the influencing factors of opportunity-related processes and entrepreneurial action 
(Davidsson, 2015; Foss & Klein, 2020; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Plummer et al., 2007). This 
study therefore corresponds with Alvarez and Barney (2020), Davidsson (2015), Davidsson 
et al. (2020) and Foss and Klein (2020) in acknowledging that much work remains to be 
done to clarify and operationalise the concept of opportunity and answer opportunity-related 
questions. 
Gap 2: The role that uncertainty in the institutional environment plays in 
stimulating and/or obstructing entrepreneurial action has remained obscure. 
Uncertainty is widely recognised as a fundamental concept in entrepreneurship 
research, since all entrepreneurial decisions and actions are at least subject to some degree 
of uncertainty due to the futurity of markets (Fisher et al., 2020; McGrath, 1999; Packard et 
al., 2017). However, the role that uncertainty plays in precluding and/or motivating 
entrepreneurial processes and action remains a matter of recent debate (e.g. Bylund & 
McCaffrey, 2017; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Townsend et al., 2018). Furthermore, 
explanations of the conditions under which uncertainty may impede and/or promote 




Scholars (e.g. Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Kirzner, 1979; Luthans & Ibraveva, 2006; 
Mahnke et al., 2007; Manolova et al., 2008) have long argued that greater uncertainty can 
constitute a significant limitation for entrepreneurial action and, in particular, for opportunity 
exploitation.  However, a growing subset of entrepreneurship research (e.g. Doh et al., 2017; 
Knight, 1921; McKelvie et al., 2011; Moulick et al., 2019; Sydow et al., 2020; Tracey & 
Phillips, 2011) has acknowledged the positive impact of institutional challenges in 
generating opportunities and stimulating entrepreneurial action.  
Gap 3: Few studies have integrated the institutional perspective in examining 
opportunity-related processes, and entrepreneurial action. 
Most research has focused on micro-level explanations for entrepreneurial 
behaviour, e.g. Katz and Shepherd (2003) and Shepherd et al. (2009) investigated the role 
of cognition and emotions on entrepreneurial behaviour, Baker and Nelson (2005), Baker et 
al. (2003) and Sarasvathy (2001) studied behavioural responses such as effectuation or 
bricolage.  
On the other hand, there is growing recognition that entrepreneurial behaviour needs 
to be interpreted in the institutional context in which it occurs (Welter & Smallbone, 2011; 
Zahra & Wright, 2011). Many scholars (e.g. Alvarez & Barney, 2020, 2007; Boettake & 
Coyne, 2009; Gartner, 1985; Kirzner, 1997; Shane, 2003; Su et al., 2016) have emphasised 
that entrepreneurship depends on the institutional environment and the existence of 
opportunity cannot be separated from its external environment. Therefore, it has been argued 
that institutional theory provides a useful framework for enhancing understanding of the 
relationship between firms, entrepreneurs and their context (Bruton et al., 2014; Hoskisson 
et al., 2000; Jennings et al., 2013; Lang et al., 2014; Muhammad et al., 2016; Thornton et 
al., 2011). Nevertheless, little work has been done to integrate them into a reliable conceptual 
framework for investigating and understanding the dynamic aspects of entrepreneurial 
action, uncertainty, and institutional change (Bjerregaard & Lauring, 2012; Bylund & 
McCaffrey, 2017; Urbano & Alvarez, 2014). Even studies that did consider the institutional 
environment pay little or no attention to opportunities (Mair & Marti, 2009; Phillips & 
Tracey, 2007). In brief, few studies have considered the institutional perspective in 
examining opportunity identification, development, evaluation, and exploitation (Bruton et 




Based on the three research gaps above, this study underscores the need for 
entrepreneurship research in extremely uncertain contexts to comprehend the nuances of 
institutional barriers and voids in relation to their influence on the firm’s survival and growth 
as well as on the opportunity-related processes and entrepreneurial action. Accordingly, the 
current study integrates the IBV and the subjectivist view of entrepreneurship as its main 
theoretical foundations. This integrated theoretical framework is proposed to investigate and 
understand how an indigenous and an MNE operator in the Palestinian mobile phone sector 
perceive and respond to uncertainties and contradictions in their institutional environment. 
 Therefore, the core research question posed here is: Are institutional barriers and 
voids in extremely uncertain environments perceived as disincentives and/or 
opportunities? Based on this central research question, this study addresses the following 
main research sub-questions:  
1- What are the main institutional barriers and voids faced by Palestinian mobile phone 
operators? 
2- How do firms respond to institutional barriers and voids?  
3- What are the antecedents of entrepreneurial processes and action in an extremely 
uncertain environment at a firm-level? 
4- How are opportunities identified, developed, evaluated, and exploited within an 
extremely uncertain business environment at a firm-level? 
2.6 Summary 
The subjectivist view of entrepreneurship has been recognised as one of the key 
theories in entrepreneurship since perceptions and personal knowledge can be a starting 
point for understanding entrepreneurship. Since both opportunities and individuals (or firms) 
are embedded in an institutional environment, it has increasingly become clear that the 
institutional environment also has impact on entrepreneurial processes and action. 
Institutional theory is indeed gaining attention in entrepreneurship research, as many recent 
studies document the importance of institutions for entrepreneurial activity. The institutional 
environments of countries can create conditions that either facilitate or deter entrepreneurial 
processes and action. However, the IBV suggests that there is a mutual interaction between 
firms and their institutional environments. The idea is that although institutional barriers and 




efforts and strategies to avoid or mitigate institutional deficiencies, exploit contradictions 
and reduce the transaction costs associated with operating in settings subject to those 
institutional shortcomings. 
Many recent studies have contended that entrepreneurial opportunities are likely to 
be greatest when market conditions are furthest from equilibrium, volatile, uncertain, and 
unpredictable. Institutional barriers and voids may exacerbate this volatility and uncertainty, 
and uncertain and risky contexts may play an important role in the emergence or creation of 
opportunity. Opportunity can therefore be both objective (discovery view) and subjective 
(creation view), and these views of opportunity are complementary rather than competing 
perspectives. Therefore, entrepreneurs may need more proactive action and effective 
strategies that fit contexts throughout the exploitation and execution stages. The next chapter 

















Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the adopted research orientation, approach and design. It also 
explains the chosen research strategy, research setting, data collection and analytical 
processes, and quality of research design. The chapter further identifies the rationale behind 
each methodological choice. The extant entrepreneurship literature provides conflicting 
evidence on the positive or negative influences of institutional barriers and voids but is 
dominated by the negative. Therefore, the core research question is: Are institutional 
barriers and voids in extremely uncertain environments perceived as disincentives and/or 
opportunities? Based on this main research question, this study aims to build on recent 
developments in entrepreneurship and institutional theories in order to investigate and 
understand how an indigenous and an MNE operators in the Palestinian mobile phone sector 
perceive and respond to uncertainties and contradictions in their institutional environment.  
3.2 Research Orientation 
The research question and purpose were matched with an exploratory study that aims 
to build an in-depth understanding of the complexities of an emergent and evolving 
phenomenon from different perspectives (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007) argued that exploratory research may be appropriate to examine a phenomenon that 
is poorly understood by the extant empirical and theoretical literature. The phenomenon of 
the ‘survival and development’ of firms operating in challenging environments might not 
have been adequately explained. Entrepreneurship scholars have considered the possibility 
of upside potentials in mature, supportive environments, and it is suggested that an 
environment featuring extreme barriers and voids, especially in the context of conflict, may 
be expected to generate fewer positive, and mostly negative, influences (Bylund & 
McCaffery, 2017; Estrin et al., 2013).  
The possibility arises that institutional barriers and voids may have an ambiguous 
impact and the existing literature lacks necessary theoretical and empirical frameworks to 
make predictions, the exploratory research therefore may help in discovering this 




perspectives of the phenomenon and providing useful insights that cannot be reached 
through quantitative methods (Mintzberg, 1979). 
The Palestinian mobile phone sector operates in a highly uncertain and possibly the 
most restrictive institutional environment in the world, involving many extreme institutional 
barriers and voids. Despite these challenges, the indigenous and the MNE operators have 
each achieved significant growth, introduced innovative services, generated reasonable 
profits, contributed significantly to the Palestinian economy, and fostered the creation of 
new mobile phone-related businesses. The survival and development of these two 
Palestinian operators therefore represent ‘extreme cases’ that may provide potential 
theorising (Fletcher et al., 2018) and can generate new/novel insights (Benbasat et al., 1987) 
by applying exploratory research (Saunders et al., 2019; Yin, 2009).  
3.3 Research Approach 
Abduction may be applied in a wide range of circumstances in which we encounter 
a phenomenon or patterns of relations that challenge extant knowledge (Bamberger, 2018; 
Shepherd & Suddaby, 2017). Shepherd (2019, p. 219) suggested that ‘… abductive research 
is likely a useful approach to building and extending the boundaries of existing theories …’ 
to accommodate the other sides of entrepreneurship, particularly from extreme contexts. I 
therefore believe that an abductive reasoning approach is most likely to be suitable for this 
phenomenon-driven (exploratory) empirical research, a theorising choice recently made in 
a related entrepreneurship studies in specific emerging economy contexts, e.g. Erdogan et 
al. (2020) on Turkey, Muñoz and Kimmitt (2019) on Chile, and Sydow et al. (2020) on 
Kenya. 
Instead of moving from theory to data as in deduction, or from data to theory as in 
induction, an abductive approach moves back and forth, incorporating both deduction and 
induction (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Suddaby, 2006). This combination offers a theorising 
path that overcomes the limitations associated with the deductive approach, e.g. its reliance 
on the strict deductive logic of theory-testing and falsifying hypotheses, and the inductive 
approach with its relative incapacity to ensure theory-building (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
While induction works with the aim of demonstrating the probable generalisability of a 
situational reality on the basis of a sample of experience and deduction is grounded on the 




the aim of demonstrating the situational validity of a generalisable rule or claim (Campos, 
2011; Locke, 2011), abduction offers a logic for considering conjectures about complex 
phenomena (Locke, 2011; Van Maanen et al., 2007), aiming for generating plausible, 
conjecturable explanations that might develop new or alternative conceptual frameworks 
(Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Shapira, 2011; Shepherd & Suddaby, 2017). 
Applying an abductive approach to this study meant obtaining data that were 
sufficiently detailed and rich, allowing me to explore and describe the phenomenon, elicit 
tentative claims, identify and explain themes and patterns, and narrow range of possible 
explanations for entrepreneurial processes and action within uncertain context (Bamberger, 
2018). I applied two types of abductive inquiries in this study, namely exploitative and 
exploratory (Bamberger, 2018). First, I started with exploitative abduction since I observed 
the long-term survival and development of an indigenous and an MNE Palestinian mobile 
phone operators in an extremely uncertain business environment. I collected as much 
information as I could about this phenomenon and then sought to find some plausible 
theories (entrepreneurship, psychology and strategy) that explain how survival/development 
could have occurred.  
I further uncovered more ‘surprising facts’ during data analysis (Golden-Biddle, 
2020; Locke, 2011; Locke et al., 2008) such as some benefits of institutional barriers and 
voids, different types of opportunity, opportunity identification process, entrepreneurial 
action, types of uncertainty and positive and negative impacts of uncertainty. These puzzling 
facts encouraged me to employ an exploratory abductive logic through using the pattern of 
results to conceive a plausible explanation. I engaged in back-and-forth iteration with the 
social world as an empirical source (data) for theoretical ideas, and with the literature in 
order to identify the underlying conditions that helped me to build a theoretical story. I was 
also open to the possibility of new findings, rather than using the study to confirm my 
preconceptions and then to select the ‘best’ explanation from competing explanations or 
interpretations of the data. This abductive approach provided this research with the 
flexibility needed to follow up on promising leads and to abandon lines of inquiry found to 
be fruitless (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). 
In summary, I was involved in a deliberate abductive process (Bamberger, 2018) in 
order to understand a phenomenon of firm’s survival and growth in an uncertain context that 




the description and abstract analysis of a concrete phenomenon to a reconstruction of the 
basic conditions that make it possible, and then tried to integrate these explanations in an 
overall conceptual framework (Burg et al., 2020; Shapira, 2011), thereby contributing to a 
theory of entrepreneurship in uncertain contexts.  
3.4 Research Design 
Much case study research uses an abductive approach to theory development (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002; Saunders et al., 2019). Qualitative methods have been gaining importance 
in entrepreneurship research that has conventionally been dominated by quantitative 
enquiries (Molina-Azorín et al., 2012; Perren & Ram, 2004). Qualitative research has also 
been considered increasingly as being important to complement quantitative research to 
understand entrepreneurial phenomena (Burg et al., 2020; Suddaby et al., 2015). Qualitative 
research methods capture context richness and diversity and seem to be appropriate to the 
advancement of entrepreneurship research into tools and concepts (Hindle, 2004; Hlady-
Rispal & Jouison-Laffitte, 2014; Rauch et al., 2014). 
Qualitative case study research was particularly well suited to this study in order to 
achieve theory development through framing the study in terms of both existing debates in 
the literature, as well as being explicit about what body of theory(ies) it is building upon, 
and why (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). This research design was suitable for addressing ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions, i.e. understanding the phenomenon from the perspective of those 
studied (informants), reporting differences in perspectives among informants and examining 
and articulating processes (Pratt, 2009). It also allowed a deep scrutiny of the complex 
plurality of a site-specific context (phenomenon) as well as mechanisms (Birkinshaw et al., 
2011; Stake, 2000; Yin, 2009). Therefore, the case study approach used in this study fits 
with what Welch et al. (2011) described as a ‘contextualised explanation’ approach, which 
represents an escape from the explanation-contextualisation trade-off. 
A theoretical sample of two ‘polar, rich, deep’ cases (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Patton, 
2015) – comprising one indigenous firm and one MNE - constituted the population of 
Palestinian mobile phone operators. The two cases were chosen in order to avoid industry 
differences and because of the importance of choosing surviving firms within the acutely 
uncertain Palestinian market where the failure of firms is common (UNEP, 2020; World 




represent ‘unusually revelatory, extreme exemplar’ cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 
27) of surviving firms, a methodological choice recently made in related, authoritative 
papers based on Alvi et al. (2019) on Palestine, Bullough et al. (2014) on Afghanistan, and 
Parente et al., (2019) on the DR of Congo. Theoretical sampling - particularly of extreme 
cases (whether notable failures or successes) - is a useful tool for developing theory because 
it allows researchers to generate insights that might be obscured or absent in more ‘typical’ 
settings (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Pratt, 2009). The two cases therefore facilitated the 
investigation of a phenomenon (the survival and development of firms in a highly uncertain 
context) that is not well understood (Marshall & Rossman, 1995), and the development of 
existing theory ‘by pointing to gaps and beginning to fill them’ (Siggelkow, 2007, p. 21). 
They also enabled a broad exploration of the research question and theoretical elaboration 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
The two cases were chosen with matched-pair and replication logic to strengthen the 
basis for an ‘analytical generalization’ (Yin, 2009, p. 43), ‘mechanistic explanations’ 
(Bunge, 1997, p. 440) and ‘contextualised explanation’ (Welch et al., 2011, p. 745) of an 
empirical phenomenon. I therefore used these two cases to yield thick descriptions of the 
phenomenon within a specific context, so as to develop and/or generate deep insights into 
how firms perceive institutional barriers and voids in extremely uncertain environments and 
elucidate the specific contingent conditions under which the postulated mechanisms of the 
relationship between entrepreneurial processes and action and uncertainty operate. 
3.5 Research Setting 
In line with others (e.g. Alvi et al., 2019; Khoury & Prasad, 2016), this study 
considers Palestine a promising laboratory for exploring the phenomenon of firm’s survival 
and growth ‘in context’ (c.f. Shepherd et al., 2020; Sydow et al., 2020; Welter et al., 2019) 
and to develop more contextualised understanding of entrepreneurship theory (Bruton et al., 
2018; Moulick et al., 2019). 
The Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) refers to the geographical area occupied 
by Israel since 1967. The OPT comprises the WB (including East Jerusalem) and the GS, 
and is controlled by the PNA after the Oslo Accords in 1993 (International Labour 
Organization, 2018). According to these accords, in the WB the PNA has a civilian and 




civilian nor security control over 61% of the WB, called area (C), where Israel still exercises 
full civil and military control over bypasses, checkpoints, crossing points, ports, and airports 
(Roberts, 1995).  
Beyond these areas of the WB, the GS has been geographically and politically 
separated since the intra-Palestinian conflict that erupted after Hamas’s victory in the 2006 
election. Subsequently, Hamas seized power and controlled the GS in June 2007, while the 
PNA remained in control of the WB. Israel imposes controls on both areas through the 
closure of the GS since 2007, controlling crossing points and the movement of resources 
(BBC, 2019). Besides having three sets of national political institutions (involving the PNA, 
Hamas and Israel) for firms to deal with, the negative impact of institutional challenges is 
sharpened by violent conflict. This violence involves an external force (Israel) as well as 
internal violence between the two major political parties: Fatah and Hamas (Alvi et al., 2019; 
International Labour Organization, 2018). Outbursts of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and within the WB and GS amplify already extreme levels of uncertainty (Hiatt & 
Sine, 2014) resulting from institutional barriers and voids (Gao et al., 2017). Many of these 
institutional barriers are imposed by a neighbouring country (Israel) and this creates a unique 
and extreme institutional environment within which firms must struggle to operate and 
survive (Alvi et al., 2019; Parente et al., 2019; Khoury & Prasad, 2016). The OPT has been 
scored with the highest national level of commercial risks from political and trading events, 
and an apparently unfavourable, negative and unstable business climate (COFACE, 2019; 
CREDENDO, 2019).  
The Palestinian mobile phone sector was chosen as the setting for this research 
because it operates in arguably the most restrictive institutional environment in the world, 
regulated by three different governments (PNA, Hamas and Israel) (Rossotto et al., 2016), 
because the industry’s market structure is unique, comprising only one established 
incumbent and a relative newcomer MNE (see Table 3-1). Furthermore, eight Israeli mobile 
operators cover the WB with mobile signals, offering illegal and unregulated services 
(Grimoud et al., 2015; Rossotto et al., 2016). Despite these challenges in the past decade, 
the indigenous and the MNE operators have each achieved significant growth, introduced 
innovative services, generated reasonable profits, contributed significantly to the Palestinian 
economy, and fostered the creation of new mobile phone-related businesses. In these 
circumstances, the long-term survival and development of the two Palestinian operators and 




environment indicate the importance of these two polar cases to the research question 
addressed by this study (Patton, 2015; Yin, 2009). 
Table 3-1: Profile of Companies 
Firm Profile 
An Indigenous Firm   It is the first Palestinian cell/mobile phone operator in the OPT. It is a part of a 
domestic company group. The firm was established in 1999 and immediately 
launched its commercial operations in the WB and GS. Since its inception, the 
firm has succeeded in providing its clients with a high-quality mobile phone 
service despite of the fiercest competition from incumbent Israeli mobile phone 
operators and facing a very difficult political, economic and social circumstances. 
It has been accomplishing outstanding financial and commercial milestones and 
attracted a significant customer base of 3 million subscribers by 2018.  
An MNE It is a subsidiary/member of an international group. It is owned by an international 
group (49.03 %), the Palestine Investment Fund (34.6 %) and the public 
(16.01 %). The MNE has been licenced as the second Palestinian cell/mobile 
operator in the OPT in September 2006. However, its commercial operations were 
subject to a 3-year delay in the WB and a 11-year delay in the GS in releasing 
their service by the Israeli government (Rossotto et al., 2016). The firm launched 
its commercial services in November 2009 in the WB and in October 2017 in the 
GS. It has succeeded in overcoming many political, economic, social and 
regulatory challenges as well as intense competition from incumbent local 
operator and Israeli operators since its launch. The MNE offers a range of services 
and products tailored to the needs of individuals and businesses in Palestine. It 
also provides high standards of mobile services and ideal coverage, high-quality 
3G services in the WB, and real value for subscribers. The firm reached 1.29 
million subscribers in 2018, achieving an annual growth rate of 27% in customer 
base and 17% in revenue. 
3.6 Data Collection Tool and Process 
The interview is probably the most widely employed method in qualitative research 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015), and semi-structured interviews may be used in an exploratory study 
(Saunders et al., 2019). This study therefore used the semi-structured interview as its primary 
data collection tool. Because little is known, rich, detailed, and evocative data are needed to 
understand the phenomenon of interest (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Such semi-
structured interviews were particularly suitable for this study as an efficient way to gather 
rich, empirical data with an open mind, especially as the phenomenon under study is unique 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The use of interviews enabled me to identify and investigate 
key variables over the course of the study, explore points of interest, and clarify and confirm 
meanings. 
Purposive sampling is often used when working with very small samples such as in 
case study research and selecting participants who are particularly informative (Saunders et 
al., 2019). I applied purposive sampling to select the informants in a strategic way, so that 




Within the indigenous firm and the MNE, senior and middle managers were selected (see 
Table 3-2), who were qualified (highly educated and experienced) to report on how they 
perceived institutional barriers and voids, and how uncertainty affected their decisions 
regarding entrepreneurial processes and action. I achieved triangulation (Piekkari et al., 
2009) in the form of a ‘triangulation of informants’ (Stake, 2000) and ‘unit triangulation’ 
(Marschan-Piekkari et al., 2004) whereby knowledgeable informants (e.g. organisational 
actors from different hierarchical levels, functional areas, and geographies) offered diverse 
views on the focal phenomenon (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Cross-case analysis was 
also conducted to identify the main similarities and differences between the two firms. 
Table 3-2: Profile of informants 
Informant 
code  
Job title Years of experience 
before joining the firm 











The Indigenous firm 










J03 Customer Care Director 1 (Local Insurance 
Sector) 
19 03/09/2018 2 
J04 Procurement Department 
Head 
No experience 17 11/09/2918 2 
J05 Legal Advisor 5 (Legal Services Sector 
& Higher Education) 
15 13/09/2018 2 
J06 Sales Director 2 (Local Service Sector) 19 17/09/2018 2 
J07 Project Management 
Office Manager 
No experience 12 23/09/2018 2 
J08 Technical Department 
Head (Gaza) 
1 (Electric Power 
Industry) 
20 27/10/2018 2 
J09 Product Development 
Department Head 







J10 Sales Planning 
Department Head 
3 (Local IT Industry) 16 04/10/2018 2 
J11 Segment Department 
Head 









Network Planning Head 
(Gaza) 

















Table 3-2: (Continued) 
W02 Regulatory and Public 
Affairs Director 
11 (Ministry of Telecom 
& Information 
Technology) 
10 05/09/2018 1.5 
W03 Marketing 
Communications Director 
6 (Local Real Estate 
Sector) 
4 06/09/2018 1.5 
W04 Chief Commercial Officer 20 (Local Telecom 












W06 Network Director 12 (International & 
Local Telecom 
Industry) 
11 10/09/2018 2 








Chief Financial Officer 14 (International 
Financial Services and 
Local Telecom Sector) 
11 13/09/2018 1.5 
W09 
 







W10 Business Transformation 
Director 
20 (International & 
Local Telecom 
Industry) 
11 25/09/2018 2 
W11 Head of Procurement & 
Supply Chain 
15 (INGOs, World 
Bank) 
8 09/10/2018 2 
Source: Author 
 
I developed an interview guide (see Appendix A). The interview guide was 
sometimes amended during the interview process and questions were revised to elicit 
different and unhesitant responses. Skype interviews were necessitated for interviews within 
the two case firms by the repeated refusal of the Israeli government to grant entry permits 
for me to enter the WB and GS. This reflects the severe constraints in the context where this 
research situated. Thirty-one (31) semi-structured interviews were conducted (16 with 12 
senior and middle managers in the indigenous firm and 15 with 11 senior and middle 
managers in the MNE). The interviews were conducted in Arabic by me (a native Arabic 
speaker) after first piloting them with two other native Arabic speakers with excellent 
English, in order to ensure the correspondence and reliability of the interview questions. The 
questions were asked in English, then in Arabic, and there were no differences in their 
understanding. The questions also were tested in the end of each interview with managers. 
The interviews started with three predetermined themes, and fifteen open-ended 




In a few interviews, these questions were asked in an order as in Appendix B, but in the 
majority of interviews, the discussion in interviews determined the sequence of questions. 
In the majority of interviews, all questions were asked, and respondents were able to answer 
them. However, in some interviews, respondents were not able to answer some questions 
because they were not related to their area of experience. At the beginning of an interview, 
I explained to the interviewee some terms such as ‘institutions’ and their types to ensure a 
better and accurate understanding of these technical terms and resolve the problem of 
tautology.  
The interview structure consisted of two main sections. The first asked for 
information about the informant, and a description and background of the business, industry 
and Palestinian context. Once sufficient trust had been established, the second part of the 
interview explored the three main themes: (1) institutional challenges and obstacles, (2) 
entrepreneurial processes and action, and (3) uncertainty and entrepreneurial opportunity, 
processes and action.  
The interviews were conducted from September to December 2018, and each lasted 
between 1 and 2 hours. All interviews were recorded and transcribed into Arabic. The 
interview scripts were translated into English by me. This resulted in over 48 hours of 
interviews captured in 260 pages of English transcript. While a two-way professional 
translation (i.e. back-translation) is recommended for some qualitative studies (Chen & 
Boore, 2009) to establish translation equivalence (Hult et al., 2008), it generates the 
‘paradox’ of equivalence (Sechrest et al., 1972) and encourages ‘a spurious lexical 
equivalence’ (Deutscher, 1973, p. 167).  I therefore discarded this option in light of the risk 
of losing the richness of context-specific accounts and social and cultural aspects and 
adopted ‘contextualising translation’ (Chidlow et al., 2014), which were central to the 
examination of entrepreneurial process and action within an extremely uncertain context. I 
relied on my own language skills to translate and overcome language differences (Chidlow 
et al., 2014) and the Arabic and English transcripts and results of this study were shared with 
the interviewees to check their accuracy and whether they reflected their opinions. This 
process verified the understanding and meaning of collected data and their analysis. It also 
ensured that most of the participants were generally happy with the drafts but wanted minor 
amendments. I then revised the drafts, taking research participants’ comments into account. 




3.7 Unit of Analysis and Data Analysis Process 
A case study may involve the examination of a single unit of analysis (holistic case 
study) and/or more than one unit of analysis (embedded case study) (Yin, 2009). A holistic 
design may be used where a single case examines only the overall nature of an organisation 
(Fletcher et al., 2018; Saunders et al., 2019). Given that this study consists of two holistic 
cases (two firms) and is concerned only with each organisation as a whole (a holistic case 
study), this study used a single unit of analysis (i.e. the firm level) that was well suited with 
the research question being addressed. 
Generally, an abductive data analysis in this study was divided into two parts: with 
inductive and deductive contributions. First, in inductive data analysis, I conducted a within-
case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). This involved an in-depth examination of each of the two 
cases, where unique insights were drawn from detailed case-level narratives of interview 
data. It allowed for gaining familiarity with each of the cases and identifying early patterns 
for each case, before embarking on the systematic examination of generalised patterns across 
cases. Subsequently, I conducted a cross-case analysis focusing on contrasts and similarities 
across the two cases. In a second, deductive stage, the inferred categories (Figure 3-1) and 
existing literature were considered in tandem (Gioia et al., 2012), whereby emergent ideas 
and extant concepts and frameworks were combined to uncover theoretical concepts that 
could be useful for both making sense of the collected data and facilitating conceptual 
development. This abductive approach to theorising and conceptual development was 
particularly useful when emerging constructs and relationships were not yet well articulated 
in the literature (Poole et al., 2000). It enabled me to make sense and (re)contextualise the 
phenomenon of a firm’s survival and growth within an extremely uncertain context within a 
set of ideas (Hlady-Rispal and Jouison-Laffitte 2014).  
At a more detailed level, Thematic Analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to 
identify, analyse and report patterns (themes) within the data. Thematic data analysis enabled 
me to ‘identify or examine the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualizations - and 
ideologies - that are theorized as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data’ 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84). Within each case, I followed the systematic approach of Gioia 
et al. (2012) to explore existing theory and to develop new concepts by using a form of 




I first read the transcripts carefully, labelled all relevant sentences, developed 
individual codes and combined them under emerging concepts. In the second step of the 
analysis, the nascent concepts were analysed against existing theories and framed into 
emerging themes by bringing several codes together and labelled themes until saturation was 
reached. Some codes involved iteration between responses and concepts from prior 
theorising and others were inductively derived. I then identified the most relevant themes, 
aggregated them into different dimensions and created a matrix demonstrating their 
connection and a hierarchy of themes. Figure 3-1 illustrates the structure and ordering of the 
data, from specific first-order codes to more general second-order codes and aggregate 
dimensions. 
These dimensions were synthesised under the three parts of the study as: 
(1) Institutional barriers (formal and informal) according to the categorisation of 
institutional constraints (Peng, 2000) and conceptualisation of institutional voids 
(Khanna et al., 2005; Khanna & Palepu, 2010), their benefits and disbenefits for the 
company, and strategic responses. 
(2) Antecedents of entrepreneurial processes and action, entrepreneurial processes and 
action, and types of opportunity and their impact on entrepreneurial processes and 
actions.  
(3) Environmental uncertainty (state, effect and response) according to Milliken’s (1987) 
typology of uncertainty, their impact as an incentive and disincentive on entrepreneurial 
opportunities, process and action, strategic actions to deal with uncertainty, and the effect 
of the psychology and attributes of managers on entrepreneurial action. 
I continued this process until it achieved sufficient coding consistency (Weber, 
1990). This structured procedure for data collection and analysis enhanced the reliability of 
the research (Yin, 2003). Data coding was followed by within-case analysis of each firm. In 
a final step, I focused on cross-case analysis to allow insights to emerge from the data and 








Figure 3-1: An Example of the Data Analysis Process 






 ‘The Palestinian context is very complicated, and it 
is very difficult to generate expectations of what 
could happen in the Palestinian market at any 
political, economic, social level’. (W05) 
 ‘We do our best to categorise uncertain contexts 
according to their causes … e.g. the political 
complications (the Israel-PNA relationship, and 
PNA-Hamas relationship), the turbulence in 
Palestine, and the market’s changes. But we are still 
uncertain about how things are changing’. (W07) 
Statements about 
the company’s 
inability to predict 







 ‘We also cannot easily estimate how these changes 
in the external and business environments could 
affect our company’. (W04) 
 ‘The risk department tries to estimate the influence 
of any changes in the external or business 
environment on our company, but this task is very 
complicated in the Palestinian market’. (W09) 
Statements about 
the company’s 
inability to predict 
the impact of 




 ‘Some environmental changes sometimes benefited 
our company and created some opportunities’. 
(W01) 
  ‘… the continuous changes … generated some 
opportunities for our dynamic firm as we can rapidly 

















 ‘This ever-changing business environment often 
impeded entrepreneurial opportunities, especially 
when we cannot determine its impact on our 
company and cannot design appropriate solutions to 












 ‘fear of failure drove us to be more aggressive and 
increased our tendency to be creative in order to 
implement our projects and achieve success’. (W01 
 ‘If this opportunity will lead to a significant 
development, we ignore our fears and exploit the 
opportunity’. (W06) 
Statement about 
how fear of failure 









 ‘… fear of failure encouraged you to avoid failure 
and achieve success, but if we do not notice any 
progress, this will lead to frustration’. (W05) 
 ‘The fear of failure varies from one managerial level 
to another. For example, lower levels of staff fear 
losing their jobs, but the higher managerial levels 
are not afraid, and this was a motive for them to 
identify and exploit new opportunities’. (W07) 
Statements about 
how fear of failure 













3.8 Research Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness issues (quality criteria of qualitative research) were carefully 
considered in this research by assessing four criteria of qualitative data robustness, namely, 
creditability, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Bryman & Bell, 2015; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Sinkovics et al., 2008). 
1- Credibility 
A high level of credibility of findings was achieved by ensuring methodological fit 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007). I followed systematic procedures to design and implement 
a two holistic case studies, articulating why case study research was appropriate and why it 
was chosen in preference to other methodologies, and providing an explanation of how and 
why the two firm cases were chosen. I also was carried out according to the ‘canons of good 
practice’ (Bryman & Bell, 2015) where semi-structured interviews were conducted carefully 
using clarifying questions, probing meanings and by exploring responses from different 
perspectives (Saunders et al., 2019). 
Credibility was enhanced by piloting the Arabic and English versions of questions 
of interview with two other native Arabic speakers with excellent English. It was also 
ensured by achieving triangulation with informants and unit triangulation. The selection of 
knowledgeable informants from different managerial levels, functional areas and 
geographies generated different insights and diverse views on the focal phenomenon 
(Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). This allowed me to reach precise understandings and 
conclusions based on varying opinions. 
Credibility was also established by the review and validation of evidence (Bryman 
& Bell, 2015; Sinkovics et al., 2008). Each key research informant was provided with the 
interview protocol, the Arabic and English script of interview, and the findings in relation to 
his/her organisation. Most of the participants were generally happy with the drafts but 
wanted minor amendments. I revised the drafts, taking research participants’ comments into 
account. Such reviews helped in avoiding researcher bias and subsequent misinterpretations, 
‘giving voice to participants’ (Bluhm et al., 2011, p. 1870), and ensuring a good 
correspondence between the findings of the study and the perspectives and experiences of 




In relation to the data analysis process specifically, I employed two analytic 
approaches to achieve credibility. The first approach involved conceptual ordering for 
drawing from case study data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I theorised by using activities 
such as abstracting, generalising, relating, selecting, explaining, synthesising and idealising 
(Weick, 1995). In this iterative process, I was able to build a logical chain of evidence and 
establish concrete outputs. Second, pattern-matching was used for comparing empirically 
observed patterns within-and-cross data with either predicted ones, or patterns established 
in prior studies and in different contexts (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010; Yin, 2009). This enabled 
me to move back and forth between theory and data and to be open to challenging the initial 
theoretical framework in order to develop a richer theoretical perspective than already exists 
in the literature. 
2- Transferability 
I recognise the limits of case studies in relation to generalisability. However, the 
purpose and value of case studies may be judged not on the basis of generalisability but on 
their transferability and comparability (Chreim et al., 2007). Transferability of findings was 
enhanced by including two firms constituting the population of Palestinian mobile phone 
operators (i.e. this study was the entire sector). The inclusion of two cases increased the 
robustness of a finding by replicating it across cases (literal replication). Once such direct 
replications have been made, the results might be accepted as being consistent with the 
theory, even though further replications had not been performed (Yin, 2009). This study 
therefore achieved ‘analytical generalisation’ rather than ‘statistical generalisation’ (Gibbert 
& Ruigrok, 2010; Yin, 2009) where I established a contextualised explanation from a 
particular set of results (empirical observations).  
I further produced a ‘thick description’ (Bryman & Bell, 2015) of the two cases. I 
provided a full description of the research question, design, context, findings and resulting 
interpretations in the research report. This may allow another researcher to make judgements 
about the possible transferability of findings to another context and to design a similar 
research project to be used in a different, although suitable, research setting (Saunders et al., 
2019). The research also explained how its findings were related to existing theory and 







The dependability of findings was enhanced by ensuring the transparency of data 
collection process and clear presentation of data analysis process and research findings 
(Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010; Sinkovics et al., 2008). The research process and procedures 
(study protocol) were carefully documented and clarified. A detailed research design was 
described, the choice of research strategy and methods was justified, and the data collection 
and analysis processes were explained. The interview guide and questions were included in 
the research report (see Appendix A & B), the selection of research participants was 
explained and information on their characteristics were provided (see Table 3-2), and a 
database of interview transcripts was developed (one example of interview scripts was 
provided in Appendix C). 
With regard to the data analysis process and research findings presentation, the 
coding schemes and each step of process were documented (see Figure 3-1) and the 
analytical techniques were described. The research data were also systematically presented 
through Tables and Figures, designed to provide a chain of evidence and ensure that the 
reader understands how I reached his conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). An 
appropriate balance between data and interpretation (Pratt, 2009) was attempted to 
demonstrate how the evidence led to the study findings. The research report was written to 
allow a ‘drive toward some new concept development and theoretical discovery’ (Gioia et 
al., 2012, p. 23). I sought to move beyond conceptual ordering (describing the data and 
condensing them into patterns and concepts) toward theorising (Yin, 2009). 
4- Confirmability  
I am cognisant of the impossibility of complete objectivity in business research 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). Nonetheless, I strived to be as objective as possible through 
employing good practices and appropriate operational procedures and minimising the impact 
of my personal values and theoretical inclinations on the conduct of the research and findings 
deriving from it. Confirmability was further achieved by ensuring my openness to different 
views and new emerging concepts and themes (Sinkovics et al., 2008). I was open to the 
possibility of being surprised by the data, rather than using it to confirm my preconceptions 
and then selecting the ‘best’ explanation from competing explanations or interpretations of 





This chapter discussed and justified each methodological choice to ensure 
methodological fit. This study adopted an exploratory research orientation and an abductive-
theorising approach. It used qualitative methodology with two case studies, focusing on the 
two (one indigenous, one MNE) mobile phone operators from Palestine/OPT. The semi-
structured interview was used as a primary data collection tool and purposive sampling was 
used to select the key research informants. The thematic analysis approach (Gioia et al., 
2012), and cross-case analysis were followed to derive the findings. Finally, the quality 
criteria of qualitative research (creditability, transferability, dependability and 


















Chapter 4: Within-Case Data Analysis and Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the within-case findings revealed through the thematic 
analysis. Findings within each case are presented and analysed into three main parts that 
correspond to the research questions. The first presents analysis related to the formal and 
informal institutional challenges faced by the indigenous and the MNE operators. This part 
identifies the institutional barriers and voids, disbenefits and benefits of institutional 
challenges, and strategic responses to institutional barriers and voids. The second part 
identifies the antecedents of entrepreneurial processes and action and explains 
entrepreneurial processes and action within Palestinian uncertain mobile phone market. The 
third part presents analysis related to the effect of uncertainty on entrepreneurial processes, 
action and opportunity. This part identifies types of environmental uncertainty and types of 
opportunity and their impact on entrepreneurial processes and action and explores the effect 
of emotions on entrepreneurial action. 
4.2 Formal and Informal Institutional Challenges: An Indigenous 
Firm  
4.2.1 Institutional Barriers and Voids 
All interviewees of the indigenous firm confirmed that there were many extreme 
institutional challenges in the Palestinian mobile phone sector exacerbated by violent 
conflict. Since violence, particularly Israeli-Palestinian, was arguably inherent in the 
Palestinian context, it was decided not to investigate separately the effects of violence. 
However, the networks director remarked that ‘The Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Second 
Intifada) severely affected our company and was the reason to prevent us to install new 
transmissions in the OPT after 2000’(J02) and the customer care director also reported that 
‘The intra-Palestinian armed conflict and civil unrest in 2007 negatively affected our 
commercial operations and significantly added further administrative burdens’ (J03). 
The findings suggested that the formal institutional barriers, especially political 
instability and imprecise regulative relations between the PNA and Israeli governments, and 




and the indigenous firm’s operations, growth and profitability. The interviewees also 
asserted that the different institutional environments and barriers within the Palestinian 
market (WB and GS) after the Palestinian division in 2007 increased the complexity of 
institutional dimensions (e.g. regulative, political, economic, legal, technological) of the 
indigenous firm’s business environment. Some managers mentioned a few informal 
institutional barriers, among which an unfavourable perception of Palestinian operators’ 
service quality in comparison to that of Israeli operators was the most commonly considered 
as the most important. Some respondents further identified some institutional voids in their 
business environment such as the lack of a telecommunications infrastructure, and local and 
international contractors and vendors (i.e. intermediaries). Table 4-1 summarises the main 
institutional barriers and voids that the indigenous firm faced and provides some illustrative 
quotations for each barrier or void identified. 




Formal institutional barriers 
The different institutional 
environment and barriers 
within the Palestinian 
market 
 ‘… the regulatory, economic and political institutions changed after the 
Palestinian division in 2007. There are two governments: the PNA in the WB 
and Hamas government in the GS, which resulted in different laws and 
regulation’ (J03, J08) 
 ‘There are two markets and there are many differences between the WB and 
GS markets’ (J10) 
Unstable political 
structure 
 ‘… the PNA has no power in GS; therefore, we have to deal with different 
laws and regulations in GS, but at the same time, we cannot coordinate with 
Hamas government in GS’ (J03) 
 ‘Political instability and the Israeli occupation created more uncertainty in 
the Palestinian market’ (J04) 
No unified, credible and 
harmonised legal 
frameworks 
 ‘The Palestinian division … led to two different legal systems. There is no 
unified Palestinian commercial law since the Jordanian commercial law is 
used in the WB and the Egyptian commercial law is used in GS’ (J05) 
 ‘The contradiction of laws, regulations and taxes due to the Palestinian 
division (two regulators: the PNA and Hamas)’ (J11) 
The technology gap 
between the Israeli and 
Palestinian operators 
 ‘The Israeli operators have been granted 3G frequencies (2004) and 4G 
(2014) … however, the Palestinian operators have been granted only 3G 
frequencies after 10 years of negotiation (2018) in the WB without GS’ (J01) 
 ‘The Israeli government prevents us from transferring advanced 
technologies such as 3G and 4G to the Palestinian market’ (J04) 
The limited spectrum and 










 ‘The Israeli government, rather the PNA, controls frequencies … our 
company was granted 5 MHz dedicated and 5 MHz shared with the Israeli 
operators. However, the smallest Israeli operator was granted at least 20 
MHz dedicated’ (J01) 
 ‘The Israeli government granted our company only 4.8 MHz band of 2G 
frequencies and around half of these frequencies are shared with the Israeli 





Table 4-1: (Continued) 
The illegal competition 
from Israeli operators 
 
 
 ‘There are nine Israeli operators that are illegally operating in the 
Palestinian market as a black market’ (J10) 
 ‘There are 500,000 SIM cards for the Israeli operators, around 17% of the 
Palestinian market’ (J01, J04) 
Israel’s control of ports 
and crossings, and a very 
lengthy and inefficient 
process for importing 
telecommunications 
equipment 
 ‘… but the entry of such equipment takes a long time, and the security 
procedures impose many restrictions … or Israeli government allows the 
entry of some parts and refuses the rest. The Israeli government also bans 
some important equipment for the mobile phone sector such as IP 
Technology’ (J08) 
 ‘Israel bans the entry of some equipment, especially to GS. For example, 
Fleet Management Tracking System’ (J10, J12) 
Movement and travel 
restrictions for staff and 
consultants 
 ‘We decided to buy a new system from an American-Dutch company, but the 
Israeli government did not grant them permission (i.e. Visa) to enter the WB 
to install and configure the system’(J02) 
 ‘The difficulty of staff’s movement and travel … and this prevented us from 
attending trainings, workshops, and conferences’ (J12) 
The fragmentation of 
Palestinian cities and 
towns 
 ‘We cannot link our infrastructure in WB and GS. There are Israeli 
restrictions on releasing permits to move equipment within Area C, build 
transmissions in the WB and GS, allow infrastructure deployment, and allow 
the installation of microwave links’ (J01, J04) 
 ‘The segregation of the Palestinian cities increased call drops and weakened 
the coverage, particularly between the WB cities, and between the WB and 
GS’ (J02) 
The weak legislative 
authority of the PNA 
 ‘There is a need for legislation to control the Palestinian market, but the 
PNA does not issue legislation to facilitate our operations’ (J05) 
 ‘The inability of the PNA to control and regulate the Palestinian market, as 
Israel controls all issues that related to the mobile phone sector’ (J10) 
The weak regulatory 
capacity of the MTIT 
 ‘There are no adequate experts and professionals in the Palestinian MTIT 
who can properly regulate the market. For example, we asked the MTIT to 
coordinate with the Palestinian Monetary Authority to legislate regulations 
and laws of the Mobile Payment System, but they don’t have specialised staff 
to enact the proper rules and regulations yet’ (J10) 
The weak enforcement 
power of the PNA 
 ‘The PNA does not have control over area (C), so traffickers are still able to 
smuggle the Israeli operators’ SIM cards to the Palestinian market. 
Moreover, the PNA does not have any enforcement power to prevent illegal 
Israeli mobile operators from working in the Palestinian territories …’ (J01) 
 ‘The weak role of the MTIT in controlling the Palestinian market. Also, the 
weakness of the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) in controlling 
municipalities’ (J06) 
The weak support for the 
Palestinian operators 
from the PNA 
 ‘The Palestinian ministries impose extensive requirements and impose many 
restrictions on our operations in the mobile phone sector’ (J06) 
 ‘The PNA charged our company $ 319 million as a license fee, while the 
Israeli operators paid only $ 9 million for a 3G licence … no adequate 
governmental support from the PNA to the Palestinian operators’. (J11) 
Informal institutional barriers 
Unfavourable perception 
of Palestinian operators’ 
service quality in 
comparison to that of 
Israeli operators 
 ‘The Palestinian culture, especially the belief in the superiority of Israeli 
products, is a challenge for our company and we are trying to change and 
influence it’ (J03) 
 ‘We aim to change the Palestinians’ belief that the Israeli products have 
higher quality than the Palestinian's products’ (J07) 
A lack of Palestinian 
awareness of some health 
issues related to the sites 
and security concerns 
related to the mobile 
phone usage in some 
towns 
 
 ‘In some villages, we faced some difficulties in installing sites, as the people 
did not have enough awareness. They also had a fear that these sites spread 
diseases’ (J06) 
 ‘We terminated some products such as a child tracking system due to some 
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A lack of awareness of 
how corporations work 
 
 ‘Due to the lack of well-established corporations in Palestine, the 
Palestinian community did not fairly understand how corporations work and 
what are the major working procedures necessary to ensure a high level of 
governance’ (J07) 
Institutional voids 
The absence of 
telecommunications 
infrastructure 
 ‘When we entered the Palestinian market, there was no telecommunication 
infrastructure’ (J01, J03) 
 ‘Our company created the telecommunication infrastructure in the 
Palestinian market’ (J12) 
The absence of 
installation and 
maintenance contractors 
 ‘There were no sites installation and maintenance companies in the 
Palestinian market …’ (J08) 
 ‘At the beginning, our company depended on its human resources (staff) … 
we established specialised teams and divisions for installing and 
maintaining sites, and a handsets (mobile) maintenance centre due to the 
absence of specialised companies’ (J10) 
A shortage of marketing 
consultants and media 
production 
intermediaries 
 ‘There was a very limited number of professional media companies; 
therefore, we contracted some media companies in other countries in the 
region … there were no marketing consultants … there was no reliable 
database for the mobile phone sector that could be used as indicators to 
segment the Palestinian market’ (J11) 
A shortage of reliable 
logistics and distribution 
companies 
 ‘There were no logistics companies, so we encouraged and collaborated 
with many contractors to expand and develop more reliable distribution 
channels’ (J03) 
 ‘We were the first company in the Palestinian economy that created the 
dealership concept’ (J06) 
A shortage of 
international and local 
vendors of 
telecommunication 
equipment, spare parts, 
software, systems, and 
applications 
 ‘Israel allows us to buy the telecommunication equipment and spare parts 
only from specific international vendors such as Ericsson and recently 
Nokia’ (J02) 
 ‘The absence of international vendors due to the political instability and a 
very limited number of local contractors’ (J04) 
 ‘The inability of our international sub-contractor and vendors, e.g. Ericsson, 
to enter the Palestinian territories to install, configure, and operate the 
equipment’(J12) 
Source: Author 
4.2.2 Disbenefits and Benefits of Institutional Challenges 
The managers of the indigenous firm stated that the aforementioned institutional 
barriers and voids (see Table 4-1) engender an extremely complex business context. They 
also increase the level of environmental uncertainty in the Palestinian mobile phone market. 
The findings of this study indicated that these institutional barriers and voids have different 
levels and trajectories of impact on the firms’ operations, growth, competitive position and 
profitability. The interviewees pointed out that these institutional barriers and voids generate 
various disbenefits/diseconomies for the indigenous firm in the form of costs, efficiency, 
quality, and overall competitiveness and prospects of growth (see Table 4-2). 
On the other hand, many managers emphasised that the institutional barriers and 




way around these barriers, fill out these voids, and get the better of this uncertain business 
environment. The benefits can be exemplified by higher creativity and knowledge, 
prospective opportunities, higher barriers to entry, a better resource allocation and 
utilisation, a higher level of commitment, and a greater attention to customers. Table 4-2 
summarises the main disbenefits and benefits of institutional challenges for the indigenous 
firm and provides some illustrative quotations for each disbenefit/benefit. 







 ‘The increase in costs and efforts to operate the networks such as OPEX for 
renting data centres (i.e. transmissions in London and Amman …’ (J03) 
 ‘We bought additional features from our vendors to ensure high quality (i.e. 




 ‘If Israel grants our company enough frequencies to serve our 3 million 
customers, we need around 500 sites in the WB and GS, but we built 1500 sites 
in order to overcome the challenge of limited frequencies’ (J02) 
 ‘We installed generators for each site (i.e. towers), but we still face a problem 
of fuel entry. Therefore, we recently installed a solar energy system, which cost 
around $ 2 million’ (J04) 
The high intensity of 
rivalry in the 
Palestinian market 
 ‘According to Arab Advisor Organisation, the Palestinian market is classified 
as the most competitive market in the region due to the illegal competition from 
the Israeli operators’ (J09) 
 ‘The presence of Israeli mobile operators reduced our market share and 
increased the competition in the Palestinian market’ (J03, J07) 
The competitive 
disadvantage of the 
Palestinian operators 
 ‘The technology gap gave competitive advantages to the Israeli operators over 
the Palestinian operators and allowed Israeli operators to extensively work in 
the Palestinian market’ (J07) 
The inability of the 
Palestinian operators 
to expand their 
networks and provide 
new services 
 ‘The limited frequencies prevented us from expanding our network to serve a 
larger number of customers, and from improving our network to provide 3G and 
4G services’ (J07) 
 ‘Our company is not able to offer new services due to the inability of the MTIT 
to properly regulate the market for new services such as Mobile Payment 
Services’ (J10) 
The low quality of 
services, voice and 
video calls 
 ‘The limited frequencies affected the quality of services ... we faced more 
difficulties in sustaining a high quality of service by using 3G frequencies, as 
the frequency’s wave of 3G is narrower than 2G’ (J06) 
 ‘We faced many technical problems such as fibre optic cables cuts in other 
countries, seas and oceans and quality problems in voice and video calls’ (J08)  
The inability of the 
Palestinian operators 
to attract new 
customers 
 ‘We cannot attract more customers (i.e. increase our market share) due to the 
inability to expand our networks’ (J01, J02) 
 ‘When our customer base reached 100,000 customers, Israel tried to destroy 
our company through preventing the entry of new transmissions to the WB and 
GS’. (J01) 
The inability of the 
Palestinian operators 
to fully capitalise on 
vendors’ services and 
offer post-sale 
services to their 
customers 
 
 ‘We cannot benefit from the services of our venders (Ericsson and Nokia) such 
as installation, maintenance, and post-sale support’ (J09) 
 ‘The difficulty of providing post-sale services and maintenance for some 
products. For example, Israel allowed the entry of 400 tracking devices to Fleet 
Management Services in the GS, but then banned the entry of these devices or 
any spare parts; therefore, we are unable to provide any services to the users of 








rather than strategic 
issues 
 ‘Instead of focusing our efforts on strategic planning, we exert around 80% of 
our efforts on operational matters’ (J02) 
 ‘This environment could impede us from thinking of development and strategic 
planning, and we are very busy all the time finding solutions for the problems 
in our operations. Indeed, we are managing crisis. We cannot plan for more 
than a week due to the continuous and fast changes in the market’ (J08) 
Delays in project 
execution and 
creating new revenue 
streams 
 ‘The 3G services project has been delayed for more than 10 years. However, 
after very long negotiations with the Israeli government through the MTIT … 
we launched 3G services in WB only …’ (J02)  
 ‘The delay in launching 3G and 4G services prevented the generation of new 
profits’ (J09) 
The suspension of 
some commercial 
activities 
 ‘In 2005, our company stopped selling SIMs to our customers because the 
Israeli government prevented the entry of equipment and SIMs’ (J04) 
 ‘In the 2008/2009 war on GS, our network completely stopped after 7 days. In 
the 2012 war, around 50% of our network was working. In the 2014 war, around 
70% of our network was working’. (J08) 
Economic losses and 
the spread of serious 
diseases in the 
Palestinian 
community 
 ‘Israeli operators steal around 17% of the Palestinian market, which harshly 
affected the Palestinian economy’ (J01, J04, J11) 
 ‘The illegal operations of Israeli operators in the OPT weakened the Palestinian 
economy and caused health problems … this caused many diseases to people 
who live near their sites’ (J07) 
Benefits 
The creation of a 
more creative and 
innovative working 
environment 
 ‘When Israel prevented the entry of transmissions, we hired data centres in 
London and Amman. Our engineers designed a system to link these 
transmissions and the networks in WB and GS. This solution was an innovative 
idea …’. (J01) 
 ‘We doubled the number of sites and reused the same frequencies to surmount 
the limited frequencies barrier, but this caused a frequency noise. We solved this 
problem through a frequency downgrade …’ (J06) 
The creation of a 
better technical know-
how and faster staff 
learning 
 ‘Nokia Company praised our staff’s capabilities in solving many technical 
problems and designing some innovative technical solutions to surmount some 
barriers’ (J02)  
 ‘Our staff became experts in dealing with this uncertain and turbulent 
environment due to the nature, number and intensity of problems and barriers 
that they face on a daily basis…’ (J05) 
The finding of more 
efficient and effective 
alternative solutions 
 ‘… but we have to find solutions (each problem has solutions). Therefore, these 
barriers motivated us to find solutions and achieve success’ (J05)   
 ‘When Israel prevented the entry of scratch cards, we converted our top-up 
system from scratch cards to 100% online top-up system’ (J01)  
 ‘We installed generators for around 550 sites (i.e. towers), then installed a solar 
energy system in the GS to get around the power cuts problem’ (J01, J03, J12) 
More efficient and 
effective allocation 
and utilisation of 
resources 
 ‘Many resources … are reallocated and combined appropriately in order to 
contribute to solving many problems …’ (J02) 
 ‘Our staff surmounted some barriers due to their ability to optimally utilise and 
employ the available resources’ (J12) 
Flexible and dynamic 
firm 
 ‘In this turbulent environment, we need managers who can properly manage, 
deal with, and benefit from the rapid and continuous changes’ (J05) 
 ‘… However, after launching 3G services, we restructured the department and 
added new positions as 3G services are different from 2G services and need a 
new mentality’ (J07) 
The improvement of 
networks and 
optimisation of value-
added to customers 
 ‘… this encouraged us to provide high quality services and new services with 
reasonable prices … this encouraged us to improve our network in Area C and 
between the Palestinian cities’ (J04) 
 ‘We commercially did many things such as offering new products with high 
quality and reasonable prices. We also have many roaming agreements with 
other operators in different countries to offer better services and add better 
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The creation of some 
opportunities for the 
firm 
 ‘We designed a new service called Traffic, which helped our customers to know 
the status of road and Israeli checkpoints between the fragmented Palestinian 
cities and towns’ (J01) 
 ‘These barriers and voids urged us to create new companies or departments, 
which can be considered as added value to both our company and the 
Palestinian market, and helped us to achieve some competitive advantages’ 
(J12) 
The creation of a 
competitive 
advantage for one 
operator rather than 
others 
 ‘Our company was the first to move into the Palestinian market, and we enjoyed 
a monopoly for around 8 years, but we were competing with the Israeli 
operators’ (J05) 
 ‘This uncertain and challenging environment gave some competitive advantages 
to local companies compared with foreign companies as foreign investors are 
afraid to work in the Palestinian market ...’ (J09) 
The generation of 
further revenues from 
products and services 
that are outdated in 
other markets 
 ‘We exploited the 2G network, especially data and internet services to the 
maximum.  For example, our customers consume daily around two Terabytes 
on our network in the GS’ (J08) 
 ‘When Israel banned the 3G services, we optimally exploited the 2G services 
(MI) and our company was achieving very good revenues from voice call 
services, which is the core business of our company’. (J09) 
The erection of more 
entry barriers to new 
entrants 
 ‘This environment created some opportunities for our company and prevented 
any new operators from entering the Palestinian market, due to the absence of 
intermediaries or third parties to install sites or scan the market’ (J06) 
 ‘This uncertain context granted our company competitive advantages as these 
barriers prevented any international operator from entering the Palestinian 
market for around 8 years’ (J09) 
The creation of more 
commitment and 
persistence to work in 
the Palestinian market 
 ‘Our company’s vision is that Palestine deserves to be served … we consider 
this environment as a challenge and we have to continue working in the 
Palestinian market’. (J03)  
 ‘There is pleasure in overcoming these obstacles. The reason for this 
commitment is patriotic and humanitarian, as allowing our network to continue 
working serves many people in the most difficult times and could save their 
life’(J08)  
Source: Author 
4.2.3 Strategic Responses to Institutional Barriers and Voids 
In the language of the IBV, the findings of this case study emphasised that 
institutional barriers and voids can be addressed and their disbenefits can be reduced by 
designing appropriate strategies/responses and can even be turned into advantages/benefits. 
The analysis underlined three distinct strategic responses and labelled them as acceptance, 
adaptation, and influence.  
Acceptance showed that the indigenous firm complied with institutional 
arrangements, without any active attempt to change either the firm or the institutions. With 
adaptation, the indigenous firm undertook internal adjustments to cope with prevailing 
institutions. With regard to influence, the firm attempted to deliberately change external 
institutional arrangements and/or create new institutions in favour of the company. These 




4-3 illustrates and classifies the strategic responses of the indigenous firm to the institutional 
barriers and voids and provides some quotations for each response/tactic. 
Table 4-3: Strategic Responses of the Indigenous Firm to the Institutional Barriers and Voids 




 ‘We complied with and implemented, some governmental decisions. For 
example, we implemented the VAT Presidential decree (17%) on GS after 11 
years of exemption’ (J02) 
Patience/wait-to-see  ‘In 2005, Israel seized some equipment and spare parts, and prevented us from 
expanding our network; therefore, we temporally stopped selling new SIMs … 
we were patient till we overcame this problem’. (J05) 





 ‘… but we have changed the views of Palestinian customers through providing 
high quality products. They are now happy to switch to our company’ (J03)  
 ‘We employed all the company’s resources, and market and competitive 
capabilities to surmount these institutional barriers and fill some voids’ (J09) 
Internalisation of 
activities 
 ‘… the manager’s perspective and valuations of these resources played an 
important role in allocating and reallocating the resources to surmount the 
barriers’ (J10)  
 ‘We sometimes adapted our procedures to fit with this changing environment’ 
(J03) 
Cost review  ‘We installed a solar energy system that reduces the fuel costs’ (J11) 
 ‘Our maintenance team fixed and re-used the existing parts’ (J12) 
Outsourcing  ‘We contracted an Arab contractor who is licensed in Israel, to install and 
maintain our sites in area C in order to link our infrastructure among the 
Palestinian cities and enhance the coverage’ (J02, J04)  
 ‘We contracted local suppliers, especially in GS, to overcome some difficulties 
in importing the handsets’ (J01) 
Bricolage  ‘GSM system is designed for voice call, but we developed this system to provide 
Internet services through converting the system to GPRS, and then to Edge’ 
(J08) 
 ‘We maximally exploited 2G services through providing Value Added Services 
(VAS) in a very creative and advanced manner compared with other mobile 
phone operators in the region, e.g. Zain Company’ (J02) 
Prospecting  ‘We placed our transmissions in London and Amman, converted our top-up 
system from scratch cards to online system, and installed a solar energy system’ 
(J01)  
 ‘We expanded our network through increasing the number of sites and 






 ‘We internally shared our knowledge and experiences, and our engineers 
depended on self-development through online training courses and reading from 
different sources of knowledge’ (J08)  
 ‘Our capabilities to deal with these situations have been developed, and we have 








 ‘Our relations and partnerships with the local community, local partners such 
as dealers and sub-contractors, helped us to overcome many barriers and solve 
many problems …’ (J11) 
 ‘Our local relations with the Palestinian community, partners and CBOs 




Table 4-3: (Continued) 
Bargaining   ‘We went through some negotiations about the 3G services, entry of equipment, 
etc.  ...’ (J03) 
 ‘We negotiated many matters with the Palestinian MTIT or Israeli government 
through MTIT’ (J06) 
 ‘We negotiated, through the Palestinian MTIT, the Israeli government to license 
3G services for many years, and now we are officially asking for a licence of 4G 
services’ (J10)  
Political influence 
tactics 
 ‘Our management puts pressures on the Palestinian MTIT to properly regulate 
and organise the Palestinian market … legislating new regulations and laws 
that help us in providing new services and products to the Palestinian market’ 
(J10)  
 ‘We discussed the barriers imposed by Israel with the International 
Telecommunication Union in order to put a pressure on the Israeli government’ 
(J05, J09)  
 ‘We lobbied many international organizations to put pressure on Israel to grant 
us 3G frequencies, and now, we are lobbying to get 4G frequencies’ (J01, J02) 
Collaboration  ‘We collaborated with the Palestinian Society for Consumer Protection and the 
movements for boycott of Israeli products, to prevent the spread and penetration 
of the Israeli operators’ SIM cards in the Palestinian territories’ (J01) 
 ‘We collaborated with our legal competitor to prevent the spread of Israeli SIMs 
and put pressure to grant permissions for 3G and 4G services’ (J05) 
Linking of interests 
between the state and 
firms 
 ‘We tried to align our interests with the PNA’s interests, especially regarding 
the presence and spread of Israeli operators’ SIM cards and operations’(J01) 
Signalling  ‘We heavily invested in our CSR activities in order to build a trust with our 
community, which helped us to surmount some social and political obstacles’ 
(J08) 
 ‘We worked with the media, influential people (on the ground or on social 
media), and the local community to indirectly influence some issues. Indeed, our 
CSR activities helped us to approach different stakeholders’ (J10) 
Substituting 
institutional practices 
 ‘We established a local company based on international standards in order to 
transfer a set of organisational practices, norms, and technologies to the 
Palestinian market’ (J10) 
 ‘Knowledge sharing and collaboration with other international mobile phone 
companies in order to improve our business practices and operations, and the 
quality of services’ (J03) 
Institutional 
brokering 
 ‘We built the Palestinian telecommunication infrastructure. We also invested in 
and helped, many local contractors to develop their capabilities to help us in 
installation and maintenance of our sites and networks, and encouraged many 
local media companies to start their operations and develop their business 
through long-term contracts’ (J01, J03)  
 ‘We established the Software Developer Company to develop our software and 
system and serve the community through developing the IT sector’ (J03)  
 ‘We encouraged the applications’ developers to develop many applications. For 
example, we worked with the banks to launch banking applications and with the 
Palestine Electric Company to launch a smart meter application’ (J09) 
Source: Author 
It is evident from the aforementioned findings that the indigenous firm faced many 
institutional challenges that may generate disbenefits and benefits. The firm also employed 
some strategies to deal with these institutional challenges and sometimes turn them into 





4.3 Entrepreneurial Processes and Action: An Indigenous Firm  
4.3.1 Antecedents of Entrepreneurial Processes and Action 
The managers of the indigenous firm pointed out some antecedents of entrepreneurial 
processes and action within the uncertain Palestinian mobile phone market. Appendix (D) 
provides the relevant quotations for each antecedent. Based on the findings, these 
antecedents of entrepreneurial processes and action can be explained as follows:  
1- The main individual attributes of entrepreneurs that help them to successfully 
identified and exploited new opportunities are creativity, optimism, motivation, risk-
taking, innovation, imagination, openness to new ideas, leadership characteristics, 
smartness, challenge, patience, and determination for success.  
2- Prior knowledge and previous experience facilitated identifying and exploiting new 
opportunities (products and services), but only to a certain level and for some types 
of opportunity. Indeed, continuous market changes undervalued the role of prior 
knowledge in the entrepreneurial process and action in the Palestinian context. 
Moreover, an extensive dependency on prior knowledge led to a more routine 
actions, and limited creativity. Previous experience may also increase familiarity bias 
and the impact of bad experiences, which may affect the entrepreneur’s perception 
of any potential opportunities. 
 
3- Strong social networks with local community and other stakeholders (e.g. staff, 
customers, beneficiaries), and partnerships with suppliers, dealers, and contractors 
played important role in entrepreneurial processes. They helped with identifying the 
market’s needs (i.e. new opportunities), accessing many resources and market 
segments, solving many problems, developing new products, improving existing 
products, and facilitating the execution process. 
 
4- A high level of heightened alertness to information, sensitivity to market changes, 
and a situational awareness increased the possibility of identifying unnoticed 
entrepreneurial opportunities before others. However, the entrepreneurs’ posts in the 
company affected their abilities to convince others and exploit the opportunities. 
5- A systematic search could supplement entrepreneurial alertness, especially in case of 
information availability. It facilitated discovering specific opportunities, creating a 
need for specific products, solving some problems, checking the market’s readiness 




6- A stable external environment facilitated both opportunity identification and 
exploitation. However, an uncertain, dynamic and changing environment generated 
some profitable opportunities, especially for entrepreneurial firms, but it also 
hindered opportunity exploitation. 
7-  The characteristics of opportunities (i.e. their origin and degree of development) 
themselves influenced the willingness of entrepreneurs to identify and exploit them. 
The clear characteristics of opportunity (i.e. a market’s needs/demands) and the 
company’s capabilities helped in identifying and exploiting the opportunity, but this 
opportunity could be easily imitated. However, the unclear characteristics of an 
opportunity required more time, effort and costs (i.e. more risk-taking), but this 
opportunity may not be easily imitated. Moreover, different types of opportunity and 
contexts (i.e. hostile, uncertain, risky, unstable, stable) may need different 
steps/procedures of opportunity identification, development, evaluation, and 
exploitation. 
4.3.2 Entrepreneurial Processes and Action 
The analysis of the findings for the indigenous firm case study identified three 
standard entrepreneurial processes commonly recognised, namely opportunity 
identification, development, and evaluation, and found detailed activities within each of 
them and even one further process, which better explain what and how ‘entrepreneurial 
action’ is determined in an uncertain business environment.   
4.3.2.1 Opportunity Identification 
Based on the insights of the managers of the indigenous firm, the findings underlined 
three distinct sub-processes of opportunity identification: recognition, discovery, and 
creation. 
A- Opportunity Recognition 
The findings indicated that the opportunity recognition process starts either with 
using existing information or acquiring new information in order to formulate new means 
(i.e. products/supply), ends (i.e. customer’s needs/demand), or means-ends relationships (i.e. 
matching between existing supply and demand). Entrepreneurs were found to observe a 




an opportunity for themselves (i.e. initial evaluation). Some managers described the process 
of recognising opportunities as one basis for opportunity identification in the following 
excerpts:  
‘We recognise some business opportunities through conducting a regular market 
scanning to monitor the market’s changes and identify any market gaps, mainly customers’ 
needs’ (J01, J02) 
‘… Salespeople provide information and new ideas through their interaction with 
customers. They present these ideas to us if they believe that this can be an opportunity. We 
coordinate with the marketing department to develop these ideas and then exploit the 
opportunities’ (J06) 
The respondents emphasised that those entrepreneurs who recognise the 
opportunities are different from others. Many characteristics of entrepreneurs were 
identified. They were sensitive to market needs, problems, and changes. Entrepreneurs were 
also open to new ideas, risk-takers, positive and collaborative. They had an advanced level 
of analysis and precognition, critical thinking, and creativity. The entrepreneur’s 
environments, prior knowledge and experience, and background were identified as 
important factors that affect their abilities to recognise potential opportunities. The managers 
of the indigenous firm mentioned some characteristics of entrepreneurs in the opportunity 
recognition process in relevant quotations as follows: 
‘… entrepreneurs who recognise the opportunities are different from others. They 
have the ability to monitor and notice any changes in the market. They are very sensitive to 
a market’s changes and dynamics and know how to benefit from it’ (J01) 
‘… They notice the market’s changes faster than others … their environments affect 
their perception and how they recognise changes; therefore, the harsh situation could be 
source of creativity’ (J07) 
‘They have non-stereotypical thinking, different perspectives, and visions. They are 
very sensitive to how market changes, and their backgrounds (prior knowledge, experience, 
and beliefs) affect their ways of thinking’ (J11) 
The managers of the indigenous firm employed some techniques to deal with 
uncertainty and risk in the opportunity recognition process. They used their entrepreneurial 
judgements and managerial experiences and considered all the available options. The 
managers also designed alternative plans, sought operational and strategic hedging, gathered 
additional information, increased the firm’s operational flexibility, and diversified the firm’s 
investments. The respondents demonstrated how their company dealt with, mitigated, or 





‘To deal with risk and uncertainty in recognition process, we always try to mitigate 
the risk (i.e. minimise the influence of risk’s consequences). We use our experience, 
judgment and knowledge, to ensure a high level of quality and continuity of services and put 
forward alternative plans and guidelines. We also plan flexible strategies that allow changes 
at the operational level, and plan different options (postponing, gradual expansion of 
services, reallocation of resources, improvement of services) as the mobile phone sector is 
very dynamic and changing, especially in the Palestinian market …’ (J03) 
‘We deal with uncertainty in opportunity recognition through using our experience 
and judgment, conducting many market studies in order to collect available information, 
monitoring the trends in the mobile phone industry around the world, planning different 
options and diversifying our investment into different products and services’ (J02) 
B- Opportunity Discovery 
Two processes for opportunity discovery were identified. First, the firm started with 
identifying known market needs and gaps, and then designing and introducing a new product 
or service that satisfied these needs. Second, the firm stimulated customers to use the 
company’s existing products and services through explaining how these products may 
satisfy their needs. The findings emphasised that entrepreneurs discover unexploited 
opportunities either accidentally through their entrepreneurial alertness or deliberately 
through conducting systematic search. The project management office manager described 
the process of discovering opportunities as one basis for opportunity identification in the 
following excerpt: 
‘The Marketing Department regularly scans the market to identify customers’ needs 
and then we develop a product or service to satisfy their needs … we provide a new product 
or service for a specific segment to either solve a problem in the market or satisfy existing 
needs … we monitor other markets in the region, transfer some technologies, products and 
services to the market and sometimes customise them to fit the Palestinian market. We also 
conduct some systematic research to identify some potential opportunities in the market’ 
(J07) 
The opportunity discovery process within the Palestinian mobile phone market was 
primarily enabled by six information collection methods, sources and channels. First, the 
indigenous firm conducted market scans and surveys, focus groups, and outgoing calls in 
order to identify customers’ needs. Second, they asked current customers about their opinion 
in case of launching any new services or products. Third, they analysed the current need of 
customers. Fourth, they explored the services and products of other mobile phone operators 
in the region, especially new products and services. Fifth, they participated in international 




vendors. Finally, they conducted benchmarking with other mobile phone operators in other 
countries. The marketing director identified these six enablers in the following quote: 
‘… the company gets ideas from different sources: conducting focus groups in order 
to identify the customers’ needs, asking our current customers for their opinion when we 
would like to launch any new services or products, conducting market surveys and outgoing 
calls, analysing the current usage of our customers in order to identify their needs and 
design suitable offers for them (i.e. voice calls, internet, messages etc.), exploring the 
services and products of other mobile phone operators in the region (i.e. Middle East) 
through reviewing Arab Advisor Group reports about their experience, especially new 
products and services, and participating in  many international telecom conferences’ (J01) 
The managers of the indigenous firm defined the characteristics of their staff who 
discover opportunities in the complicated Palestinian market. They were critical thinkers and 
creative. They also took problems and barriers as a challenge, understood market changes in 
different ways compared to others, and sought further development. They had bisociative 
thinking, a high level of entrepreneurial alertness, good systematic search skills and special 
capabilities to read what is ‘between the lines’ (i.e. underneath the surface). Some managers 
mentioned some characteristics of entrepreneurs in the opportunity recognition process in 
the relevant quotations as follows: 
‘… they look differently at problems and barriers and they take them as a 
challenge … they have an advanced level of linking and analysing variables and changes in 
the market … they are visionary leaders … they seek more development and further 
progress’ (J03) 
‘They are critical thinkers and have a high level of entrepreneurial alertness and 
good systematic search skills’ (J04) 
‘They are more creative, have special capabilities of linking fragmented events and 
variables, and have the ability to understand and explain the events that happen in the 
complicated and uncertain environments. They convince customers to use some products or 
services’ (J10) 
Some techniques were found to deal with, mitigate, or overcome risk in the process 
of discovering opportunities. The indigenous firm conducted exploratory research to 
discover the market, conducted some experimentations (i.e. trial-and-error), transferred and 
shared the knowledge and experiences between its departments, and consulted experts. The 
company also used its managers’ knowledge, experiences and heuristic, designed different 
scenarios at operational and strategic levels, assumed a certain level of risk in the planning 
process, and started its projects on a small-scale. The managers illustrated how their 




‘…, but our company should develop its capability to collect timely and relevant 
information (there is deficiency in this aspect). We conduct exploratory research. Our 
previous experiences also play a good role in developing our capabilities to discover 
opportunities. We consider certain levels of risk during planning process, and prepare many 
alternative plans’ (J10) 
 ‘We depend on our experiences and experimentation, and share knowledge and 
experiences among our company’s departments …, we consult local and international 
consultants’(J04) 
‘The company depends on our previous experiences, but sometimes this does not 
work because we have to find a new solution instead of the previous one’ (J06) 
C- Opportunity Creation 
The findings of the indigenous firm case study indicated the process of creating 
opportunities to be one basis for opportunity identification, but opportunity creation is very 
limited and rare in the indigenous firm.  This is evident in the following excerpts:  
‘… mobile phone operators are not innovation companies; therefore, they transfer 
and employ new technologies rather than invent them …’ (J11) 
‘The creation of opportunities could be very limited in our company’ (J04) 
‘Indeed, the mobile phone industry does not create or manufacture new advanced 
technologies. We often transfer technologies rather than invent them ... Generally, the 
mobile phone sector is not an innovative business. It uses the technology extensively, but it 
does not invent the technology’ (J10) 
The findings also revealed that the indigenous firm focuses on the traditional/core 
business (i.e. voice calls, VAS, and data) rather than the greater digital market. The company 
is strong enough in managing this business and is achieving a reasonable level of revenues 
from it. The product development department head and sales planning department head 
asserted this in the following statements from the interviews, respectively: 
 ‘… we focus on our core business and don’t focus on creating new opportunities 
(i.e. we try to protect and sustain the existing revenue streams)’ (J09) 
‘... But the most important question is if our company can exit the traditional 
business, which we are strong enough to manage, and enter a new market (i.e. digital 
market)’ (J10) 
However, some managers demonstrated that opportunity creation takes place in the 
indigenous firm and starts with either transferring some technologies and services from other 
markets to the Palestinian market, or designing completely new products or services, and 
then stimulating customers to use these products and services. The following quotations 




 ‘We created some entrepreneurial opportunities through transferring some 
technologies and services from other countries and markets to the Palestinian markets and 
designing completely new products or services for the market and motivating customers to 
use them. For example, our company created the mobile phone industry in Palestine …’ 
(J01) 
‘Creating opportunities is essential to our company, as without it we cannot expand 
and improve our products and services and increase our profits. We also transferred 
products or services after customising them to be suitable for the Palestinian market and 
explained to customers how these products could satisfy their needs ...’ (J09) 
The findings revealed two sources of opportunities in the opportunity creation 
process: (1) internally from the company’s staff such as initial ideas and proposals, and (2) 
externally from customers, vendors and partners. Some managers of the indigenous firm 
identified these sources in the following quotes:  
 ‘… encouraging and asking our staff to provide their proposals for any new ideas 
for products or services ... Some individuals, either from the company or outside the 
company, suggest ideas or initiatives. For example, fleet management services were initiated 
internally, and we persuaded customers to try and use these services and the Kareem Taxi 
application was initiated from external party …’ (J03) 
‘We regularly encourage our staff to express their initiatives and ideas through a 
programme called “Say it”. In addition, we have an innovation division in the Project 
Management Department. Moreover, our group established a company to design new 
products, create new inventions and produce entrepreneurial ideas’ (J07) 
Based on the insights and descriptions from the managers of the indigenous firm, I 
summarised nine steps of the opportunity creation process as follows: (1) initial idea(s) 
formulation, (2) initial idea(s) development, (3) mature idea(s) sharing with concerned 
parties, (4) feedback and further development, (5) solid idea development, (6) internal 
application, adjustments and modifications, (7) market needs creation, (8) limited market 
trial and feedback, and (9) product modification and gradual market expansion. The 
following quotations provide detailed descriptions of these steps:  
‘… starts internally in the company and we conduct many trials to reach a certain 
level of idea maturity. We share our thoughts with other employees or managers in order to 
develop the idea, but many changes could take place. We conduct some experiments or 
design models for this product or service. We use it internally then start externally with a 
limited number of customers’ (J01) 
‘The creation process starts internally, i.e. in the company, as initial ideas, 
suggestions and proposals. Then, the owner of the idea should develop it to a certain level, 
then we do many pilots before going to the market. We always make many adjustments and 




 ‘… after conducting some research, we initiate the idea and discuss it either with 
other staff or customers and vendors to reach a certain level of clarity. Then we develop the 
idea to be more solid opportunity, determine the target segment, start stimulating the need 
for this product or service in the market, and offer this product and expand gradually in the 
market’ (J07) 
The managers of the indigenous firm emphasised that it is very difficult to have a 
clear vision from the beginning of the opportunity creation process, but it will be clearer 
with further progress and development of the opportunity. The segment department head 
explained that ‘the ideas will not be clear enough in the beginning, but they will be clearer 
after time, experiments, and more progress. Creating opportunities often starts with some 
initial characteristics and finishes with completely different products or services. The 
creation process could happen many times’ (J11). 
Evidence showed that opportunity creation depends on individuals who have 
different beliefs, backgrounds and perspectives, which vary from one entrepreneur to 
another. Therefore, the opportunity creation process could be based on different trajectories. 
This is noted in the following quotations: 
‘The opportunity creation depends on individuals who have different beliefs and 
perspectives, and advanced capabilities …’ (J10) 
‘Creating opportunities is not an easy process. It’s very complicated and needs very 
special capabilities and a high level of creativity and imagination. It could depend on 
different approaches and varies from one person to another’ (J09) 
Many techniques were used to tackle uncertainty in the process of creating 
opportunities. The managers of the indigenous firm used their creativity, critical thinking 
skills, logical thinking and problem-solving heuristics. They further employed 
experimentation, optimal resource utilisation, data collection, and business scaling strategy. 
The managers were also motivated, optimistic and patient, flexible and adaptable, and 
collaborative. The managers of the indigenous firm demonstrated how their company dealt 
with uncertainty in the opportunity creation process in the following quotes: 
‘Collecting as much available data and information as we can, creativity, using a 
logical linking of variables, ensuring a fit between the products or services and market, and 
preparing different alternatives to deal with uncertainty …’ (J07) 
‘… creativity and flexibility, collective work (i.e. team work), encouraging our 
employees to share their ideas with others, collecting data and information about the 
opportunity and market as much as we can, sharing our road map with other segments and 





‘Indeed, we deal with uncertainty in different ways: … using available resources and 
given conditions to maximise utilisation and benefits’ (J02) 
‘We use some of the following techniques to reduce the level of uncertainty … 
motivation … starting execution on a small scale and then expanding to a wider scale (i.e. 
piloting); understanding the nature of the market; and being flexible, adaptable and 
compatible with the changes of opportunity and market’ (J04) 
In summary, the study found evidence that the indigenous firm frequently identified 
business opportunities through opportunity recognition and discovery, and significantly less 
through opportunity creation. The company focused on its core traditional business rather 
than adopting a digitalisation strategy.  
4.3.2.2 Opportunity Development 
The opportunity development process was started from the emergence of initial ideas 
from individuals or teams within the company or its business partners. The customer care 
director emphasised that ‘the development process starts from the time of suggesting an 
initial idea. We ask the owner of the idea (individual, team or department) to provide all the 
details and information about the idea’ (J03). 
Based on the insights and descriptions from managers of the indigenous firm, I 
summarised eight steps of the opportunity development process as follows: (1) data and 
information collection, (2) initial idea(s) adjustments, (3) clear idea(s) development, (4) 
business case preparation, (5) initial evaluation and feedback, (6) solid opportunity(ies) 
development, (7) opportunity(ies) evaluation and approval, and (8) regular pre- and post-
evaluations for continuous development. The following illustrative statements from the 
interviews provide a detailed description of these steps:  
‘… we ask the owner of the idea to prepare the business case to explain their ideas, 
nature of the product or service, the market’s needs and competition status … In the 
development process, the initial idea could be adjusted many times, creating complementary 
services (i.e. opportunities) to fill some gaps that discovered in the market, either for the 
same customers (target segment) or a new segment (customers) or maybe leading to 
completely new opportunities …’ (J01) 
‘We collect the data and information required to develop the idea. In addition, we 
often make many changes to be very clear about the opportunity. This process could happen 
many times before reach the exploitation stage, or is changed, or a decision made to 
terminate’ (J07)  
‘… then we direct this business case to a specialised committee to initially evaluate 
the extent to which this idea is valid and suitable for our company and if it is the right time 




‘… we conduct regular pre- and post-evaluations for these opportunities in order to 
ensure continuous development of these products’ (J04) 
‘… We start with many opportunities, but we develop them into better and more solid 
conceptualisations, or this process may create new opportunities or completely different 
opportunities from the initial ideas… Indeed, we often change some of our offers, services 
and products. We may be planning to go in a certain direction, but we went in another 
direction’ (J09) 
The opportunity development process was frequent, continuous and iterative. It 
could happen many times and this could raise some new opportunities that related to existing 
or create completely new products. The sales planning department head asserted that ‘the 
development process … is continuous and iterative and it could happen many times’ (J10), 
and the sales director added that ‘there is continuous development of products even after 
offering them to the market as we add some additional ideas and features or offer completely 
new products or services…’ (J06). 
Many enabling factors for the opportunity development process were identified. The 
availability of required capabilities and resources, the accessibility of sufficient and relevant 
information, and the availability of relevant prior knowledge and experience were important 
in facilitating opportunity development. The indigenous firm was familiar with the market 
structure and sensitive to market changes. It also had strong networks within the local 
community, vendors and dealers. All of these factors enabled the indigenous firm to develop 
its opportunities in the uncertain Palestinian business environment. The following statements 
from the interviewees illustrate these factors: 
‘The suitability of the opportunity with the market, the relationships with our vendors 
and dealers, and the sensitivity of staff for the market’s changes due to the fast changes in 
the Palestinian market, so some ideas could be quickly becoming outdated’ (J11) 
‘… the ability of our company to collect sufficient information about the external 
environment, our capabilities to understand the market and its needs, our experience in 
developing commercial opportunities in this complicated and uncertain context, our 
relationships with the vendors, our staff capabilities and skills, and the extent to which the 
market is ready for these products and services’ (J01) 
‘… the compatibility of this opportunity with the company’s work and profile, the 
ability of the company to implement this opportunity (i.e. technical, human, financial 
resources), and the market’s dynamic and needs’ (J02) 
‘… market mechanism, our company’s resources and capabilities … our relations 
with local community, partners, and vendors, and the ability of vendors or contractors (i.e. 




4.3.2.3 Opportunity Evaluation 
The indigenous firm used a general evaluation framework (i.e. administrative 
procedures). This framework was based on the company’s main indicators, standards, and 
objectives as well as technical and financial justifications. However, some opportunities 
need different assessment procedures, e.g. based on the opportunity circumstances (i.e. 
recognised, discovered or created opportunity) and the size of the investment. The managers 
of the indigenous firm explained these evaluation frameworks in the following excerpts: 
‘Around (90%) of our opportunities are evaluated by the same procedures and 
according to the main indicators. However, some opportunities (around 10%) need different 
evaluation procedures and indicators’ (J01) 
‘There is a general process or procedure (i.e. administrative steps), but there are 
different procedures (i.e. technical steps and criteria), which depend on the type and nature 
of the opportunity’ (J02, J03, J06) 
‘We use different assessment procedures. It depends on the size of investment needed 
to implement the idea and exploit the opportunity. If the investment is small, e.g. developing 
the existing products, we can easily and quickly assess the opportunity and exploit it. But, if 
the investment is large, it should be assessed by different committees and pass all the 
evaluation stages’ (J07) 
The evaluation process was a stage/step assessment process. This enabled the firm 
to precisely evaluate each development step of the opportunity and collect feedback for 
further steps of development or implementation. The following illustrative quotes provide a 
detailed description of this process: 
‘Generally, we evaluate each stage of opportunity development and consider the 
progress of the processes. In each stage, we evaluate the opportunity against certain criteria 
and organisational objectives’ (J02, J03, J06) 
‘The evaluation is step-based process in order to precisely assess these opportunities 
and collect a sufficient feedback to develop the opportunity’. (J01) 
The findings revealed that seven indicators were considered by the indigenous firm 
in the opportunity evaluation process. These indicators were feasibility, financial and non-
financial returns, attractiveness, market readiness, the availability of required resources and 
capabilities for execution, strategic fit, and durability and sustainability. Some managers of 
the indigenous firm mentioned these indicators in the following quotations: 
‘…feasibility (return on investment, revenues, and costs), the compatibility of the 
opportunity with the company’s objectives, and the compatibility of the opportunity with the 




‘… not only financial returns, but also reputation and branding, the availability of 
financial and human capital for execution, and the compatibility with the company’s vision, 
objectives and priorities’ (J02)   
‘… the extent to which this opportunity is compatible with our company’s objectives 
(profits, improvement of services, cost minimisation) … and it should be within the 
specialisation of our company (mobile phone sector)’ (J03) 
 ‘The market’s readiness for these products or services, and the sustainability of this 
project or product’ (J07) 
Seven main components of opportunity assessment plan were identified. The 
indigenous firm’s managers developed an opportunity assessment plan that involved: (1) 
opportunity description, (2) market structure and mechanism, (3) feasibility study, (4) the 
required resources and capabilities, (5) the execution plan, (6) resources allocation plan, and 
(7) monitoring procedures and plans. The following statements from interviews indicated 
these main parts: 
‘… opportunity and product (nature, functions, needs, specifications), market, 
segments (how this opportunity could affect other segments to avoid any contradiction), 
customers, competitors, and vendors. The benefits of this opportunity to the company (i.e. 
increase of either revenues or customer base) and how this opportunity is consistent with 
the company’s road map. The required resources and capabilities to exploit this opportunity, 
and the execution plan and allocation of resources’ (J01) 
‘… the market structure, changes and players (reaction and response of competitors 
and customers; vendors, dealers) … and monitoring plans and procedures’ (J11) 
4.3.2.4 Entrepreneurial Action 
One of the most potentially insightful findings of the indigenous firm case study is 
that immediate opportunity exploitation was found to be one possible action, but not the only 
one, after opportunity evaluation. The firm considered other options/actions in case of the 
unsuitability of opportunity exploitation. These actions could be in the form of waiting 
before exploiting the opportunity, deferring opportunity exploitation, and revising or even 
aborting the opportunity. This implies that exploiting opportunity in an uncertain 
environment is no easy matter and it may need more actions before reaching such a kind of 
action. Some managers of the indigenous firm mentioned these actions in the following 
excerpts: 
‘Based on  the results of the evaluation process, our company takes one or more of 
the following options: (1) postponing the project implementation or opportunity 
exploitation, if it’s not clear enough, (2) executing and exploiting the opportunity  if the 




capabilities and resources if needed, (4) collecting more information and data to reach a 
reasonable level of clarity, not full clarity, and (5) developing the opportunity to reach a 
solid vision and identify potential problems and their solutions’ (J02, J07) 
‘… delay the implementation to adjust or develop the idea …, as the company 
currently has some priorities rather than this project, waiting for a better situation, as the 
current situation is not suitable for implementation, or terminate the exploitation of 
opportunity if it does not match our evaluation’s standard’ (J11) 
 
Uncertainty was found to be a major source of hindrance and/or motivation for 
opportunity exploitation. The managers of the indigenous firm addressed the uncertain 
Palestinian environment as a challenge and were sometimes able to exploit opportunities. 
The following statements from the interviews emphasised that the uncertain Palestinian 
market could impede and/or motivate opportunity exploitation:  
‘This hostile business environment inhibits opportunity exploitation, but sometimes 
motivates us to be more creative and exploit the opportunity’ (J03) 
‘… But we deal with this uncertain environment as a challenge and we try to employ 
our experience and our well-qualified team’s capabilities to work in this context in order to 
prove themselves’ (J01) 
‘Uncertain context mainly impedes opportunity exploitation, but it may not inhibit 
us from exploitation if some supporting factors do exist’ (J04) 
Eight factors were found to be positively affecting opportunity exploitation in the 
uncertain Palestinian market. The availability of resources (e.g. experienced and skilled 
staff, financial), the willingness of the management to bear uncertainty, a familiarity with 
uncertainty, and mutual trust and confidence among staff were mostly cited to be important 
internal/organisational factors. On the other hand, the availability and accessibility of 
information, strong relations with, and support from, stakeholders, market readiness, and 
return on investment were related to external environment factors that may enable the firm 
to exploit the opportunity. Some managers of the indigenous firm mentioned these factors 
in the following quotations: 
‘… understanding the environment instability, our managers’ and staff’s experience 
in this context, our company’s and staff’s capabilities, the strong relationships with our 
vendors and local community, and the good relationship with the PNA and MTIT’ (J01) 
‘… (1) market readiness to receive this service/product, (2) company readiness to 
implement this project or exploit this opportunity, (3) the extent of clarity of the project’s or 
product’s success, and (4) the influence of opportunity exploitation on the company’s 




‘… the willingness to bear uncertainty and downplay its role, … and the team support 
to us (managers) and managers’ support to our staff (i.e. mutual trust)’ (J03) 
‘… the availability of supporting information about the market and opportunity, the 
availability of experienced managers and staff who know how to deal with and exploit the 
opportunities within these turbulent environments, the support from local community, 
customers, and partners … and the familiarity with working in this uncertain market’ (J04) 
‘… our feelings of the importance of these products and services to our customers, 
and our willingness to bear this uncertainty’. (J10) 
Based on insights and descriptions from the managers of the indigenous firm, I 
summarised five main steps in the opportunity exploitation process. First, once the 
exploitation decision was made, the managers start with coordination between, and with the 
involvement of, all concerned departments. Second, they prepared implementation and 
resource allocation plans. Third, each department executed all required managerial and 
technical functions. Fourth, according to type of opportunity, the company either 
implemented its project fully or scaled it up. Finally, managers received continuous feedback 
for improvements. The following illustrative quotations provide a detailed description of 
these steps: 
‘… we coordinate with concerned departments in order to plan for execution. Then, 
we prepare the plan that explains the allocation of resources and staff. In some 
opportunities, we go directly to the market and provide the product or service. However, in 
the case of opportunities where we are not certain about their impact and the reaction of the 
market, we start either by small-scale projects or experiments, then we go to the market’ 
(J01)   
‘… we make a work/implementation plan and allocate the required resources 
(human, physical, financial), then according to the type of opportunity, some opportunities 
are implemented broadly to the whole market, certain segments and piloting groups, and 
after implementation, we receive continuous feedback from different parties (vendors, 
dealers, customers, staff) to develop the product or service’ (J02) 
It is apparent from the above-mentioned findings that the external/institutional 
environment, especially the uncertain business context, played an important role in all 
entrepreneurial processes and action. Uncertainty was a source of negative and/or positive 
impacts on entrepreneurial opportunity-related processes. Accordingly, the next section will 




4.4 Uncertainty and Entrepreneurial Processes, Action, and 
Opportunities: An Indigenous Firm  
4.4.1 Environmental Uncertainty 
The managers of the indigenous firm reported that they experienced state, effect, and 
response uncertainty (Milliken, 1987). With state uncertainty, the respondents referred to 
their inability to predict how the components of the Palestinian business environment are 
changing, particularly at political and economic levels. In respect to effect uncertainty, the 
managers expressed their inability to predict what the nature of the impact of current and 
future events within their business environment (Palestinian and regional markets) or 
environmental changes, will be on the company. With response uncertainty, the managers 
indicated their inability to design actions to address these changes and/or external 
environment players’ reactions. They were also unable to predict the likely consequences of 
a response choice. Table 4-4 illustrates the three types of environmental uncertainty and 
provides relevant excerpts from the interviews. 
Table 4-4: Excerpts from Quotes on Types of Uncertainty from the Indigenous Firm 
Type of Uncertainty Quotations 




 ‘One cause of uncertainty could be our inability to anticipate the changes in the 
Palestinian market and external environment, e.g. political instability, economic 
situation, and Israeli policies’ (J01, J03) 
 ‘We try to understand the rapid changes in the Palestinian market, which 
increase the level of ambiguity and uncertainty …’ (J07) 




 ‘We also cannot predict how these changes in our external environment could 
affect our company’ (J01, J03) 
  ‘… the inability to predict the influence of the changes of major players in the 
external environment on our company’ (J10) 
What am I going to do 
about it? (Response 
Uncertainty) 
 
 ‘We cannot plan for more than a week due to the continuous and fast changes 
in the market. It is also very difficult to identify the alternatives that can be 
considered in our plans because of the inability to predict the reaction of 
stakeholders’ (J08) 
 ‘We often face difficulty in sales planning due to our inability to ensure the entry 
of materials or anticipate the receiving date of these materials. This situation, 
to some extent, prevents us from planning our operations and designing 
campaigns in order to deal with these uncertainties’ (J10). 
Source: Author 
This study found compelling evidence that all managers of the indigenous firm 
shared the same perception of high state uncertainty in a Palestinian environment beset by 
political instability under the authority of three different governments, constant Israeli-




As the sales director stated: ‘We do our best to identify the changes (external environment, 
competitors, and customers) … but this often does not work ...’ (J06). 
Apart from high state uncertainty, however the findings revealed that perceptions of 
effect and response uncertainty could vary. Three levels (high, intermediate, low) of effect 
and response uncertainty were specified, based on interview statements (see Appendix E). 
These three levels explain ‘the extent to which the firm can solve or control’ effect and 
response uncertainties (see Appendix F). Further explanations for these three levels will be 
discussed in 5.4.1. 
4.4.2 The Effect of Uncertainty on Entrepreneurial Processes, Action, 
and Opportunities 
The analysis revealed that the three types of uncertainty have positive and negative 
impacts on opportunity identification and exploitation. This dual impact was largely 
attributed to how the managers perceived them. 
Table 4-5: Quotes on the Positive and Negative Impacts of Uncertainty Types on Opportunity 
Identification from the Indigenous Firm 
State uncertainty 
Positive impact 
 ‘The rapidly changing environment creates some opportunities, but the company 
should be more dynamic and flexible in order to identify and exploit these 
opportunities and generate a good profit’ (J01) 
 ‘The unexpected technology and demand changes generate some opportunities, 
facilitate some tasks and motivate more creativity’ (J02) 
 ‘These institutional barriers and voids could create some opportunities and benefits, 
but they increase the required costs and efforts to deal with them’ (J08) 
Negative impact 
 ‘…if the reason for uncertainty is political instability, this may hinder us from 
identifying more opportunities’ (J11) 
Effect uncertainty  
Positive impact 
 ‘Our inability to identify how these changes may affect our company motivates us to 
design alternative solutions and plans, which generate new opportunities’ (J03) 
Negative impact 
 ‘Generally, external environmental changes inhibit opportunities … Therefore, we 
take very high risks when we identify opportunities in this context’ (J02) 
 ‘The unexpected effects of market changes on our company increase vagueness and 
uncertainty, which negatively affect the generation of opportunities’ (J07) 
Response uncertainty  
Positive impact 
 ‘Our company sometimes is unable to design only one plan for our operations due 
to changes, which motivates us to prepare many plans and design different solutions 
that may generate some new opportunities (J08) 
Negative impact 
 ‘Our inability to define the governmental (i.e. PNA, Israel and Hamas) responses to 
our initiatives limits our ability to design appropriate procedures that may help us 





As demonstrated in Table 4-5, state uncertainty was viewed as a source of 
opportunities only when the indigenous firm had low effect and/or response uncertainty. 
State uncertainty generated opportunities through external environmental changes that 
created new conditions and information, especially technological and demand changes, but 
the firm was able to determine their impact and was dynamic and flexible in order to identify 
new opportunities. The firm further considered the negative impact of external changes, 
particularly institutional voids, as an opportunity because they had the capacity and 
fundamentals to act/respond. Therefore, effect uncertainty could also have a positive impact 
by creating opportunities, especially for firms with low response uncertainty. 
As for negative impacts, state uncertainty was perceived as a hindrance to 
opportunities when in the presence of effect and/or response uncertainty. Effect uncertainty, 
particularly a lack of understanding and difficulties in predicting the effect/influence of 
political instability, blocked opportunities. A high level of response uncertainty also 
increased the preoccupation of managers with designing different plans in order to 
act/respond to environmental changes or their unexpected impacts. 
Table 4-6: Examples of Positive and Negative Impacts of Uncertainty Types on Opportunity 
Exploitation from the Indigenous Firm 
State uncertainty 
Positive impact 
 ‘The turbulent environment encourages creativity and entrepreneurial work’ (J12) 
 ‘In the most cases, this changing environment urges us to be more innovative and 
creative in overcoming these barriers or exploiting these voids’ (J01) 
Negative impact 
 ‘Our inability to clearly understand the rapid changes in the Palestinian market 
prevents us from developing and exploiting opportunities’ (J07) 




 ‘Our inability to identify how changes could affect our company, means that we 
employ our experience in exploiting opportunities’ (J01) 
 ‘We deal with an unpredictable impact as a challenge …, this urges us to be more 
creative to provide a product or service to match this need because if we don’t match 
this need, either our legal competitor or illegal Israeli operators will’ (J04) 
Negative impact 
 ‘The ambiguity of how these changes could affect whether our company inhibits or 
postpones the implementation or the exploitation stage’ (J02) 
Response uncertainty 
Positive impact 
 ‘Our inability to define certain options for reacting to governmental policies and our 
competitors campaigns encourages us to be more creative in implementing our 
projects because there is no option other than success’ (J08) 
Negative impact 
 ‘… we are very busy all the time finding solutions for problems in our operations 
and reactions of our stakeholders (i.e. we are managing crisis) rather than exploiting 
new opportunities’ (J08) 
 ‘We cannot define options for reacting to political instability; therefore, sometimes 





Regarding opportunity exploitation, as can be seen in Table 4-6, state uncertainty 
was associated with positively motivating opportunity exploitation, but only if it drove a 
higher level of creativity and innovation. Effect uncertainty was also considered as an 
incentive for opportunity exploitation if it stimulated proactiveness that could help managers 
in controlling or influencing the impact of environmental changes and implementing their 
business projects. Response uncertainty was found to motivate a higher level of creativity, 
rivalry and openness. This, in turn, meant that state and effect uncertainty may affect 
response uncertainty, but this impact was related to positive outcomes (i.e. opportunity 
exploitation), if firms had low response uncertainty. 
At the same time, state, effect and response uncertainties were also responsible for 
negatively influencing opportunity exploitation (see Table 4-6). For example, state 
uncertainty increased the managers’ preoccupation with identifying options and finding 
alternative solutions rather than directing their focus and efforts towards developing existing 
products and/or planning and implementing new projects. A higher levels of effect 
uncertainty may lead to the deferral or abandonment of the opportunity exploitation process. 
The presence of both state and effect uncertainty may lead to response uncertainty, deterring 
managers from engaging in the opportunity exploitation process. 
When analysing the indigenous firm’s opportunity exploitation in the face of 
uncertainty at an aggregate level, the findings showed that the firm accommodated, and even 
took advantage of, aggregate uncertainty until it reached a critical level, whereupon the firms 
deferred or abandoned opportunities. The following illustrative quotations explain how the 
managers accept uncertainty up to a certain level, but after this level, they do not exploit the 
opportunity: 
‘We accept the uncertainty and exploit opportunity, but up to a certain level. If the 
level of uncertainty exceeds our ability, we terminate, postpone, or redirect this opportunity’ 
(J03) 
‘… if we are talking about products or services, we slowly but cautiously stop them 
if the level of uncertainty is severe and we cannot bear it …’ (J08) 
‘We accept uncertainty to a certain level …; after this level, we try to find or create 
new opportunities in the market before stopping this service or product’ (J07) 
The findings of the indigenous firm case study revealed that the motives of 




motives could be patriotic, humanitarian, and commitment-based. The managers of the 
indigenous firm asserted this motivation in the following excerpts: 
‘... Indeed, there is a sense of responsibility towards Palestine, and we are very 
committed to work in the Palestinian market’ (J02) 
‘… we have to provide high quality services to the Palestinian customers even if this 
is not very profitable (it could be more profitable for our investors to invest elsewhere)’ 
(J03)   
‘Indeed, the motivation for opportunity exploitation is patriotic, developmental, and 
humanitarian; therefore, we believe that each barrier has a solution’ (J07)  
 ‘The patriotic motivation … we are part of this country, and it’s a part of us’(J12) 
The findings provide evidence that the psychology and attributes of managers play a 
critical role in hindering and/or motivating entrepreneurial processes and action. The next 
section will focus on how emotions may affect entrepreneurial action. 
4.4.3 The Effect of Emotions on Entrepreneurial Action 
The analysis demonstrated that the entrepreneurial processes and action did not 
exhibit a one-sided adaptation of behaviour to external conditions, but rather a complex 
reciprocal interaction between individual managers and their environment. The findings 
therefore identified impacts that are related to the psychology and attributes of the managers, 
and to subjective interpretation and judgement regarding the uncertainty (see Table 4-7). 
Table 4-7: Quotations on the Effect of Emotions and Attributes of Managers on Entrepreneurial 
Processes and Action from the Indigenous Firm 
Emotion/Attribute Quotations 
Achievement  ‘If uncertainty will lead to accomplishments in the end, it will increase our ability 
to take entrepreneurial action’ (J09) 
Willingness to bear 
uncertainty 
 ‘We perceive the uncertainty less than others do, and our experiences in dealing 
with this environment help us in exploitation processes’ (J06) 
 ‘Our perspectives on the value and consequences of this uncertainty, and our 
willingness to bear this uncertainty, play a crucial role in motivating us to take 
entrepreneurial action’ (J10) 
Self-efficacy  ‘We enhance self-confidence and trust among our team, which motivates us to 
identify and exploit more opportunities’ (J08) 
 ‘Managers’ self-esteem and belief in their abilities to deal with uncertainty are 
very important to exploit opportunities in the Palestinian context’ (J12) 
Resilience and 
perseverance 
 ‘After 16 years of work in this environment, I became calmer and quietly accept 
any bad news and then start thinking about solutions’ (J10) 
 ‘The accumulation of experience over years of work helps us to make exploitation 
decisions in this environment. We are used to dealing with this uncertain context 






Table 4-7: (Continued) 
Fear of failure  ‘Fear of failure urges us to exert our maximum efforts to find creative ideas and 
innovative solutions to achieve success. This means that fear of failure increases 
our ability to act entrepreneurially’ (J12)  
 ‘Fear of failure does exist and negatively affects our ability to exploit 
opportunities …’ (J09) 
Stress  ‘Stress is a very big challenge for us. We deal with the reasons for this stress, but 
sometimes it could impede us from exploitation’ (J06) 
 ’In the Palestinian market, stress is a motivator as we achieve many 
accomplishments when we overcome the barriers, especially those created by 
Israel’ (J09) 
Anger  ‘Annoyance decreases with working in this context, and we have the ability to deal 
with it and thus it becomes a challenge. Therefore, we act despite our anger and 
implement the projects’ (J02) 
 ‘We should not get upset or angry. We deal with these barriers as a challenge and 
we have to overcome these barriers and innovate appropriate solutions’ (J03) 
Source: Author 
With regard to the attributes of managers, aggregate uncertainty was responsible for 
producing some positive outcomes, especially when the uncertainty was connected to a 
generally positive event. For example, the desire for achievement and success may positively 
influence managers to exploit the identified opportunities even under great uncertainty. 
Furthermore, managers with a high willingness to bear uncertainty may downplay its 
importance or employ their prior knowledge and experience by developing existing products 
and processes or creating something new. It also turned out that the managers who were high 
in entrepreneurial self-efficacy were more likely to respond favourably to dynamic changes 
in uncertainty. In another example, managers in the indigenous firm asserted that their 
personal resilience and perseverance had been developed over time within a challenging 
business environment. 
The analysis further found evidence that some negative emotions such as fear of 
failure, stress and anger were reported to generate an ambiguous impact (incentive and 
deterrence) on entrepreneurial processes and action. This ambiguous impact and its 
mechanism will be discussed in detail in 5.4.3. 
Besides the importance of an uncertain external environment, managers in the 
indigenous firm asserted the influence of types of opportunity on entrepreneurial processes 




4.4.4 Types of Opportunity and Their Impact on Entrepreneurial 
Processes and Action 
The analysis demonstrated that the indigenous firm identified, developed and 
exploited different types of opportunity, and four were identified: problem solving, 
introduction of products and services, technology transfer, and daily business 
transactions/deals. The managers of the indigenous firm mentioned these types of 
opportunity in the following quotations:  
‘There is an opportunity if the market’s needs are clear and the company’s 
capabilities are not clear, but we need to use all available resources, study the problems and 
how to employ the company’s capabilities, invest more in our company’s capabilities or ask 
for external consultation to solve this problem …’ (J06) 
‘There is an opportunity if the market’s needs are not clear and the company’s 
capabilities are clear, but the company should create the need for their products. For 
example, we introduced Blackberry service to the Palestinian market when the customers 
did not know how to use or maximise their benefits from this service, but we raised their 
awareness of the importance of this service …’ (J01) 
‘We scan the market to identify customers’ needs and market disequilibrium. This 
helps in defining the market’s needs (i.e. demand) or creating new needs and transferring 
products or technologies from other markets to the Palestinian market. We also discover 
other markets and mobile phone operators in the region to identify and transfer new 
products and technologies’ (J04) 
‘If the market gaps are clear and the company knows how to employ their existing 
resources and product, this is normal business and an easy opportunity to identify and 
develop’ (J11) 
The tacitness of the opportunity’s characteristics (i.e. the difficulty of codifying, 
articulating, and communicating the opportunity) was cited as a source of obscurity for the 
managers/staff who had no prior knowledge or experience. This increased the difficulty of 
identifying, developing, and exploiting opportunities. However, the managers/staff equipped 
with prior knowledge and experience were more likely to overcome these challenges, and 
identify, develop and exploit the opportunity through discovery and/or exploratory research. 
The following quotes provide examples: 
 ‘If the opportunity’s features are not clear and there is no prior knowledge, we 
ignore this opportunity. But there is an opportunity if the features of opportunity are not 
clear but there is prior knowledge and the best way to identify the opportunity is 
discovery …’ (J10) 
‘Discovery and exploratory research are the most appropriate opportunity 




On the other hand, the explicitness of the opportunity’s characteristics (i.e. a well-
documented, articulated and communicated opportunity) was found to be facilitate 
entrepreneurial processes, especially in the form of the prior knowledge and experience 
availability. However, the lack of prior knowledge and experience required further 
development of the company’s capabilities, enhancement of learning, and knowledge 
sharing. Some managers of the indigenous firm explained this in the following excerpts:  
‘There is a clear opportunity if the characteristics of opportunity are clear enough 
and we do have previous experience. The best way to identify the opportunity is a focused 
search in order to minimise the efforts, costs and time. The prior experience speeds up the 
exploitation and execution of projects. Moreover, the opportunity could be identified if the 
characteristics of opportunity are clear enough and we do not have previous experience, but 
this opportunity should be in our field. The best way to identify the opportunity is exploratory 
research and should be based on learning from the new opportunity to develop the 
company’s capabilities’ (J06) 
‘… there is an opportunity if the characteristics of opportunity are clear and we do 
not have previous experience … the best way to identify the opportunity is systematic search, 
exploratory research and experiments’ (J11) 
4.5 Summary: An Indigenous Firm  
The indigenous firm operated in a turbulent business environment having extreme 
institutional barriers (formal and informal) and voids in the Palestinian mobile phone sector. 
These institutional challenges were also amplified by constant violence. However, they may 
generate both disbenefits and benefits for the indigenous firm. The firm employed three 
strategic responses to deal with these institutional challenges: acceptance, adaptation, and 
influence.  
The managers of the indigenous firm identified seven antecedents of entrepreneurial 
processes and action, consisting of three processes: opportunity identification, development, 
and evaluation. After opportunity evaluation, the firm considers some entrepreneurial 
options, e.g. opportunity exploitation. The indigenous firm frequently identified business 
opportunities through opportunity recognition and discovery, and significantly less through 
opportunity creation. 
The indigenous firm faced at least three types of uncertainty (state, effect and 
response), with negative and positive impacts on entrepreneurial processes and action. These 




psychology and attributes of managers significantly affected their ability and/or inability to 
take entrepreneurial action within the uncertain Palestinian market. 
In addition to an uncertain institutional environment, the respondents emphasised 
that the characteristics and nature of opportunity play critical roles in entrepreneurial 



















4.6 Formal and Informal Institutional Challenges: An MNE  
4.6.1 Institutional Barriers and Voids 
The analysis found that the extreme institutional barriers and voids faced by the 
indigenous firm were arguably even more severe for the relatively new MNE operator, with 
less local knowledge and higher entry barriers. All interviewees of the MNE confirmed that 
there were many extreme institutional challenges in the Palestinian mobile phone sector 
exacerbated by violent conflict. The CFO did volunteer the remark that ‘Palestine has great 
violence and unrest due to intra-Palestinian and Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ (W08) and the 
CCO reported that ‘… the armed conflict and civil unrest caused the delay of the GS project 
for many years’ (W04). 
The managers of the MNE emphasised that their firm operates in a most obstructive, 
ambiguous and antagonistic business environment due to many extreme institutional barriers 
and voids in the Palestinian mobile phone sector. The findings emphasised three major 
formal institutional barriers: (1) the political system (e.g. political instability), (2) regulatory 
barriers (e.g. imprecise regulative relations between the PNA and Israeli governments, and 
between the PNA and Hamas governments), and (3) market structure (e.g. the dominance of 
the mobile phone sector by the local Palestinian operator). These barriers seriously affect the 
stability of the mobile phone sector and the firm’s entry, operations, growth and profitability. 
In terms of informal institutional barriers, the lack of awareness of how MNEs and 
corporations work, and an unfavourable perceptions of Palestinian operators’ service quality 
in comparison to that of Israeli operators were widely cited to be important. In regard to 
institutional voids in the business environment, respondents identified a lack of 
telecommunications infrastructure, supportive systems, and intermediaries, and the absence 
of an independent regulatory body as most evident. Table 4-8 summarises the main 
institutional barriers and voids that the MNE faced and provides some illustrative quotations 











Formal institutional barriers 
The different institutional 
environment and barriers 
within the Palestinian 
market 
 ‘… the GS is different from the WB, therefore, we faced either different or 
more complicated barriers in GS, …’ (W05) 
 ‘We faced different institutional barriers in the GS and WB. There were some 
advantages and disadvantages.  For example, the GS space is smaller than 
the WB therefore, that reduces the number of our sites (costs) and there are 
no Israeli SIMs in the GS market. However, we faced the problems of 
difficulty of equipment entry and the banning 3G services in the GS’ (W03) 
Unstable political 
structure 
 ‘We are talking about a state without any element of a state. There are no 
borders (there is no control over crossing points and no airport) and there 
are not enough regulations to regulate the Palestinian market’ (W08) 
 ‘There are many regulators (Israeli government, the PNA in the WB, and 
Hamas government in the GS due to the Palestinian division) of the 
Palestinian market and mobile phone sector’ (W06)  
No unified, credible and 
harmonised legal 
frameworks 
 ‘The law used to regulate the telecommunications sector is based on the 
Jordanian and Egyptian laws that were used in 1965, and these laws are not 
suitable for regulating the Palestinian telecommunications sector and 
market ...’ (W02)  
 ‘The conflict of laws and protocols for sites’ installation due to the 
duplication of authority in the WB and GS’ (W04) 
Corruption and lack of 
transparency 
 ‘The personal relations between the MTIT and mobile phone operators led 
to the lack of transparency in regulating the market’ (W02) 
The dominance by a local 
Palestinian operator of 
mobile phone sector 
 ‘Our competitor was monopolising the Palestinian market for 10 years in 
the WB and 19 years in the GS…’ (W01) 
 ‘The X group, which our competitor is a part of it, is the only provider of 
leased line in the Palestinian territories; therefore, they charge our company 
high prices and unfortunately we don’t have any alternative’ (W11) 
Unethical competition 
from the local Palestinian 
competitor 
 ‘Our local legal competitor’s managers … link their CSR activities with 
business transactions with municipalities, local councils, and companies. 
They granted them funds in return for giving exclusivity to our competitor in 
some business activities’ (W01) 
 ‘Our local competitor signed 3-5 years monopoly contracts with companies 
and individuals, which is considered illegal and unethical competitive 
practice’ (W10) 
The technology gap 
between the Israeli and 
Palestinian operators 
 ‘Israel creates a technology gap between the Israeli and Palestinian 
operators through granting abundant frequencies, 3G (for more than 10 
years) and 4G (for 4 years) frequencies to the Israeli operators’ (W02)  
 ‘The technology gap between the Palestinian operators, and both the Israeli 
and international operators’ (W10) 
The limited spectrum and 
frequencies granted to the 
Palestinian operators 
 ‘… the spectrum of frequencies and code number are controlled by Israel 
…’ (W02)  
  ‘The limited frequencies granted to our company due to the Israeli control 
of spectrum of frequencies. For example, Israel granted our company 3.8 
MHz and 2G frequencies in 2009, while they granted 30 to 40 MHz, and 3G 
and 4G frequencies to the Israeli operators’ (W06) 
The illegal competition 
from the Israeli operators 
 ‘The wide-spread illegal operations and SIMs of Israeli operators in the WB 
(450,000 Israeli SIMs) …’ (W01)  
 ‘The widespread of the Israeli operators’ SIMs and their illegal operations 
in the Palestinian market’ (W08) 
Movement and travel 
restrictions for staff and 
consultants 
 ‘The difficulty of mobility between our company’s offices due to the 
fragmentation of the WB’s cities and geographical segregation between the 
WB and GS’ (W03) 
 ‘Israel does not allow the entry of experts to install equipment and networks 
… we also cannot transfer our knowledge and experience among our 




Table 4-8: (Continued) 
The Palestinian operators 
do not have their own 
international gateway and 
cannot install their core 
equipment in the 
Palestinian territories 
 ‘We don’t have our own international gate to connect our network and 
Internet with the outside world. We have to buy a service from the Israeli 
operators to transfer the Internet and connect our network to the other 
countries through their Optic Fibre lines’ (W11) 
 ‘Israel does not allow us to install our core equipment in the Palestinian 
territories, so we are forced to place them in Israel, which increases our 
operating expenses’(W06) 
Israel’s control of ports 
and crossings, and a very 
lengthy and inefficient 
process for importing 
telecommunications 
equipment 
 ‘The difficulty of the entry of telecom equipment, spare parts, and tools. They 
have to go through a very lengthy and highly restrictive security check, and 
sometimes Israel does not allow them to enter. For example, our equipment 
for the GS project had arrived at the Israeli ports in 2011 and Israel seized 
them for 5 years, even though this equipment is the same as equipment 
installed in the WB’ (W06)  
The fragmentation of 
Palestinian cities and 
towns 
 ‘We cannot properly access and approach our Palestinian customers due to 
the fragmentation of the WB’s cities and the classification of areas in A, B, 
and C, which increase the difficulty of linking our infrastructure and 
network, and reaching our customers’ (W06) 
The weak regulatory 
capacity of the MTIT 
 ‘The MTIT does not regulate and implement the MNP service in the 
Palestinian market, which gives a competitive advantage for our local 
competitor...’ (W11) 
 ‘The inability of MTIT to regulate the market. It is the dominant local 
company who is the actual regulator of the Palestinian market’ (W02) 
 ‘The MTIT is a part of the PNA (i.e. the political system); therefore, there is 
an extensive bureaucracy that reduces its ability to keep pace with the 
administrative and financial developments of the private sector (i.e. mobile 
phone operators). The MTIT is not able to regulate the competition in the 
Palestinian market or design applicable strategies. The MTIT also does not 
have enough expertise to play the role of the regulator…’ (W02)  
 ‘The inability of the Palestinian MTIT to properly regulate the Palestinian 
market. For example, the MTIT does not have experts to regulate or 
implement the MNP service in the market’ (W09) 
The weak enforcement 
power of the PNA 
 ‘The inability of the PNA to implement its commitments that are mentioned 
in the licence granted to our company. We committed to pay $ 364 million 
in return for granting our company the required frequencies and the launch 
of our operations in the WB and GS in 2006 with 2G and 3G (exclusive for 
5 years) frequencies. But we launched our company in the WB with 2G 
services only in 2009 and 3G services in 2018, while we entered the GS 
market with 2G services only at the end of 2017’ (W04)  
 ‘The Israeli control of granting frequencies to the Palestinian operators; 
therefore, the PNA has no executive power in the market’ (W10) 
 ‘The Palestinian MTIT cannot obligate our competitor to implement MNP 
service in the Palestinian market’ (W01) 
The weak support for the 
Palestinian operators 
from the PNA 
 ‘The PNA does not support or facilitate our entry and operations as a foreign 
investor in the Palestinian market’ (W01) 
 ‘Our company is the largest foreign investor in Palestine ($ 350 million), but 
there are no incentives or facilities from the PNA …’ (W04) 
 ‘… initiating restrictive and non-supportive laws and regulation to the new 
companies in the mobile phone sector’ (W10)  
The limited market 
growth and the blurred 








 ‘The Palestinian market is very limited. There is insignificant market growth 
in both the WB and GS (around 3%), which increases the intensity of rivalry 
among existing competitors. Moreover, there is overlapping among the 
Palestinian society’s layers, which increases the difficulty of dividing the 
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Informal institutional barriers 
Unfavourable perception 
of Palestinian operators’ 
service quality in 
comparison to that of 
Israeli operators 
 ‘The Palestinians consider that the Israeli products have higher quality than 
the Palestinian products’ (W03) 
 ‘The Palestinian customers desire to have high quality services with lower 
prices; therefore, they compare our services and products with the Israeli 
operators’ (W08) 
A lack of awareness of 
how MNEs and 
corporations work 
 ‘The majority of companies that work in the Palestinian market are local 
and they don’t have any international experience and exposure. The 
Palestinian market is closed and has no international experience)’ (W10) 
 ‘The Palestinians do not properly understand how international 
corporations work … they have been exposed to a very limited corporate 
experience’ (W09) 
The limited exposure of 
customers and staff to 
advanced mobile phone 
experiences and services 
 ‘The people’s limited exposure to telecom experience. Also, many of the  staff 
recruited don’t have prior experience in the mobile phone sector’ (W07) 
Institutional voids 
A shortage of 
telecommunications, 
technological, electric 
power infrastructure and 
supportive systems 
 ‘The absence of an ecosystem and online payment system complicates our 
task of creating a business climate that depends on the Internet and 3G 
services’ (W04) 
 ‘The lack of the required infrastructure to work in the Palestinian market, 
either that directly related to the telecommunications infrastructure or the 
electricity and power infrastructure’ (W10) 
The absence of an 
independent regulatory 
body to regulate the 
Palestinian mobile phone 
sector 
 ‘There was TRC from 2005 to 2007, but the dominant company in the 
telecommunications sector worked hard to deactivate it …’ (W02) 
 ‘In any country around the world, there is an independent and unbiased 
committee to regulate the telecommunications sector, that is called TRC …, 
but unfortunately this committee does not exist in Palestine’ (W05)  
A shortage of installation 
and maintenance 
contractors 
 ‘We depend on our technical and engineering team in installing and 
maintaining our sites due to the lack of local contractors’ (W02) 
  ‘There is a limited number of installation and maintenance companies in 
the Palestinian market. For instance, there were only 4 cranes in the GS, 
and we had to install all the sites in less than 4 months’ (W04) 
A shortage of marketing 
consultants and media 
production 
intermediaries 
 ‘The lack of specialised companies in deep marketing, segmentation, 
communications, and training’ (W07) 
 ‘We internally developed our marketing department to fill the gap of the lack 
of qualified companies in the field of marketing’ (W09) 
A shortage of reliable 
logistics, promotion and 
distribution companies 
 ‘We established our own call centre to communicate with our customers, but 
we recently tried to encourage them to communicate with our company 
through the online agents’ (W01, W03, W09) 
 ‘We established our own dealership network due to the lack of reliable 
dealers and intermediaries’ (W03, W05)  
 ‘The geographical and political segregation between the WB and GS, and 
the Israeli restrictions, forced us to deal with small and unqualified 
companies that don’t have the required capacities to properly provide the 
products and services needed’ (W11) 
A shortage of 
international consultants 
and vendors, and local 
suppliers 
 ‘Israel does not allow us to contract international staff or let them enter the 
Palestinian territories’ (W07) 
 ‘Although there are some Palestinian companies (i.e. local suppliers), which 
have financial solvency, but many international companies … refuse to 
franchise these companies … the lack of credible, large companies that we 







4.6.2 Disbenefits and Benefits of Institutional Challenges 
The managers of the MNE stated that the extreme institutional barriers and voids 
(see Table 4-8) in Palestine constitute an uncertain business environment. They indicated 
that these institutional barriers and voids had different influences on the company’s market 
entry and performance, emphasising that they may generate disbenefits/diseconomies for the 
MNE. The most important disbenefits were cited as additional costs, higher barriers to entry, 
competitive disadvantage, obstacles to growth, and low quality (see Table 4-9).  
On the other hand, the analysis provides evidence that the extreme institutional 
barriers and voids may create benefits/advantages for the MNE. The most evident benefits 
included a higher creativity, efficiency and effectiveness, prospective opportunities and 
advantages, and a better resource allocation and utilisation. Table 4-9 summarises the main 
disbenefits and benefits of extreme institutional barriers and voids for the MNE and provides 
some illustrative examples for each. 






 ‘… We were forced to place them in Israel, which increased our operating 
expenses. Our connections with the rest of world should go through the Israeli 
international gate (i.e. we pay for leasing of fibre optic, data centres rents, and 
operating costs) (W06) 
 ‘We paid for storage, cargo and landing of our GS network’s equipment and 




 ‘The limited frequencies increased the CAPEX. We installed three times as many 
sites as needed in a normal situation, due to the limited frequencies’ (W03) 
 ‘We invested a large amount of money in our sites and an electricity control 
system that monitors the fuel consumption’ (W08) 
The high intensity of 
rivalry in the 
Palestinian market 
 ‘The spread of Israeli operators’ SIMs increased the competition in the market 
and reduced the potential revenues to our company’ (W04)  
 ‘There is insignificant market growth in both the WB and GS (around 3%), 
which increases the intensity of rivalry among existing competitors’ (W09) 
The competitive 




 ‘… Israel bans the entry of advanced and high capacity technologies, which 
gives a competitive advantage to the Israeli operators’ (W06)  
 ‘The limited frequencies granted in the WB, and the difficulty of covering area 
(C), helped the Israeli operators to expand their spread and operations in the 
Palestinian territories’ (W04)  
The competitive 
disadvantage of the 
company due to the 
incumbent firm’s 
dominance of the 
market 
 
 ‘The dominance of our competitor on the Palestinian market and the absence of 
TRC resulted in a difficult entry to the Palestinian market and our company 
suffered for long years due to the lack of governmental support or proper 
regulations to help our company to enter the market’ (W10)  
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The inability of the 
Palestinian operators 
to expand their 
networks and provide 
new services 
 ‘The technology gap hinders our company from implementing our expansion 
plans, especially in the field of digitalisation and providing new products and 
services to the market. For example, there no credit cards penetration, payment 
gateway, or online payment system’ (W10)  
 ‘The difficulty of developing our network due to the limited frequencies granted 
in the WB, and the difficulty of covering area (C)’ (W04)  
The low quality of 
services, voice and 
video calls 
 ‘… the poor quality of services, which requires massive efforts to improve the 
quality of voice calls and services…’ (W06)  
 ‘The limited frequencies granted resulted in more call drops and the inability to 
cover all our customers’ (W08)  
The inability of the 
company to 
approach/attract new 
customers and expand 
its market share 
 ‘The inability of the MTIT to regulate the market increased the difficulty of 
expanding our market base and penetrating the market’ (W09) 
 ‘The limited frequencies granted resulted in the inability to cover all our 
customers and recruit new customers, …’ (W08) 
The inability of the 
company to take 
advantage of being a 
part of a multinational 
group, and fully 
capitalise on vendors’ 
after-sales services 
 ‘We are a part of multinational group company (it works in 12 countries) …, 
but we cannot take the advantages and privileges of agreements with some 
systems’ vendors such as Ericsson, SIMs’ vendors, and Top-ups’ vendors like 
other companies in our group’ (W04) 
 ‘We tried to transfer the international experience from the Turkish companies 
and our vendors (i.e. Ericsson), but we cannot bring them to the WB and GS and 
benefit from their after-sale services’ (W06) 
The inability of the 
company to benefit 
from any privileges 
and exclusivity as 
stated in the licence 
 ‘According to our licence, we have the right of exclusivity to provide 3G services 
for 4 years, but due to the delay in granting 3G frequencies, we did not benefit 
from this exclusivity’ (W01) 
 ‘If our company was granted its exclusive right for operating 3G services, it was 
much easier for us to overcome our competitor’s dominance of the Palestinian 
market’ (W09) 
The inability to 
implement the 
company’s plans and 
work procedures 
 ‘This situation prevented us from implementing our plans and working 
procedures in the GS’ (W10) 
 ‘We cannot implement any project plan within its timeframe. Also, there are 
always many extra costs that exceed our budget’ (W11) 
Delays in project 
execution and 
creating new revenue 
streams 
 ‘The delay of our launch and operations affected our financial position. There 
were many expenses without any revenues for many years’ (W02) 
 ‘3G services project suffered for a long time and was banned in the WB till the 
beginning of 2018 and is still banned in the GS …’ (W05)  
The obstruction of 
potential/future 
opportunities 
 ‘The absence of an ecosystem and supportive government don’t directly affect 
our company nowadays, but this will definitely affect our company in the long 
run. We cannot identify new opportunities ...’ (W10) 
 ‘Our digitalisation project suffers from the lack of systems and regulation that 
support and regulate the electronic payment sector’ (W10) 
A managerial  
preoccupation with  
operational problems 
rather than strategic 
issues 
 ‘These barriers and voids converted us to micro managers. This forced us to put 
our hands in the operations’ (W05)   
 ‘These barriers increased the complications of this business environment, the 
difficulty of managing our company in GS and resulted in focusing only on our 
operations rather than planning for new products and services’ (W01) 
Economic losses to 
the Palestinian 
economy, mobile 
phone sector and the 
company 
 ‘The widespread of illegal Israeli operators’ operations causes fatal losses for 
our company and our legal competitor. The Palestinian operators and 
Palestinian economy lose around $ 100 million annually’ (W05)  
 ‘The delay of our launch negatively affected our financial and competitive 
position in the Palestinian market ...the mobile phone market lost around a third 
of its value during the 3 years of our operations delay’ (W08) 
Benefits 
More efficient and 
effective allocation 
and utilisation of 
resources 
 ‘This encouraged us to optimise utilisation of resources’ (W01) 
 ‘When we changed our network in the WB from 2G to 3G, we used the WB’s 2G 
network parts as spare parts for the GS’s network, and store other materials 
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The creation of a 
more creative and 
innovative working 
environment 
 ‘…, but our engineers designed our network to be operated with the limited 
frequencies granted, and operated some features that are not used in any place 
around the world … We also designed “Wallmote Sites” that are placed within 
cities to avoid interferences and ensure the network optimisation. In addition, 
we designed Very High Gain Amplifier (VAGA) that provides remote coverage, 
which helps us to cover around 90% of area (C)’ (W06) 
 ‘…, but these obstacles often motivate our staff to be more innovative to 
overcome these barriers ...’ (W07) 




and faster staff 
learning 
 ‘… the ability of the company to reach the relevant information about all issues 
that could affect the company’s operations in Palestine … the experience is not 
limited to the field of mobile phone sector, but the experience in the Palestinian 
context, which has very complicated political, social and economic components’ 
(W02) 
 ‘In the 3G project … our engineers designed 2 software and demo models to 
install 3G equipment on the old towers ... they then dismantled the software and 
made some modifications to it; so they were able to operate the 3G network in 
three months instead of one year and offer the best 3G services in the Palestinian 
market’ (W06) 
The finding of more 
efficient and effective 
alternative solutions 
 ‘… we bought a power control system called Clock-Domain Crossing (CDC) 
that organises and coordinates the process of shifting electricity sources and 
operating of our network. This system also provides reports about level of fuel, 
power in batteries, and alerts’ (W04) 
 ‘We added a free service called ‘Your New Number’ that provides a voicemail 
and text message of the new mobile number of our customers to both caller and 
receiver when anyone dialled their old mobile numbers, to temporarily solve the 
absence of MNP service’ (W09) 
Flexible and dynamic 
firm 
 ‘We redesigned many commercial programmes and offers to fit our customers 
in GS due to the bad economic situation’ (W01)  
 ‘We make some adjustments to fit with the scarcity of talents and adjust some 
selection and recruitment standards’ (W07) 
 ‘We constantly monitor the projects’ time plans and make the required 
adjustments’ (W11)  
Cost reduction  ‘…, instead of heavily investing in the showrooms, we designed booths in the 
malls and shopping centres, and our showrooms in cities and towns have very 
simple and inexpensive modern designs …’ (W01) 
  ‘Our competitor took the advice of international suppliers, but we saved about 
$ 4 million and completed the project in about a quarter of the expected time 
period’ (W06) 
Offering high quality 
products and services, 
and optimising value-
added to the 
customers 
 ‘… this urged us to develop our capabilities, improve our work and provide high 
quality services with affordable prices. We aim to maximise the value-added 
(i.e. big value) to our customers with affordable prices’(W01) 
 ‘We adopt a customer-centric strategy. We try, as much as possible, to provide 
high quality services with affordable prices, and focus on adding distinctive 
value to our customers’ (W09)  
The creation of some 







 ‘The blockade on the GS for around 12 years drove the Palestinians' need for a 
change in the Palestinian market. This helped our company to penetrate and  
acquire a large market share within a very short period of time and our 
performance was great in the GS … this resulted in an increasing of our 
company’s profit by around 25% in the last year’ (W09)  
 ‘… these institutional barriers and voids could generate opportunities, as our 
staff became qualified and able to overcome these barriers and sometimes 
convert them to opportunities’ (W07) 
The learning from 
overseas operators’ 




 ‘The delay in allowing the entry of advanced technologies and services to the 
Palestinian market helped our company as a second operator to learn from 
other operators’ experience about how they dealt with the dominating 




Table 4-9: (Continued) 
The creation of a 
competitive 
advantage for one 
operator rather than 
others 
 ‘…we reached an agreement that Israel grants our company 1800 frequencies, 
10 MHz, which gave us a competitive advantage in GS market, as we provide 
high quality services, and this could reduce the cost of our future investment 
regarding number of sites and the network’s development’ (W08) 
 ‘… this situation helped us in attracting a large number of our customers in the 
GS within a very short time after our launch in the GS at the end of 2017, as the 
Palestinian citizens in the GS have a desire to switch from the first operator’ 
(W11) 
The generation of 
further revenues from 
products and services 
that are outdated in 
other markets 
 ‘I think that despite the declining sales and profits of 2G services generally in 
almost all countries, they continued to generate good profits due to using voice 
calls instead of social media, due to the banning of 3G services in the WB until 
the beginning of 2018, and they are still generating profits in the GS’ (W07) 
The erection of more 
entry barriers to new 
entrants 
 ‘These barriers impeded any third operator to enter the Palestinian market, as 
the Palestinian market has no further room for a third operator’ (W11) 
The creation of more 
commitment and 
persistence to work in 
the Palestinian market 
 ‘…, living in this difficult context is a catalyst to serve this country and these 
customers (i.e. patriotic incentive). Moreover, some companies are interested in 
adding to their profile that they are working in Palestine, as a kind of affiliation 
to this place that has importance for the Arab and Islamic nation’ (W09) 
 ‘The level of employees’ engagement is very high, as our staff is very interested 
in the success of the company because they are Palestinians’ (W07) 
Source: Author 
4.6.3 Strategic Responses to Institutional Barriers and Voids 
In line with the IBV, the analysis revealed that the MNE designed a set of 
strategies/responses directed at handling the prevailing institutional barriers and voids in 
order to obtain and/or retain competitive advantages. These responses varied depending on 
the barriers/void itself and representing a sequential escalation of the firm’s efforts in coping 
with, leveraging and/or shaping institutional contradictions. 
Specifically, the findings articulated three levels of firm responses in dealing with 
the institutional barriers and voids: (1) acceptance of the environment as given, without any 
active attempt to change either the firm or the institutions, (2) adaptation of some areas of 
the firm to better leverage the existing institutional conditions, and (3) making deliberate 
and active attempts to influence (change existing and/or create new) institutions in favour of 
the firm. These three strategic responses and their respective tactics will be discussed in 
detail in 5.2.3. Table 4-10 illustrates and classifies the strategic responses of the MNE to the 












Compliance   ‘If we are talking about regulative matters (i.e. laws and systems), informal 
institutions neither substitute for nor complement formal institutions, and we have 
to obey these regulations’ (W04) 
 ‘Israel did not allow us to install our core equipment in the Palestinian territories, 
so we were forced to place them in Israel’ (W06) 
Patience / wait-and-
see 
 ‘Our investors understand the political situation and they were patient and 
insisted on the continuation of our company's operations’ (W08) 
 ‘The GS project was delayed for many years, but we were patient and eager to 
work in the GS market’ (W04) 
Adaptation 
Outsourcing  ‘We contracted local suppliers to provide us with handsets’ (W04) 
 ‘We hired international consulting firms to fill the gap of expertise in managing 
large corporations’ (W09) 
Hiring  ‘We leased the Israeli operators’ fibre optic network to link our networks in the 
WB and GS, and to link our network with international networks (International 
gate)’ (W02)   
 ‘Our company hired data centres in Israel and Jordan (at Shouna as it’s the 
closest to the WB for better connectivity)’ (W06) 
Internalisation of 
activities 
 ‘We stored large quantities of SIM that are enough for 2 years in order to avoid 
any stock-out due to the siege on the GS’ (W04) 
 ‘We adapted to some changes and some situations, and we made some 
adjustments to our business model’ (W10) 
Heuristic-based 
approach 
 ‘We employed our previous experiences in the WB in order to overcome the 
barriers in GS market’ (W01) 
 ‘We invested in the development of our staff’s capabilities through encouraging 
them to join and enrol in some vocational and educational development 
programmes’ (W07)  
 ‘…we send our staff to learn about the operating systems in these countries. In 
the trial phase of the systems, we send our staff to see and know how the system 
actually works before it is installed and operated in Palestine’ (W04) 
A market-based 
strategy 
 ‘We depended on our capabilities to provide distinctive services with affordable 
prices in the Palestinian market’ (W05) 
 ‘… we are in a price war with our competitor, but we use all the available 
capabilities such as approaching and contacting our customers, wide and solid 
selling channels, high quality services and genuine customer care’ (W01) 
Cost review  ‘We invested in our sites, as we added generators and  batteries for each site, and 
we installed a system for monitoring and coordinating different sources of power 
in order to minimise the cost of operating our network’ (W08) 
 ‘Our main strategy is cost reduction, and our managers’ views and opinions play 
a role in properly valuing and allocating the available resources’ (W09) 
Bricolage  ‘Our engineers designed our network to be operated with the limited frequencies 
granted and operated some features that aren’t used in any other place around 
the world …’ (W06) 
 ‘We effectively and efficiently deployed the available resources to solve some 
problems … we tried to exploit any opportunity and contribute to building a 
network with the banks and other organisations to support our digitalisation 
project’ (W10) 
Prospecting  ‘… our staff found some solutions for problems …, but our engineers creatively 
found innovative solutions that surprised our international vendors’ (W08) 
 ‘To overcome the absence of MNP service, we offer a free service called “My New 
Number”, …’ (W02) 
 ‘We designed an innovative tactical promotion, as our competitor will not be able 








  ‘We tried to capitalise our benefits through the informal institutions and our 
relationships with universities, CBOs, local communities, partners, dealers, and 
vendors. This significantly facilitated our accessibility to the information, 
resources, and opportunities’ (W07) 
 ‘Our partnerships with the local communities, business partners, and 
municipalities helped us to solve some problems, and fill the gaps due to the 
inability or absence of formal institutions’ (W01) 
Collaboration  ‘We collaborated with the MTIT to implement the MNP service. We provided 
many proposals for implementation procedures and explained how this service 
could contribute to our expansion in the market, as the majority of customers 
would prefer to keep their old mobile phone numbers’ (W02) 
 ‘We depended on collaborations with our local competitor in some issues (e.g. 
combating the spread of Israeli SIMs in the Palestinian territories)’ (W08) 
Linking of interests 
between the state 
and firm 
 We tried to link our company’s interests with the PNA’s interests, especially in 
the case of the spread of Israeli SIMs, which cause annual losses of around 300 
million NIS ($ 85 million) to the Palestinian economy. We work with the PNA to 
control the Palestinian market and reduce the spread of Israeli SIMs’ (W02) 
Political influence 
tactics 
 ‘We tried to be part of the decision-making process for many matters that related 
to the mobile phone sector. For example, we participated in formulating some 
laws and systems to regulate the market …’ (W04) 
 ‘We put pressures and participated in regulating and implementing the MNP 
service. Our company also urged the PNA to regulate the payment gateway and 
online payment system’ (W10) 
Bargaining   ‘We negotiated the limited frequencies granted to our company with the Israeli 
government through the Palestinian MTIT. We also negotiated the licence fees 
and some taxes with the PNA (MTIT and Prime Minister), to discount the fees and 
have some taxes exemption’ (W01) 
 ‘We negotiated, through the Palestinian MTIT, 3G services and frequencies with 
the Israeli government. We recently negotiated 4G services’ (W09) 
Signalling   ‘… to establish strong networks with our stakeholders through our CSR activities, 
which helped us to build networks with the local community, and decision makers 
either in governmental or non-governmental organisations’ (W04) 
 ‘We built a good reputation and relations with our community through our CSR 
activities. We supported the health sector in the GS with $ 1.5 million 
(medication), the steadfastness of Palestinians in Hebron with $ 1.8 million, and 




  ‘Being a part of a multinational group helps us with some resources, especially 
international standards, systems and reports that facilitate our access to some 
important information that helps in surmounting some of these barriers’ (W05) 
 ‘Our company also contributed to some changes in the community regarding the 
HR practices’ (W07) 
 ‘We try to transfer other operators’ experiences into our group to fill some voids, 
especially in the regulations and operational issues’ (W10) 
Institutional 
brokering 
 ‘We established a call centre, but it is not traditional, as we encourage our 
customers to use social media and live chat to contact our company’ (W03, W07) 
 ‘We coordinated with the Palestinian universities to train and equip students with 
the essential skills and abilities to work in the market, which helps us to overcome 
a scarcity of talent and fill the gap of lack of skilled employees in the Palestinian 
market’ (W07) 
 ‘We linked our interests and benefits with the banking sector to encourage them 






This study provides evidence that, besides the cumulative and negative influences of 
institutional barriers, voids and conflict, the MNE confronted with the liability of 
foreignness. However, it was found that being an MNE brings benefits as well as liabilities 
of foreignness. Foreignness, for example, led to the MNE’s need to conform and adapt to 
existing institutions to seek legitimacy and pacify stakeholders. On the other hand, the MNE 
took advantage of its experience in other countries and transferred employees with relevant 
experience of international standards, and new systems, products and services. The MNE 
reported many strategic responses to institutional challenges that were associated with 
positive outcomes. The next section therefore will focus on entrepreneurial opportunity-
related processes. 
4.7 Entrepreneurial Processes and Action: An MNE 
4.7.1 Antecedents of Entrepreneurial Processes and Action 
Unsurprisingly, the analysis found that a wide variety of factors influenced 
opportunity-related processes and entrepreneurial action. These factors/antecedents were 
broadly related to the entrepreneur’s personality, institutional environment, and 
opportunity’s characteristics. Appendix (G) provides the relevant quotations for each 
antecedent. Based on the findings, these antecedents of entrepreneurial processes and action 
can be explained as follows:  
1- The main individual attributes of managers that help them to successfully identify 
and exploit new opportunities were creativity, optimism, motivation, risk-taking, 
openness to new ideas, and determination for success. 
2- Prior knowledge and previous experience were found to be important in identifying 
and exploiting new opportunities, but only to a certain level and for some types of 
opportunity. The uncertain Palestinian business environment underestimated the role 
of prior knowledge in the entrepreneurial processes and action. Such an uncertain 
context required creativity and innovation, finding alternative solutions, and 
employing different thinking modes, especially for some types of opportunity. 
3- Social networks with local partners and communities were found to be critical for the 
MNE to overcome its foreignness, access a pool of resource and information, identify 
the market’s needs, and to exercise its influence. In addition, the MNE employed its 




other operators in the group to surmount its weakly embedded position in the 
institutions and networks of the Palestinian market and its competitive 
disadvantages. Social relations also facilitated solving many problems, developing 
new products, improving existing products, and exploiting opportunities.  
4- A high level of heightened entrepreneurial alertness to information, and sensitivity 
to the market’s changes and gaps increased the possibility of identifying hidden 
business opportunities before others and facilitated fast implementation. Some 
managers assumed that certain staff are endowed from birth with a high level of 
alertness, but others can be trained to develop their entrepreneurial alertness 
capabilities. 
5- Systematic search interestingly turned out to be supplementary to entrepreneurial 
alertness. It helped in discovering specific opportunities, improving some services, 
and understanding how to stimulate a consumption for specific products. Systematic 
search also provided the MNE with relevant information regarding the market 
readiness for new products, market dynamics, and how to approach potential 
customers and solve some problems, which helped the MNE to overcome its local 
knowledge disadvantage. 
6- It transpired that an uncertain institutional environment may generate some 
profitable opportunities, but it may also preclude opportunity exploitation. Since the 
MNE used to operate in a lower level of uncertainty in other countries compared to 
the Palestinian context, the MNE suffered for many years from the extreme 
uncertainty in order to enter and establish itself as a competent competitor.   
7-  It appeared that the types of opportunity influenced the willingness of entrepreneurs 
to identify and exploit them. A high level of clarity of both the characteristics of an 
opportunity and how the MNE can employ its capabilities helped in identifying and 
exploiting the opportunity. Such opportunities may be important to realise short-term 
success. One the other hand, a low level of clarity of the characteristics of an 
opportunity and a more complicated/ambiguous situation required more efforts, time, 
costs, creativity and innovation (i.e. more risk-taking). These opportunities may be 





4.7.2 Entrepreneurial Processes and Actions 
Despite the fact that the MNE operates within an extremely uncertain business 
environment, the analysis underlined three widely cited entrepreneurial processes in the 
entrepreneurship literature: opportunity identification, development, and evaluation 
(Ardichvili et al., 2003). However, the findings provided a thick description of how and by 
whom these activities are done within each of these processes. More importantly though, 
this study offered a deep and advanced understanding of ‘entrepreneurial action’ within 
such an uncertain environment.  
4.7.2.1 Opportunity Identification 
It was established that the managers of the MNE identified business opportunities 
through three distinct processes: recognition, discovery, and creation. This result showed 
that the MNE used all possible ways of identifying opportunities in order to survive and 
grow within the Palestinian mobile phone market. The findings also emphasised that the 
MNE invested heavily in its market intelligence to mitigate its local knowledge 
disadvantage. 
A- Opportunity Recognition 
The MNE’s managers started the opportunity recognition process with either using 
available databases and information or obtaining new/additional information through market 
intelligence and market scans. This facilitated the imagination process of how managers can 
formulate a supply-demand framework and match them together. The managers observed 
and initially evaluated a potential opportunity. They then decided if a potential opportunity 
is real/profitable or unpromising/unprofitable opportunity for them. The managers of the 
MNE described the process of recognising opportunities as one basis for opportunity 
identification in the following excerpts: 
‘Our company conducts quarterly market intelligence and continuously 
communicates with our customers via social media in order to identify the market’s needs 
and gaps. When the appropriate products are available, they are provided to our customer 
to satisfy their needs’ (W06) 
‘… we regularly scan the market to recognise any matching between the market’s 




‘Our staff notice some gaps in the market that can be filled by our existing products 
and services. They also differentiate between the real opportunities that could generate 
profits to our company and the fake opportunities that don’t suit our company’ (W04) 
The findings demonstrated that the personal characteristics of managers/staff 
influenced the opportunity recognition process. The MNE’s entrepreneurs were able to 
recognise opportunities when they were sensitive to, and familiar with, market needs, 
problems, and changes. They also had an advanced level of analysis and precognition, 
constructive criticism, and persuasion skills. The managers/staff were passionate about 
growing and expanding their operations in the market, which urged their willingness to 
identify further opportunities. In addition, the analysis emphasised that the entrepreneur’s 
origins, background and specialisations affected their abilities to recognise potential 
opportunities and set out boundaries for their focal areas. The managers of the MNE 
mentioned some characteristics of entrepreneurs in the opportunity recognition process in 
relevant quotations as follows: 
‘… they have to be familiar with the nature of this segment. This means that they are 
able to identify the market’s needs and follow up any changes that take place in the market. 
They also have high sensitivity to the market’s changes and an ability to collect and properly 
analyse the required and relevant data. Their backgrounds also affect the nature of identified 
opportunities. For example, our staff who work on the youth segment are young people from 
the same segment and they have a continuous interaction with youth’ (W09)    
‘… they are pioneers, willing to take risks, highly sensitive to changes in the market, 
have the ability for constructive criticism, and have a business background and a good 
understanding of the market. They also have the ability to sell their ideas to others’ (W10) 
The analysis has shown that the MNE’s managers employed a set of techniques at 
different managerial levels to mitigate the severity and impact of uncertainty and risk on 
their firm in the opportunity recognition process, based on their judgements and prior 
experiences. The managers put forward a pool of alternative plans and options, sought 
operational and strategic hedging, developed a reliable database, increased firm’s 
operational flexibility, and scaled up projects. They also involved, and coordinated with, all 
concerned committees, depended on experimentations and learning, and employed ‘what if’ 
analysis. The respondents demonstrated how the MNE handled uncertainty and risk in the 
process of recognising opportunities in the following quotes:  
‘We regularly conduct market research, and involve many committees in evaluating 
and assessing these opportunities such as: Commercial Activity Team (CAT), Executive 




‘… (1) what if analysis, (2) sometimes developing some opportunities to be more 
solid, waiting to collect more information about them …, (3) depending on the 
experimentation, learning, and listening to new ideas …, (4) using our previous experiences 
and judgments in dealing with uncertainty …, and (5) in case of information and data 
availability, collecting as much as possible of these data and making some expectations 
based on them’ (W10) 
‘… we put many alternatives and take into consideration the value of risk and 
uncertainty during the planning stage. We start with a small project in order to reduce the 
level of uncertainty, and then we gradually launch our projects. We try to minimise the 
impact of uncertainty on the quality and continuity of our operations … there is coordination 
among all departments (i.e. business chain) … this uncertain environment affected our 
organisational form, …’ (W06) 
B- Opportunity Discovery 
The MNE’s managers reported two processes for opportunity discovery: (1) the firm 
started with scanning the market to identify its needs and then introduced a new product or 
service, and (2) the firm used its existing products and services and stimulated consumption 
of them. It was also established that the MNE entrepreneurs did not only discover 
unexploited opportunities accidentally through their entrepreneurial alertness but also 
deliberately through conducting systematic search. The findings showed that the MNE 
enriched its discovery capabilities through investing in its market intelligence capabilities 
besides developing its staff's entrepreneurial alertness capacity. The marketing 
communications director described the process of discovering opportunities as one basis for 
opportunity identification in the following excerpt: 
 ‘We adopt different ways to identify the opportunities. Our customer sometimes 
could ask for new services or products (existing needs) and we offer a suitable product for 
these needs. The diverse customer base (prepaid and post-paid) helps in defining more 
opportunities and using different ways to do this. We also scan the market to find out the 
customers’ needs and satisfy their needs with either our existing product or new products. 
Moreover, we transfer some products or services from other international and regional 
countries to fill the gaps existing the market … the process of opportunity discovery depends 
on the type of opportunity and the market’s needs. If the opportunity is clear and the required 
information is available, we use systematic search. However, we sometimes accidently 
discover some unnoticed opportunities during market scanning’ (W03) 
Six main information collection methods, sources and channels that facilitated the 
opportunity discovery process emerged from the analysis. First, the MNE conducted market 
intelligence and benchmarking studies either by internal staff or international consultants. 
Second, the firm communicated with customers via social media. Third, the customers, 
dealers, and vendors provided a continuous feedback. Fourth, the sales and marketing teams 




products or services supplied by other operators in the region. Finally, the MNE explored 
neighbouring markets. The following excerpts provide some relevant examples from the 
interviews: 
‘We regularly conduct market scanning to identify the market’s needs/gaps … we 
also conduct benchmarking studies ... we also receive some reports and offers about some 
products or services that are provided by other operators in the region and we transfer them 
to the Palestinian market’ (W01) 
‘… market intelligence and continuously communicating with our customers via 
social media ... we also explore and study the neighbouring markets to learn from the 
experience of other operators and transfer some advanced technologies, products and 
services to the Palestinian market for existing market disequilibrium’ (W06) 
‘… we regularly collect data about the Palestinian market ... which facilitates the 
segmentation process, determining the value of potential investments in these segments, and 
identifying the potential opportunities ... conducting research about customers’ behaviour 
to identify their current needs or potential needs, in order to design the appropriate products 
or services to satisfy their needs’ (W09) 
A number of personal characteristics of managers/staff who discover opportunities 
were identified. They were critical thinkers, realistic, creative and familiar with the market. 
They also had bisociative thinking, a high level of imagination, anticipation, persuasion 
capabilities, and willingness to take risk. Some managers reported these characteristics in 
the relevant quotations as follows: 
‘…they have advanced level of capabilities such as imagination, analysis, and in 
linking different variables together. They have a wide relations network, are open to new 
ideas, have the willingness to bear risks, and have clear vision and long-term objectives’. 
(W05)  
‘… have the ability to prove the concept, the advanced skills and capabilities that 
enable them to deeply understand the market, the ability to optimise the benefits from the 
market’s gaps, the ability to link different and complicated variables together, and they are 
visionary’ (W10) 
‘… they can link different events and variables together and solve some complicated 
issues in the market. They have a high level of anticipation capability and smartness. They 
are up to date and follow other markets besides the Palestinian market’ (W03) 
A variety of techniques were expressed in relation to how the MNE managed risks 
in the process of discovering opportunities. The firm conducted exploratory research to 
discover the market, and developed a reliable database and an advanced analytical system. 
The MNE also depended on experimentations and learning, developed a programme for 




managers’ judgement and prior experiences. The managers illustrated how the MNE dealt 
with risk in the opportunity discovery process in the following excerpts: 
 ‘Our managers and teams explore the market, depend on their previous work 
experience and try to employ it … collect as much as we can of the data about the market, 
opportunity and competitors … conduct many types of data analysis for collected data to 
deal with risks in discovery process’ (W03) 
‘We … conduct many experiments to validate these opportunities and learn from 
these experiments in order to deal with risks …’ (W05) 
 ‘…, we conduct some studies and exploratory research to understand the nature of 
the market and changes that happen in it, and try to estimate what could happen in the 
future … and mutually share the information and experience among our company’s 
departments, as well as between our company and other operators in the group’ (W06) 
C- Opportunity Creation 
It was noted that the process of creating opportunities was one basis for opportunity 
identification in the MNE. The firm encouraged creativity in all work aspects. It had three 
strategic programmes to encourage new initiatives and opportunity creation: (1) a forum to 
present staff’s ideas at all managerial levels, (2) an individual initiative at the department 
level, and (3) a CEO prize for creativity. This is evident in the following excerpts:  
 ‘… we encourage the creativity in all the aspects that are related to new products, 
work efficiency, cost optimisation, opening new revenue streams … etc … our company has 
three strategic programmes to encourage new initiatives: (1) There is a forum to present 
our staff’s ideas at different levels and these ideas are assessed by a specialised committee,  
(2) There is individual initiative at the department level to encourage creativity and ideas 
and knowledge sharing, as each employee should present an idea, it could even be very 
simple, and (3) The CEO prize for creativity: it is a quarterly prize for a large number of 
staff, as the CEO granted 15 prizes in the last quarter’ (W10). 
‘The CEO initiated a programme called “Creativity Platform” to encourage our 
staff to express and share their creative and innovative ideas’ (W01) 
This opportunity creation was found to be related to the MNE’s digitalisation project. 
The company focused on digitalising and improving customer experience, explained in the 
following excerpts: 
‘…, nowadays the regional and international markets tend towards digitalisation, 
and we create some opportunities through online shopping, e-payment, mobile money, taxi 
application, and many other applications. These opportunities often upgrade the level of 
services provided, stimulate/create new needs in the market, and generate very good profits 




‘…, there is a tendency towards technology transfer, digitalisation, and customer 
experience improvement. This vision affects the nature of opportunities that we aim to 
identify and exploit in the Palestinian market ... opportunity creation is closely related to 
our company’s strategy in the next stage. We are working on creating some products and 
encouraging the Palestinian customers to use them (i.e. digitalisation of the Palestinian 
market)’ (W09) 
A common view amongst interviewees was that opportunity creation started by 
transferring some technologies and products from other markets or designing completely 
new products or processes, and then incentivising consumption of them through exhibiting 
the added-value of using these products. The MNE also created opportunities through 
entering new markets (e.g. GS market). The following quotations provide some relevant data 
from the interviews: 
‘Opportunity creation starts from new technology transfer to the Palestinian market 
(e.g. tracking system) or the entry to a new market (e.g. entry to the GS market). Sometimes 
we adjusted these products to suit the Palestinian market and, in some cases, we encouraged 
our customers to use these new products and services’ (W03) 
‘… we also create new opportunities through designing new products or operating 
procedures and stimulate their consumption/use in the market’ (W07) 
‘We follow our neighbouring countries and transfer some products or services after 
making some adjustments to fit the Palestinian market … we encouraged our customer to 
use live chat and social media, which helped us to reduce the costs and increase the usage 
of 3G services (i.e. market penetration)’ (W01)   
Three sources of opportunity in the creation process were identified. First, they used 
internal sources as initial ideas and initiatives from the company’s staff. Second, some ideas 
or suggestions were derived from reviewing international, regional, and other operators’ 
reports. Third, business partners and suppliers provided ideas and proposed joint projects. 
As the business transformation director stated ‘we figured out some ideas or suggestions 
from reviewing some international, regional, and other operators’ reports … we internally 
design proposals for new products or processes to be provided to the market or receive some 
suggestions from external parties (i.e. other companies that work in the market) for new 
services and products …’ (W10) 
The majority of the MNE’s managers offered a variety of explanations for the 
opportunity creation process and I summarised them into eleven steps as follows: (1) initial 
idea(s) imagination and formulation, (2) initial idea(s) development, (3) rethinking and 
modification to reach mature idea(s), (4) mature idea(s)-sharing with concerned parties, (5) 




feasibility measurement, (8) evaluation and feedback, (9) experimentation and modelling, 
(10) limited market trial and feedback, and (11) product modification and gradual market 
expansion. The following illustrative quotations provide a detailed description of these steps:  
 ‘The opportunity creation starts with a simple or initial idea from an individual (i.e. 
employee) or team within the company, then we develop this idea to be an opportunity, and 
measure its suitability for the market. We sometimes conduct some experiments and make 
some adjustments before introducing these products or services to the market’ (W01) 
 ‘… the process is considered a personal effort and the idea is formed within the 
imagination and thought of the entrepreneur, and s/he tries to develop it internally to reach 
an acceptable level of clarity to present the idea to others. The entrepreneur could rethink 
his/her idea many times before reaching a reasonable level of understanding, then present 
it to a manager who will adopt and support this idea for further development to turn it into 
a solid and clear opportunity’ (W04)    
 ‘… we start with piloting this project within the company (i.e. internally) and then 
on a small group, then expand it on a larger group in order to minimise the risks and 
uncertainties, and then implement it on the mass market. Indeed, these opportunities and 
their contents may be changed several times, and may result in new and different 
opportunities due to a change in the perspective and beliefs of the idea’s owners or the 
discovery of other things throughout the development process to reach a mature and feasible 
idea (i.e. opportunity)’ (W09) 
Some informants expressed the belief that they had difficulties in establishing a clear 
vision and a path forward from the beginning of the opportunity creation process, but this 
could become clearer with further progress and solid development of the opportunity. For 
example, some managers reported this in the excerpts below: 
‘The opportunity creation starts with a simple idea and it will be clearer with time 
and progress ...  if you ask me about this programme, I can just give you general ideas, but 
we are building a complete working framework and with more progress, this idea will be 
more mature and clearer’ (W01) 
‘There is no clear vision from the beginning of the opportunity creation process. 
Therefore, we need permanent monitoring of the development of the simple idea due to the 
high dynamic of the process that requires continuous changes and adjustments to the idea’s 
nature or vision’ (W04) 
It was established that the MNE used a wide range of techniques to tackle uncertainty 
in the process of creating opportunities. The managers of the MNE employed their creativity, 
and problem-solving heuristics. They further employed logic of causation and 
appropriateness, and developed a reliable database and analytical system (e.g. experiments, 
estimation, business scaling). The managers also were flexible, adaptable, and tolerant to 
changes. Some responses to the question of how the MNE dealt with uncertainty in the 




 ‘… using our adaptability capabilities to keep up with the fast and continuous 
changes in the opportunity creation process … creativity and imagination … identifying the 
causes and effects, and trying to discover the relations and link them together … trying to 
fit the opportunities and product to the existing reality … developing the opportunities 
through trial and error and depending on experimentation before going for further stages … 
starting with small-scale projects and step-stage programmes’ (W04) 
 ‘… creativity and innovation … logical thinking … linking variables and events and 
analysing their relations … providing understandable and reasonable explanations … 
ensuring the compatibility of our objectives with available resources, the nature of 
opportunity, and the current environment’ (W06) 
‘… the ability to identify the justifications, causes, and effects of any action, and the 
ability to estimate and see the long-term future, not only short-term estimations’ (W05) 
Overall, these results indicated that the MNE frequently identified business 
opportunities through opportunity recognition and discovery as well as significantly through 
opportunity creation. The company has adopted a digitalisation strategy, which involves 
creating further opportunities. 
4.7.2.2 Opportunity Development 
The findings showed that initially identified opportunities were further developed 
since the emergence of initial ideas and proposals from individuals or teams within the MNE 
or its parent group and business partners. The CCO emphasised that ‘the opportunity 
development starts from the beginning of identifying the opportunity (i.e. initial idea), as the 
owner of the idea should start to develop it to reach an acceptable level of clarity and this 
could happen many times’ (W04). 
In response to the question about the opportunity development process, a range of 
steps was elicited as follows: (1) data and information collection, (2) initial idea(s)-sharing 
with direct managers, (3) initial idea(s) modifications, (4) clear idea(s) development, (5) 
business case and technical study preparation, (6) initial evaluation and feedback by CAT, 
(7) CAT shares and discusses the business case and technical report with concerned 
departments, (8) solid opportunity(ies) development, (9) opportunity(ies) evaluation and 
approval, and (10) regular pre- and post- evaluation. The following statements from the 
interviews provide a detailed description of these steps:  
‘The owners of the ideas share their ideas with their direct manager, and then discuss 
it. When they reach a clear idea, they will present to, and discuss with, a higher managerial 




helps in developing the idea to reach a clear and solid opportunity. We then prepare a 
business case and technical study for this opportunity …’ (W05) 
 ‘… the owner of the idea should prepare a business case that contains all the details 
and information about the idea. The business case should be discussed at different levels 
and some adjustments could take a place to the opportunities, which could generate some 
new or complementary opportunities ...’ (W10) 
 ‘… we also depend on market feedback channels to help us in the development 
process, or develop some opportunities after introducing them to the market and doing some 
adjustment on them’ (W04) 
 ‘The owners of the ideas should develop their initial ideas to be a mature and clear. 
They prepare a business case to be presented in front of the Commercial Activity Team 
(CAT). This process could happen many times and some modifications could take place to 
reach the final opportunity’ (W06) 
It was also established that the aforementioned opportunity development process was 
dynamic and iterative through which initial ideas were elaborated, refined, changed or even 
abandoned. This process raised some new opportunities that related to the existing products 
or created completely new products. The marketing communications director asserted that 
‘the opportunity development could happen many times (many adjustments) to reach a clear 
understanding of all the opportunity’s aspects’ (W03) and the marketing director added that 
‘… in the development process, we make some adjustments to the opportunity. This may lead 
to identifying complementary opportunities, or completely new opportunities, and expand 
our project to other segments …’ (W09). 
The majority of participants attributed the success of opportunity development 
process to many enabling factors. The MNE used a bundle of its resources and capabilities, 
developed a reliable data collection and analysis system, and designed a collaborative and 
integrative corporate environment. It also invested heavily to establish strong ties with local 
community and business partners, and to obtain better market knowledge. The following 
statements from the interviewees illustrate these factors: 
‘… the availability of required resources; the availability of the required information 
to reach a clear idea and convert it to an appropriate opportunity; the availability of human 
resources able to think, plan, and execute this opportunity; good relations with our partners, 
vendors, contractors and dealers’ (W03) 
‘… the company’s capabilities to develop and then exploit this opportunity, the 
consistency and coordination among different departments (having enough salespeople; 
having enough staff at the call centre during the launch and implementation of the project; 
ensuring the marketing department has enough capacity to promote these products and the 




market’s nature and needs, the availability of vendors and dealers for these products, and 
sometimes the need for previous experience, but not always’ (W04) 
‘… the market’s requirements and needs for this opportunity (service) … the nature 
of the opportunity and to what extent it fits with our company’s vision and objectives at this 
stage … and reaching a reasonable level of clarity about the opportunity…’ (W09) 
4.7.2.3 Opportunity Evaluation 
A common view amongst respondents was that, since some opportunities were 
classic commercial opportunities, the evaluation was based on a general evaluation 
framework (i.e. administrative procedures). However, because other opportunities that had 
multidimensional constructs required different procedures besides the general framework, 
their evaluation relied on subjective judgements regarding different characteristics of 
identified opportunities. The managers of the MNE explained these evaluation frameworks 
in the following excerpts: 
‘There is a general evaluation procedure for the normal commercial opportunities, 
and it’s based on figures, calculations and main evaluation indictors. But there are some 
opportunities that need special evaluation procedures’ (W03) 
‘There is a general procedure for standard classic opportunities, as we conduct 
opportunity analysis, design a business case and then conduct opportunity evaluation 
through the decision-making forum in our company (e.g. around 60% of opportunities are 
evaluated in this general procedure). However, there are different evaluation procedures 
depending on the nature of the opportunity … we may take this decision and implement it 
within a few hours in order to respond to the market’s changes. Indeed, we extensively 
depend on the available data and information, but our managers’ judgments also play a very 
important role’ (W04)  
‘… as the evaluation of some opportunities could be based on figures and others 
could be based on the manager’s judgments in the case of data unavailability. Some 
opportunities should be evaluated immediately and fast, others need a long time to be 
evaluated and many procedures (e.g. the size of investment plays a role in the evaluation 
procedure)’ (W05)  
The analysis revealed that the evaluation process within the MNE went through 
decision-making forums before reaching the final committee, based on successfully passing 
from one managerial level or stage to the next. This enabled the firm to precisely evaluate 
each development step of the opportunity, involve all concerned parties, establish a 
collective judgement and collect feedback for further steps of development or 
implementation. The following quotes provide a detailed description of this process: 
 ‘… if this opportunity passes these required stages of assessment or not, as this 




based on this assessment, we make an appropriate decision for this opportunity …’ (W09, 
W10) 
‘Generally, each opportunity should move from one evaluation level to another until 
it reaches the final committee (i.e. CAT)’ (W06) 
The MNE’s managers reported a variety of indicators that were considered in 
opportunity evaluation decision-making process. These indicators can be broadly 
categorised into desirability, feasibility, resource availability and strategic fit. The quotations 
below described in detail these indicators: 
 ‘… feasibility (costs and returns) and the returns could be financial or more 
acquisition in the market; the extent to which this opportunity suits the company’s objectives 
and activities; the availability of financial and human resources to exploit this opportunity; 
the market’s nature and structure; timing of this opportunity; the value added to our 
company from this opportunity in the long-term, not only for short-term …’ (W04) 
‘… the extent to which the required resources (human, physical, financial) for 
opportunity exploitation are available … the company’s priorities and the importance of this 
opportunity to our company … the extent to which there is a need for fast implementation’ 
(W03)   
Five main components of the MNE’s opportunity assessment plan were identified: 
(1) opportunity description, (2) market structure and mechanism, (3) the required resources 
and capabilities and their allocation, (4) execution and exit plans, and (5) monitoring plans 
and procedures. The following statements from interviews indicated these main parts: 
‘… the description and explanation of the nature of the opportunity and detailed 
components … the description and analysis of the market, competitors, potential customers 
(i.e. segment), and the expected responses of our competitors … the available resources, and 
the resources required to exploit this opportunity … the execution plan and procedures such 
as the allocation of financial, physical, and human resources … implementation timeline,  
and the coordination procedures among different departments’ (W04) 
‘… (1) the opportunity (i.e. product, service, process) and all of its details, … the 
market (i.e. target segments), competitors, vendors, customers, and their expected responses 
to introduction of this product or service … the value added to the industry … the materials 
and equipment required, and the human and financial resources to exploit this 
opportunity … the exploitation and execution plans, the resources allocation plan, and the 
required activities (i.e. production plan) to produce this product or service’ (W10) 
‘… the execution, monitoring and evaluation and exit plans, and their timelines are 






4.7.2.4 Entrepreneurial Action 
One interesting finding is that after a deliberate opportunity evaluation, action was 
not limited to opportunity exploitation since other options were considered when this option 
was infeasible, even deliberate decisions not to pursue an identified opportunity. Given that 
the exploitation of opportunities typically required the MNE to commit substantial resources, 
the uncertainty added further doubt and burden in determining whether it was worthwhile 
for the MNE to further exploit the opportunity, adapt the chosen course of action, switch to 
an alternative opportunity, or abandon the entrepreneurial endeavour altogether.  Some 
managers of the MNE reported these actions in the following excerpts: 
 ‘… we immediately exploit the opportunity. Indeed, the fast implementation is very 
important, especially in the Palestinian market, as the market is saturated, and our 
competitors keep their eyes open on the market … wait to collect more information to reach 
a reasonable level of certainty … wait to develop our company’s capabilities or ask for 
consultation with experts if needed … make some changes and adjustment to the opportunity 
to fit the fast changes in the market …  terminate the opportunity if we find that it does not 
add a value to our company within the expected timeframe’ (W05)  
‘… implementation may be delayed in order to collect more data or build the 
company’s capacity … some opportunities may be exploited directly, and some ideas or 
opportunities may be cancelled or terminated’ (W06) 
‘… conducting pilot studies and demo samples, collecting more data and information 
to develop the opportunity, converting to another opportunity (i.e. reallocate our resources 
to another project)’ (W09) 
Another important finding was that uncertainty had dualistic behavioural impact 
(avoidance and/or motivation) on opportunity exploitation. While uncertainty prevented 
opportunity exploitation in many cases, the managers of the MNE were able sometimes to 
exploit opportunities. These two views were reported in the following statements from the 
interviews:  
‘The uncertainty did both inhibit and motivate our company to exploit the 
opportunity. Our company does not only seek instant (i.e. short term) profitability, as it has 
other objectives. This motivated us to exploit these opportunities if they were within our 
vision, achieve our Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), and serve the Palestinian 
community’ (W09)  
‘… In some cases, uncertainty motivated us to exploit the opportunity. However, in 
other cases, uncertainty impeded us from opportunity exploitation ...’ (W10) 
‘Uncertainty is a barrier, as it increased challenges and limitations … But 
uncertainty is also a motivator, as it created room for creativity and motivated us to find 




The success of the opportunity exploitation was attributed to some 
internal/organisational and external factors. Internally, the MNE had abundant resources 
(e.g. experienced and skilled staff, financial, international experience), and a collaborative 
and supportive corporate culture. The managers also had a reasonable level of willingness 
to bear, and familiarity with, uncertainty, and they received a support from the board of 
management (BoM).  Externally, the MNE developed a reliable market intelligence system 
and established strong ties with its stakeholders. The managers also were motivated by a 
high return on investment, intense competitive rivalry, and market acceptance of their 
products and services. Some managers of the MNE mentioned these factors in the following 
quotations: 
 ‘… if the opportunity is a priority for our company … if our company has the 
financial and human capabilities that help us to invest in this opportunity … our company’s 
willingness to bear risk and uncertainty … the availability of a skilled team who can exploit 
the opportunity and implement the project … the support from the local community for our 
company … the long-term impact of this opportunity on our company’s customer base and 
profits … the availability of previous experiences and knowledge of the market’s structure … 
if the market and customers accept this product or service … the limited options in the 
Palestinian market encouraged us to find alternatives and exploit the opportunities and 
implement the project’ (W05)   
 ‘… the availability of a team that has experience in the Palestinian uncertain 
context, not only experience in the mobile phone sector … self-confidence and willingness 
to achieve success and self-esteem … the willingness to bear risks and uncertainties … the 
support from our teamwork, partners, local communities, vendors, and dealers …’ (W04) 
   ‘The support of BoM, as they understand the Palestinian uncertain context and 
market … our managers’ experiences in the Palestinian market, and how they can handle 
the instability and uncertainty … the availability of information that helps us in opportunity 
exploitation …’ (W06) 
‘There are some supportive factors … such as building a collaborative corporate 
culture’ (W11) 
Five main steps of opportunity exploitation process emerged from the analysis. First, 
once the exploitation decision was made, the MNE’s managers created a channel of 
communication for a better coordination with and involvement of all departments concerned 
or business partners. This facilitated creating an interactive environment and forming a 
collective judgement and decision. Second, based on the available information and the 
managers’ judgement, they prepared implementation and resource allocation plans, and an 
exit plan. Third, each department executed all required managerial and technical functions 
and coordinated with other departments or business partners for any joint work. Fourth, 




experimented on a small scale and then scaled it up. Finally, managers received continuous 
internal and external feedback for improvements and designed appropriate reactions. The 
following quotations provide a detailed description of these steps: 
‘… the same steps of any project implementation as we employ all the required 
resources to exploit the opportunity, and manage them through planning, organizing, 
designing execution operations, monitoring implementation procedures, and receiving the 
feedback to improve the execution, make some corrections, or properly reallocate these 
resources’ (W01)  
‘We involve and coordinate among all departments concerned (sales, marketing, 
finance, human resources, and call centre) to prepare a detailed execution plan … we then 
allocate and use all the required resources … start the implementation stage … ensure  
continuous monitoring … receive the feedback either to make further improvement and 
development or create other, new opportunities’ (W04) 
‘We coordinate among all departments concerned to design an appropriate 
procedure to exploit the opportunity … then we make the execution plans: the allocation of 
the required financial and human resources for implementation and the exit strategy. After 
that, we do all the managerial processes (planning, organizing, staffing, monitoring and 
evaluation) and make continuous adjustments based on the feedback’ (W05) 
Together these results provide important insights into how the external/institutional 
environment, especially the uncertain business context, affect entrepreneurial processes and 
action. Uncertainty was found to be a source of negative and/or positive impacts on 
entrepreneurial opportunity-related processes, and more importantly, on entrepreneurial 
action. The next section therefore was concerned with a deeper understanding of the 
conditions and mechanisms of the influence of uncertainty on entrepreneurial opportunity, 
processes and action. 
4.8 Uncertainty and Entrepreneurial Processes, Action, and 
Opportunities: An MNE 
4.8.1 Environmental Uncertainty 
The analysis established that the MNE’s managers experienced state, effect, and 
response uncertainty (Milliken, 1987) in the turbulent country and industry environment of 
Palestine. In relation to state uncertainty, the managers were unable to predict and clearly 
understand how the external and business environment may change, particularly at political 
and economic levels. The majority of respondents attributed effect uncertainty to their 
inability to predict what would be the impact of present and upcoming events within their 




growth. In respect of response uncertainty, the managers referred to their incapacity to put 
forward deliberate strategies and actions to address adverse events and changes and/or 
stakeholders’ reactions. They were also incapable of predicting the consequences of a 
response choice. Table 4-11 illustrates the three types of environmental uncertainty and 
provides relevant excerpts from the interviews. 
Table 4-11: Excerpts from Quotes on Types of Uncertainty from the MNE 
Type of Uncertainty Quotations 




 The Palestinian context is very complicated, and it is very difficult to generate 
expectations of what could happen in the Palestinian market at any political, 
economic or social level’ (W05) 
 ‘We do our best to categorise uncertain contexts according to their causes … e.g. 
the political complications (the Israel- PNA relationship, and PNA-Hamas 
relationship), the turbulence in Palestine, and the market’s changes. But we are still 
uncertain about how things are changing’ (W07) 
How will it impact me? 
(Effect Uncertainty) 
 
 ‘We also cannot easily estimate how these changes in the external and business 
environments could affect our company’ (W04) 
 ‘The risk department tries to estimate the influence of any changes in the external 
or business environment on our company, but this task is very complicated in the 
Palestinian market’ (W09) 
What am I going to do 
about it? (Response 
Uncertainty) 
 
 ‘We cannot design our short- and long-term plans and achieve our strategic 
objectives, due to the fast changes in the Palestinian market and our inability to be 
sure of how the stakeholders and market will react to our actions’ (W05) 
 ‘Despite great uncertainties, which may sometimes hinder us from identifying 
possible actions, we designed appropriate plans and alternative options in our entry 
to GS market and launch of the 3G services because of our heavy investment in 
market intelligence, accessibility to information about our legal and illegal 
competitors, and transferring the experience of other operators in our group to our 
company’ (W09) 
Source: Author 
Because the Palestinian environment is characterised by political instability (three 
different governments) and economic depression, magnified by persistent Israeli-Palestinian 
and intra-Palestinian conflict, it was no surprise that all managers of the MNE shared the 
same perception of high state uncertainty. For example, the marketing communications 
director emphasised that ‘identifying the changes in external environment (political, 
economic, social … etc) and predicting the situation is a very difficult task …’ (W03). 
However, it was somewhat surprising that the MNE’s managers had varied 
perceptions of effect uncertainty and response uncertainty beside high state uncertainty, but 
three levels (high, intermediate, low) of effect and response uncertainty were specified. The 
study developed a codebook relating those three levels to relevant words or phrases in the 
interview statements (see Appendix E). This classification was based on ‘to what extent the 
MNE was able to predict or handle’ effect and response uncertainties (see Appendix H). 




4.8.2 The Effect of Uncertainty on Entrepreneurial Processes, Action, 
and Opportunities 
The analysis has shown that all three types of uncertainty had positive and negative 
impacts on opportunity identification and exploitation. The majority of informants attributed 
this dual impact to how the managers perceived these types of uncertainty. The MNE 
experienced a tough start for around 10 years and was about to announce its closure and 
bankruptcy in 2012. However, the managers had the willingness and capacity to work in the 
uncertain Palestinian market. As the regulatory and public affairs director stated ‘… we 
survived for around 10 years until we started our operations in the WB and GS ..., this 
uncertain business environment was disincentive, as the closure of our company was 
possible at the beginning, but later, we depended on ourselves and this situation was an 
incentive to continue in the Palestinian market (e.g. there was determination and 
persistence)’ (W02). 
Table 4-12: Quotes on the Positive and Negative Impacts of Uncertainty Types on Opportunity 




 ‘Some environmental changes sometimes benefit our company and create some 
opportunities’ (W01) 
  ‘… the continuous changes … may generate some opportunities for our dynamic firm as 
we can rapidly adapt to changes’ (W03) 
  ‘These environmental changes may help us to identify new opportunities, … however, if 
the circumstances change for the better, there will certainly be plenty of opportunities 




 ‘This ever-changing business environment often impedes entrepreneurial opportunities, 
especially when we cannot determine its impact on our company and cannot design 
appropriate solutions to deal with it’ (W01) 
Effect uncertainty  
Positive 
impact 
 ‘The institutional barriers and voids may positively affect our company if we have the 
capacity to mitigate or control any unexpected effects in order to overcome these barriers 
and/or exploit these voids’ (W10) 
Negative 
impact 
 ‘Our inability to determine the impact of these changes on our company hinders the 
emergence of opportunities in the Palestinian market’ (W03) 
 ‘Political instability and weak enforcement power had an unexpected impact on our 
company, which led to the loss of our 5 years exclusivity for 3G services’ (W05) 
Response uncertainty  
Positive 
impact 
 ‘The political, economic, and technological infrastructure in the Palestinian market is 
not ready yet for any ecosystem; therefore, we feared our stakeholders’ reactions. 
Therefore, we designed many plans to work on this project, which created many 
uncertainties, but also opportunities. Indeed, we piloted this in a few cities in the WB, 
which generated some opportunities for our company that were unnoticed’ (W04) 
Negative 
impact 
 ‘We sometimes cannot determine the degree and nature of our regulators, competitors, 
partners and customers’ reactions, which prevent us from developing our plans and 





As can be seen in Table 4-12, state uncertainty was found to be a source of 
opportunities but only when the MNE had low effect and/or response uncertainty. Since the 
MNE was dynamic, adaptative and proactive, it was able to identify new opportunities that 
generated from external environmental changes (i.e. state uncertainty), particularly 
technological changes. The MNE’s ability sometimes to determine the impact of these 
changes on the firm played important role in identifying real opportunities and understand 
how to leverage on them. The firm further had a bundle of resources (i.e. systems, 
experience, capabilities, products, international networks) that enriched its capacity to 
act/respond, even to consider the negative impact of external changes, particularly 
institutional voids, as an opportunity and thrive on it. It turned out that effect uncertainty had 
a positive impact when it encouraged further exploration to design protective measures, 
which probably generated or uncovered new opportunities. Response uncertainty was also 
found to be a source of opportunities in that it motivated a more openness and tolerance to 
changes. 
Turning now to negative impacts on opportunity identification, it was established 
that state uncertainty was perceived as an impediment to opportunities when in the presence 
of effect and/or response uncertainty. State uncertainty increased the early obsolescence of 
initial ideas (i.e. potential opportunities) and intensified competition due to limited 
opportunities and growth in the market. In relation to effect uncertainty, a number of 
respondents also reported that their inability to understand and determine how political 
instability, unreliable legal framework and unfavourable events and changes may affect their 
firm prevented them from identifying prospective opportunities.  
The findings also revealed that a high level of response uncertainty forced managers 
to be involved in operations and distracted them from focusing on long-term planning, 
developing existing products and identifying new opportunities. The MNE’s managers were 
also preoccupied with designing different plans to respond to environmental changes or their 
unexpected impacts. It further appeared that the MNE suffered from some liabilities of 
foreignness and worked hard to match its stakeholders’ expectations and appropriately react 








Table 4-13: Examples of Positive and Negative Impacts of Uncertainty Types on Opportunity 




 ‘…, at the personal level, the experience encourages me to either explore more before 
implementation or immediately exploit an opportunity’ (W09) 
 ‘… external changes could motivate us to exploit the opportunity, especially with the  
availability of experts, who are able to manage execution’ (W10) 
Negative 
impact 
 ‘… but the problem will be at the exploitation stage, as the uncertainty inhibits our 
company from implementing these projects because of the company’s inability to 
forecast these rapid changes’ (W09) 
 ‘…, but the external environment changes make the next stages (i.e. development and 




 ‘The ambiguous impact of uncertainty motivates us to design measures to mitigate its 
impact on our company (e.g. from the PNA or customers), or surmount its impact (e.g. 
from our competitor) ... We deal with these causes of uncertainty as a challenge and 
we have to overcome them at the implementation stage’ (W04) 
 ‘The disruptive impact of uncertainty motivates our company to be proactive rather 
than just active, which helps us to exploit opportunities’ (W06) 
Negative 
impact 
 ‘The unexpected effects of external environmental changes create more difficulties in 




 ‘In the 3G project, … even we know that some of their reactions are still unknowable; 
however, this helps us to design different scenarios to implement this project through 
conducting market intelligence and exploiting this opportunity’ (W09) 
 ‘The difficulty of defining possible options motivates us to be entrepreneurial, flexible, 
adaptable, and a learning firm in order to exploit these opportunities’ (W06) 
Negative 
impact 
 ‘We cannot determine the consequences of our actions, especially the Israeli reactions, 
which sometimes prevents us from moving to opportunity exploitation’ (W04) 
Source: Author 
In relation to opportunity exploitation, as demonstrated in Table 4-13, state 
uncertainty was associated with positively motivating opportunity exploitation, but only if 
it encouraged a need to employ the firm’s experience in managing its changeable 
environment. It was also suggested that effect uncertainty was perceived as a motive for 
opportunity exploitation if it drove a high level of proactiveness, which may help managers 
to seek further understanding of how this uncertain environment may affect their firm and 
consider protective measures in order to mitigate, control or influence the impact of 
changeable events, and in the end, exploit opportunities and implement their business 
projects. A number of respondents emphasised the motivational role of response uncertainty. 
It was found to stimulate higher levels of creativity, rivalry and openness. A higher level of 
response uncertainty also encouraged the MNE to seek more flexibility, adaptability and 
learning, requiring further use of market intelligence tools and methods, which may prompt 
a strategic move toward exploiting a perceived potential opportunity. In summary, these 




impact was related to positive outcomes (i.e. opportunity exploitation), if firms had low 
response uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, a common view amongst the MNE’s managers was that state, effect 
and response uncertainties were responsible for negatively influencing opportunity 
exploitation (see Table 4-13). State uncertainty, for example, was found to increase the 
complexity of opportunity exploitation process due to the changeable business environment 
that added further elements to be considered during this stage. Regarding the negative impact 
of effect uncertainty, it was found that it may involve additional costs, time and efforts in 
order to identify the direct and indirect impact of environmental changes. A higher level of 
effect uncertainty required more investment in designing appropriate adapting, controlling 
and influencing strategies in the response phase. This may lead to the deferral or termination 
of the opportunity exploitation process. It was also noted that a high level of state and effect 
uncertainties may drive a higher level of response uncertainty. The managers then may exert 
massive efforts and spend a long time in designing and selecting appropriate 
reactions/strategies based on their judgements and predictions, which may deter them from 
engaging in the opportunity exploitation process. 
One interesting finding when analysing the MNE’s opportunity exploitation in the 
face of uncertainty at an aggregate level was that the firm accommodated, and started to 
flourish around, aggregate uncertainty until it reached a tipping point, whereupon the firms 
deferred or abandoned opportunities. A number of respondents explained how they work 
with uncertainty up to a certain level, but above this level, they terminate or decide not to 
exploit the opportunity, in the following quotations: 
‘We entered the GS market in the worst conditions …, which is an indicator of our 
willingness to bear uncertainty, but if the situation continues like this (e.g. PNA-Hamas 
relationship and economic recession), we have to re-assess our operations there’ (W01) 
‘… this helps us to determine the proper procedures to deal with uncertainty, but 
sometimes we cannot bear this level of uncertainty, therefore, we gradually terminate these 
projects or products’ (W05) 
‘… we accept uncertainty if we reach an acceptable level of clarity. We often decide 
not to go for extreme positions, i.e.  we should do nothing, or we should do everything’ (W06) 
‘We accept and deal with uncertainty, especially since the Palestinian context has 





The aforementioned finding suggests a tentative pattern that may explain how the 
aggregate level of uncertainty affects opportunity exploitation. This pattern of the MNE’s 
response to uncertainty was vividly described by the network director as a shift from a 
‘challenging’ to a ‘panic’ zone. The network director stated ‘Briefly, if staff work in the 
challenging zone, this uncertain environment is considered as a motive. But, if they work in 
the panic zone, this unstable environment is considered as a disincentive’ (W06). This 
suggested pattern will be discussed in detail at 5.4.2. 
In addition, the majority of informants from the MNE referred to psychology-related 
motives behind their willingness to operate, and seek growth, as well as to exploit 
opportunities and execute their business projects. These motives could be patriotic, 
commitment and seeking presence in Palestine. The managers of the MNE asserted this 
motivation in the following excerpts: 
 ‘The entry of the GS market after around 10 years despite the siege on the GS and 
harsh economic situation, but all of these barriers were motivators for us to provide our 
services to the Palestinians in the GS. We never give up and continue in our work to change 
the situation for the better’. (W05) 
 ‘Our investors understand the political situation … for prestigious and patriotic 
reasons (i.e. the historic status of Palestine) rather than commercial considerations’ (W08) 
‘Some companies are interested in adding to their profile that they are working in 
Palestine, as a kind of affiliation to this place that has importance to the Arab and Islamic 
nation ... We also, are proud to work in the Palestinian market’ (W09) 
 ‘… all foreign investments in the Palestinian market came from Arabic countries to 
support Palestine …  In fact, this is our own country and we will not leave for any other 
place’ (W11) 
Overall, because psychology is concerned with how individuals think, feel and 
behave, and focuses on personality, cognition, emotion and attitude (see 2.4.5), the analysis 
has shown that the psychology and attributes of managers play a critical role in precluding 
and/or stimulating entrepreneurial processes and action, particularly within an uncertain 
environment. Accordingly, the next section of the analysis is concerned with investigating 





4.8.3 The Effect of Emotions on Entrepreneurial Action 
The majority of respondents reported that the opportunity-related processes and 
entrepreneurial action did not constitute an unilateral adaptation of behaviour to external 
conditions, but also involved complex mutual interaction between individual managers and 
their environment. As a number of the MNE’s managers emphasised this bilateral 
interaction, this study identified impacts that are related to the psychology and attributes of 
the managers, together with the subjective interpretation and judgement of uncertainty (see 
Table 4-14). 
Table 4-14: Quotations on the Effect of Emotions and Attributes of Managers on Entrepreneurial 
Processes and Action from the MNE 
Emotion/Attribute Quotations 
Achievement  ‘… our willingness to achieve success and our objectives are considered as 
motives for opportunity exploitation’ (W05) 
Willingness to bear 
uncertainty 
 ‘The perspectives of managers on the level of uncertainty in this environment, and 
the willingness of our company to bear uncertainty, significantly affect our ability 
to act on opportunity’ (W01)   
 ‘Our managers’ perception of the value of uncertainty is different and we 
perceived less uncertainty than other managers in other contexts, which motivates 
us to identify, develop and exploit more opportunities’ (W04) 
Self-efficacy  ‘A higher level of self-confidence leads to a greater ability of managers to sell and 
promote their ideas, which increases their ability to act entrepreneurially and 
make opportunity exploitation decisions’ (W06) 
Resilience and 
perseverance 
 ‘Our experience in dealing with this environment has been increased, i.e. wisdom, 
and this increases our ability to exploit the opportunities, but our stamina could 
be decreased due to ageing, i.e. rapid burning-out due to these uncertain 
conditions’ (W05) 
 ‘We become more able to bear this uncertain context …, as we are able to deeply 
understand the market and clearly distinguish among types of uncertainty that 
could hit, annoy, or not affect our company; and this helps us to determine the 
best way to deal with this uncertain environment’ (W10) 
Fear of failure  ‘… fear of failure encourages you to avoid failure and achieve success, but if you 
do not notice any progress, this will lead to frustration’ (W05) 
 ‘The fear of failure varies from one managerial level to another, e.g.  lower levels 
of staff fear losing their jobs, but higher managerial levels are not afraid, and this 
is a motive for them to identify and exploit new opportunities’ (W07) 
Stress  ‘We accept the stress to a certain level, as some causes of stress could encourage 
us to exploit the opportunities, but other causes could frustrate us’ (W10) 
 ‘We deal with the stress as a challenge … increases our ability to deal with 
uncertainty in the short-term, but if we don’t notice any progress, this could lead 
to frustration’ (W05) 
Anger  ‘We become less nervous and if there is something makes us angry, we take it as 
a challenge, which means that we must overcome the barrier and implement our 
projects and prove that we are able to overcome the causes of this anger’ (W06) 
 ‘We attack the cause of this anger, but you may reach the stage of making a 






In relation to the attributes of managers, the majority of informants referred to 
uncertainty as a producer of some positive outcomes. The analysis demonstrated that the 
desire for achievement and success may have beneficial effects on entrepreneurial activities 
(e.g. opportunity exploitation) even under great uncertainty. The findings also found that a 
high willingness of managers to bear uncertainty was linked with increasing their 
engagement with, and commitment to, work within an uncertain environment. It was 
established that a high level of entrepreneurial self-efficacy may help the MNE’s managers 
to visualise potentially positive outcomes and establish favourable responses in the face of 
uncertainty.  
Some interviewees argued that their personal resilience and perseverance had 
developed over time within a challenging business environment, while others recognised 
that perseverance may need to go beyond resilience in the sense of stamina and commitment 
to a strategy or project, beyond ‘going on with life’ (Bullough et al., 2014, p. 474). Under 
extreme uncertainty, a number of respondents emphasised that resilience had to be extended 
to identifying and dealing with uncertainties and launching new strategies and ventures. At 
the same time, it was recognised that any kind of resilience could eventually fade, in the face 
of a hostile environment over many years. 
The majority of the MNE’s managers offered evidence of an ambiguous impact 
(deterrence and/or incentive) of some negative emotion (e.g. fear of failure, stress and anger) 
on entrepreneurial processes and action in the face of uncertainty. This ambiguous impact 
and its mechanisms will be discussed in detail at 5.4.3. 
Finally, a common view among the MNE’s managers was that in addition to the 
external environment, particularly uncertain business environment, the types of opportunity 
also had a significant influence on entrepreneurial processes and action. The next section, 
therefore, moves on to analyse and discuss how types of opportunity may affect opportunity-





4.8.4 Types of Opportunity and Their Impact on Entrepreneurial 
Processes and Action 
The majority of managers in the MNE reported that they identify, develop and exploit 
different types of opportunity. They also explained how these types of opportunity affect 
entrepreneurial processes and action. The analysis broadly identified seven types of 
opportunity: problem solving, new market entry, digitalisation, boundary-spanning 
(experience, systems and standards), introduction of products, technology transfer, and daily 
business transactions/deals. The managers of the MNE mentioned these types of opportunity 
in the following quotations:  
 ‘… we use problem solving techniques or seek external consultation (from our group 
or the experience of the other operators in dealing with similar problems) to solve these 
problems while making some adjustments to be suitable for the Palestinian market that is 
different from other markets’ (W09) 
‘The entry of our company to the GS market, in this extremely uncertain context, 
means that we consider these barriers as incentives and see a promising market there ...’ 
(W01)  
‘… this does not mean that the ambiguity of opportunity’s characteristics could 
prevent our company from identifying and exploiting this type of opportunity in order to 
achieve long-term objectives. For example, the opportunity of digitalisation that we are 
working on now, is not clear enough in the Palestinian market’. (W05) 
‘Being part of a multinational group helps us to transfer the experience and systems 
at all managerial, operational, and technical levels …’ (W10) 
‘… we have to identify the segment that will benefit from introduction of this product 
or service and heavily focus on this segment to stimulate a need for the product/service and 
explain how to add value for our potential customers ...’ (W04)  
‘… we transfer these new products to the Palestinian market and create needs for 
them in the market, hence there is an opportunity, but we have to explain these needs to our 
customers, along with how to use these products and how these products could add value 
for them. This often happens in the case of technology transfer to the Palestinian market …’ 
(W10) 
‘… this is our normal and daily work in the market …we have to ensure the fast and 
immediate exploitation’ (W05) 
The MNE case study found that the managers without prior knowledge and 
experience were, to great extent, unable to codify, articulate and communicate opportunities 
that were high in tacitness, which may drive them to overlook an opportunity. However, the 
findings demonstrated that the managers/staff sought further knowledge and established 




identify, develop and exploit the opportunity through discovery and/or exploratory research. 
Perhaps one unexpected finding was that prior knowledge and experience may not help with 
some types of opportunity (e.g. creation and innovation-related opportunities). The 
following quotes provide examples: 
‘If the opportunity’s features are not clear, there is still an opportunity and the prior 
knowledge could help us in fast discovery of the opportunity and explain its features, but the 
absence of prior knowledge will not always impede us from discovering and exploiting this 
opportunity ... the best way to identify the opportunity is a discovery or consulting experts’ 
(W05) 
‘The availability of information plays the most important role in the process of 
opportunity identification and exploitation. Therefore, it is very difficult to identify, develop 
and exploit an opportunity if the opportunity’s characteristics are not clear and there is no 
prior knowledge and experience. However, the prior knowledge could help us in a quick 
discovery of the opportunity through using some techniques, such as exploratory research, 
but sometimes prior knowledge cannot help in identifying some types of opportunity’ (W09) 
On the other hand, it was established that the MNE’s managers with prior knowledge 
and experience were able to document, articulate and communicate opportunities that were 
high in explicitness, which may facilitate entrepreneurial processes. Here, focused and 
systematic search were specified as useful searching tools for opportunities. However, a lack 
of prior knowledge and experience may require further investment in the company’s 
capabilities to identify, develop and exploit opportunities. Exploratory research and 
experimentation were identified as suitable searching and developing tools where a lack of 
experience and knowledge prevailed. Some managers of the MNE explained this in the 
following excerpts: 
 ‘There is an opportunity if the opportunity’s features are clear and there is prior 
knowledge. The best way to identify the opportunity is systematic search. There is also an 
opportunity if the opportunity’s features are clear and there is no prior knowledge. The best 
way to identify the opportunity is exploratory research and experiments’ (W01) 
‘… the type of opportunity plays a role in determining the appropriate search 
procedures, so some types of opportunities need prior knowledge and can be identified 
through systematic search or specific search to save the required time, efforts and costs (i.e. 
investment); others don’t need prior knowledge, and some of them need more investment 





4.9 Summary: An MNE 
The MNE faced an extremely hostile business environment due to various 
institutional barriers (formal and informal) and voids imposed by three governments (Israel, 
PNA and Hamas). Political instability and barriers to entry (i.e. market structure) were the 
most distinctive institutional barriers. These institutional challenges were also magnified by 
persistent violence, and may generate both disbenefits and benefits for the MNE. The firm 
employed three distinct strategic responses to deal with these institutional challenges: 
acceptance, adaptation, and influence. 
The managers of the MNE identified seven antecedents of entrepreneurial processes 
and action. The entrepreneurial processes in the MNE accord with a broadly recognised 
processes: opportunity identification, development and evaluation. After opportunity 
evaluation, the firm may select or create a set of options as an entrepreneurial action, 
including opportunity exploitation. The MNE frequently identified the business 
opportunities through opportunity recognition and discovery, and significantly through 
opportunity creation. The company adopted a digitalisation strategy, and this required 
creating/introducing new products and promoting market demand. 
The MNE faced at least three types of uncertainty (state, effect and response). These 
types of uncertainty had negative and positive impacts on entrepreneurial processes and 
action, mainly based on the managers’ perceptions of these types of uncertainty. The 
findings suggested a tentative pattern that may explain how the aggregate level of 
uncertainty affects opportunity exploitation. The movement from a ‘challenging’ to a ‘panic’ 
zone may be an explanation for this impact. 
In addition to an uncertain institutional environment, the respondents emphasised the 
importance of psychology, the attributes of managers, and types of opportunity. The 
psychology (particularly emotions) and attributes of entrepreneurs significantly affected 
their ability and/or inability to take entrepreneurial action. The managers of the MNE also 
explained that the characteristics and nature of opportunity played a critical role in 
entrepreneurial processes and action. The next chapter will present the cross-case findings 





Chapter 5: Cross-Case Analysis  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the cross-case findings to identify patterns across the two cases 
in the context of the three main research parts: formal and informal institutional challenges, 
entrepreneurial processes and action, and uncertainty and entrepreneurial processes, action, 
and opportunities. 
5.2 Formal and Informal Institutional Challenges  
5.2.1 Institutional Barriers and Voids 
Both the indigenous firm and the MNE found the business environment of the 
Palestinian mobile sector to be challenging and obstructive, where they faced great 
uncertainty due to numerous institutional barriers and voids. Table 5-1 lists the similar 
institutional barriers and voids for both cases. These barriers and voids are further classified 
into regulatory barriers, political system and market structure. 




 The technology gap between the Israeli and Palestinian operators 
 The limited spectrum and frequencies granted to the Palestinian operators 
 Israel’s control of ports and crossings, and a very lengthy and inefficient 
process for importing telecommunications equipment 
 Movement and travel restrictions for staff and consultants 
 The weak legislative authority of the PNA 
 The weak regulatory capacity of the MTIT 
 The weak enforcement power of the PNA 
 The weak support for the Palestinian operators from the PNA 
 
Political System: 
 The different institutional environment and barriers within the Palestinian 
market 
 No unified, credible and harmonised legal frameworks 
 Unstable political structures 
 The fragmentation of Palestinian cities and towns 
 
Market Structure: 
 The illegal competition from the Israeli operators 
Informal institutional 
barriers 
 Unfavourable perception of Palestinian operators’ service quality in 
comparison to that of Israeli operators 




Table 5-1: (Continued) 
Institutional Voids Infrastructure (Absence/Shortage of): 
 Installation and maintenance contractors 
 Marketing consultants and media production intermediaries 
 Reliable logistics, promotion and distribution companies 
 International consultants, vendors and local suppliers 
Source: Author 
Even though the two firms operated in the same institutional environment, they faced 
some different institutional barriers and voids (see Table 5-2). With regard to the indigenous 
firm that was the first mover in the Palestinian mobile phone market and an established 
incumbent operator, it was reported that it suffered more than the latecomer MNE from an 
absence of telecommunications infrastructure and from a lack of customer awareness of the 
impact of telecommunications towers and their signals on their health. On the other hand, it 
was established that the MNE had suffered from its liability of foreignness. The severity of 
some barriers and voids similar for both firms may be even greater for the MNE due to its 
relatively limited local knowledge and networks and higher entry barriers. These barriers 
and voids negatively affected market entry, operations and growth of the MNE as a 
latecomer into the Palestinian market. 
Table 5-2: Different Institutional Barriers and Voids 
Institutional barriers and voids The indigenous 
firm 
The MNE 
Formal institutional Barriers 
Corruption and lack of transparency (Political System)  X 
The dominance by local Palestinian operator of the mobile phone sector 
(Market Structure) 
 X 
Unethical competition from the local Palestinian competitor (Market 
Structure)  
 X 
The Palestinian operators do not have their own international gateway 
and cannot install their core equipment in the Palestinian territories 
(Regulatory Barriers) 
 X 
The limited market growth and the blurred layers of Palestinian society 
(Market Structure) 
 X 
Informal institutional barriers 
A lack of Palestinian awareness of some health issues related to the sites 
and security concerns related to mobile phone usage in some towns 
X  
The limited exposure of customers and staff to advanced mobile phone 
experiences and services 
 X 
Institutional voids   
The absence of telecommunications infrastructure (Infrastructure) X  
The absence of an independent regulatory body to regulate the 
Palestinian mobile phone sector (Regulatory) 
 X 







5.2.2 Disbenefits and Benefits of Institutional Challenges 
It is evident that institutional barriers and voids generated largely similar benefits 
and disbenefits for both firms and Table 5-3 summarises similar disbenefits and benefits of 
institutional barriers and voids reported in both cases. Despite the similar benefits and 
disbenefits generated, the extent of influence on the two firms was different. Both firms were 
unable to approach/attract new customers and expand their market share due to the weak 
regulatory capacity of the MTIT for new services, the weak enforcement power of the PNA 
and the Israeli control of spectrum. These barriers, for example, generated greater disbenefits 
for a relatively newcomer MNE as it was harder for the firm to penetrate the Palestinian 
market, take advantage of being a part of a multinational group and benefit from any 
privilege and exclusivity. In contrast, the MNE had an advantage of learning from other 
operators’ experiences overseas in dealing with a first mover’s reactions and strategies. 
Table 5-4 presents the different disbenefits and benefits of institutional barriers and voids 
reported by the indigenous firm and the MNE. 
Table 5-3: Similar Disbenefits and Benefits of Institutional Challenges for both Cases 
Disbenefits Costs: 
 High additional operating expenses (OPEX) 
 Extra capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
 Economic losses to the Palestinian economy, mobile phone sector and the company 
 
Efficiency: 
 A managerial preoccupation with operational problems rather than strategic issues 
 Delays in project execution 
 
Overall Competitiveness:  
 The high intensity of rivalry in the Palestinian market 
 The competitive disadvantage of the Palestinian operators 
 
Prospects of Growth: 
 The inability of the Palestinian operators to expand their networks and provide new 
services 
 The inability of the company to approach new customers and expand its market share 
 The obstruction of creating new revenue streams 
 The suspension of some commercial activities and obstructing potential opportunities 
 
Quality:  
The low quality of services, voice and video calls 
Benefits Creativity and Knowledge: 
 The creation of a more creative and innovative working environment 








Table 5-3: (Continued) 
Benefits 
 
Resources Allocation and Utilisation: 
 The finding of more efficient and effective alternative solutions 
 More efficient and effective allocation and utilisation of resources 
 Flexible and dynamic firm 
 Cost reduction 
 
Prospective Opportunities:  
 The creation of some opportunities 
 The creation of a competitive advantage for one operator rather than others 
 The generation of further revenues from products and services that are outdated in other 
markets 
 
Attention to Customers: 
 The improvement of networks and operations, the offering of high-quality products and 
services, and increasing value-added to the customers 
 The creation of more patience, commitment and persistence to work in the Palestinian 
market 
Source: Author 
Both firms were able to generate some competitive advantages out of the different 
institutional barriers. The indigenous firm took advantage of the political instability since 
2002 and enjoyed a seemingly monopolistic position in the market for around 8 years during 
a relatively stable political situation. It also benefited from the high entry barriers facing 
newcomers like the MNE due to the political instability, its dominant position and the lack 
of a telecommunications infrastructure. At the same time, after a negotiation with the Israeli 
government through the PNA, the MNE took advantage of being granted a higher frequency 
band in the GS compared to the indigenous firm. 
Table 5-4:Different Disbenefits and Benefits of Institutional Challenges 




The competitive disadvantage of the company due to the incumbent 
firm’s dominance of the market (Overall Competitiveness) 
 X 
The inability of the Palestinian operators to fully capitalise on vendors’ 
services and offer post-sale services to their customers (Efficiency) 
X  
The inability of the company to take advantage of being a part of a 
multinational group, transfer their international sales experience, and 
fully capitalise on their after-sale services (Overall Competitiveness) 
 X 
The inability of the company to benefit from any privileges and 
exclusivity as stated in the licence (Costs and Prospects of Growth) 
 X 




The learning from overseas operators’ experiences as second-movers 






5.2.3 Strategic Responses to Institutional Barriers and Voids 
There was great similarity between both cases in terms of their strategic responses to 
the institutional barriers and voids (see Table 5-5), implying that firms could design 
deliberate strategic responses and tactics to deal with institutional challenges in order to 
survive, grow and succeed in this hostile market. It is observed that the MNE, a relative 
newcomer, employed a wider range of tactics (e.g. hiring) than the incumbent indigenous 
firm. 
Table 5-5: Similar Strategic Responses and Tactics of both Cases to the Institutional Barriers and 
Voids 
Strategic Responses Tactics 
Acceptance  Wait-and-see  
 Compliance and conscious obedience 
Adaptation  Scoping: outsourcing, hiring, internalisation of activities. 
 Reconfiguring: a market-based strategy, cost review, bricolage, 
prospecting, heuristic-based approach.  
Influence  Networking: a network-based strategy, collaboration, linking of 
interests of the state and firm. 
 Manoeuvring: political influence tactics, bargaining, signalling. 
 Spanning: substituting institutional practices, institutional brokering. 
Source: Author 
The findings underlined three types of strategic responses: acceptance, adaptation, 
and influence, and articulated their respective tactics (see Table 5-5). With acceptance 
responses, the findings showed that both firms simply complied with local institutional 
conditions, with no active attempt to change either the firm or the institutions.  
Two tactics were identified within the acceptance response: compliance and a wait-
and-see approach. The indigenous firm and the MNE complied with and adopted local 
institutional requirements, and/or patiently waited of institutional changes before 
considering any further action. Acceptance may also involve the cancellation or mothballing 
of projects. 
In respect to adaptation, both firms undertook internal adjustments to cope with 
prevailing institutions, adjusting their resources and capabilities, business models and/or 
operational configurations for this purpose.  
Two adaptation tactics – this study labels them scoping and reconfiguring – were 




resource base, business activities and operations. The firms modified their inventory systems 
and operations to fit local conditions and surmount market inefficiencies, and outsourced 
parts of its operations and activities. They created their own dealership networks, designed 
their routines and established their own call centres. The MNE also hired 
telecommunications equipment and data centres to secure the continuity of operations. 
The reconfiguration tactic was deployed by the MNE in anticipation of entry, and by 
both firms in anticipation of operation in an uncertain Palestinian mobile phone market. The 
firms adjusted and re-arranged the set-up, combination and coordination of resources and 
capabilities, business models, operational components and processes, and cost and revenue 
structure of the firm. They made quick, small-scale changes, recombining existing resources 
in order to boost their market strengths, differentiate themselves from competitors and 
improve their position by seizing potential opportunities. The firms also streamlined 
operations, exploited their employees’ knowledge and focused on creativity and flexibility 
to compete effectively. 
In relation to influence, both firms tried to deliberately change external institutions 
and/or create new ones in favour of their firms. Three forms of influence tactics – the current 
study labels them networking, manoeuvring and spanning – were specified in this study. 
The indigenous firm and the MNE built new networks, collaborating with 
stakeholders and aligning its interests with other stakeholders (e.g. the government). For 
instance, the MNE embedded itself within local informal and business networks to overcome 
the absence of formal institutions. The two firms also cooperated with official institutions, 
local community, business partners, and competitors in order to address some institutional 
contradictions and an absence of formal market-supporting institutions. They aligned their 
interests with the PNA to regulate and implement some services and they colluded to prevent 
the spread of Israeli SIMs in the OPT. 
With regard to manoeuvring, the two firms influenced key local institutions by 
employing political strategies and negotiations about issues concerning access to critical 
resources and deals. The MNE, for example, used its political skills and influence to regulate 
and implement new policies (e.g. the Mobile Number Portability–MNP–and an online 
payment system) and change the form and content of regulations. The indigenous firm also 
negotiated issues such as transmission frequencies and new technologies with official 




corporate social responsibility, community engagement, religion, or culture) to navigate 
around, or substitute for, institutional voids and to convey credibility and enhance a 
favourable reputation and legitimacy. 
In relation to spanning, the two firms attempted to surmount institutional barriers and 
voids by proposing the inward transfer of institutions from other countries and creating new 
infrastructure and/or market mechanisms that could also benefit third parties. For instance, 
the indigenous firm established the Palestinian telecommunication infrastructure and the 
MNE transferred overseas products, organisational practices, standards, systems and 
technologies. The two firms also founded ventures and created proto-institutions that reduce 
institutional uncertainty gradually. These ventures and institutions were found to be 
necessary in the face of cultural-cognitive barriers (e.g. lack of skilled staff on the local 
market) and institutional voids (e.g. an absence of supportive systems). As an example of 
spanning, the MNE established a training centre that was used by the firm and local 
universities and colleges to equip new graduates and other new staff with missing essential 
skills and abilities. The indigenous firm also established a software developer company to 
incubate software developers. In another example, the two firms created an online payment 
gateway and systems and gradually made them available to banks and other businesses. 
In summary, both the indigenous firm and the MNE designed three types of strategy 
and employed many tactics to deal with these institutional challenges and sometimes turn 
them into business opportunities. The next section will therefore present cross-case findings 
that in relation to entrepreneurial opportunity-related processes. 
5.3 Entrepreneurial Processes and Action 
5.3.1 Antecedents of Entrepreneurial Processes and Action 
The findings of both cases agreed on the antecedents of entrepreneurial processes 
and action as follows: 
1- Individual attributes of entrepreneurs may help them to successfully identify and 
exploit new opportunities.    
2- Prior knowledge may help in entrepreneurial processes and action, but only to a 
certain degree, as this changeable market creates new variables and information 




firm also emphasised that an extensive dependence on prior knowledge may lead 
to more routines, limit creativity, increase familiarity bias and a bad experience 
effect. 
3- Social networks may play a crucial role in the uncertain Palestinian market and 
help the two firms in all entrepreneurial processes and action.   
4- Entrepreneurial alertness may increase the possibility of identifying 
unnoticed/hidden opportunities before others. The MNE assumed that some staff 
really are born with a high level of alertness, but others may be trained.  
5- Systematic search may complement entrepreneurial alertness in the opportunity 
identification process. 
6- The Institutional/external environment was found to significantly affect 
entrepreneurial processes and action. A stable environment may facilitate 
processes and action. An uncertain environment may create a bigger challenge 
and hinder opportunity exploitation. However, it may also generate profitable 
opportunities.  
7- Types of opportunity may affect the willingness of entrepreneurs to identify, 
develop, and exploit them. A planned opportunity may be easily identified, 
developed and exploited. On the other hand, an unplanned opportunity may be 
incompletely identified, developed and exploited. 
The current study investigates whether the indigenous and MNE operators in the 
Palestinian mobile phone sector, under high levels of uncertainty, perceive institutional 
barriers and voids as disincentives and/or opportunities. Since this study provides evidence 
that these institutional barriers and voids may generate opportunities, 5.3.2 will focus on the 
entrepreneurial opportunity-related processes and action within an uncertain business 
environment. 
5.3.2 Entrepreneurial Processes and Action 
The cross-case analysis of both firms established that the entrepreneurial processes 
within the uncertain Palestinian market were threefold: opportunity identification, 
development (Ardichvili et al., 2003), and evaluation (Haynie et al., 2009; Hisrich et al., 
2013). Both firms usually considered and/or created diverse options after opportunity 




5.3.2.1 Opportunity Identification 
The two firms emphasised that opportunity identification may result from any one 
sub-process, or from any combination of them: opportunity recognition (Miller, 2007), 
discovery and creation (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Ardichvili et al., 2003). 
A- Opportunity Recognition 
The indigenous firm and the MNE recognised business opportunities through using 
existing information or/and acquiring new information to observe a potential opportunity 
and then conduct initial evaluation. However, the MNE invested more time and money in 
market intelligence and scanning in order to bridge the market knowledge gap.  
There are generic characteristics to opportunity identification in most cases, e.g. risk-
taking, visionary, creativity, advanced level of analysis and precognition and sensitivity to 
market changes (see Table 5-6). This may demonstrate that a person’s environment, belief 
and personal background will affect his/her abilities to recognise potential opportunity. 
Nonetheless, the indigenous incumbent firm was familiar with the market, tending to be 
more bureaucratic and focusing on its traditional core business. A relatively new MNE to 
the market had less knowledge and limited resources, tending to be more dynamic. The 
MNE’s staff, therefore, were willing to be more passionate about growing their business and 
familiarising themselves with the market to understand its changes and recognise new 
opportunities. They also were willing to be persuasive to convince their top management to 
invest in their ideas, and to be good learners from their experience in this new market through 
constructive criticism to identify further opportunities. 
Table 5-6: The Characteristics of Entrepreneurs Who Recognise Opportunity 
Characteristics The indigenous 
firm 
The MNE 
Sensitivity to market changes X X 
Openness to new ideas X  
Risk-taking X X 
Optimism  X  
Smartness X  
Creativity X X 
Advanced level of analysis and precognition X X 
Critical thinking X  
Collaboration X  
Passionate  X 
Constructive criticism   X 





The two firms clearly used similar actions to deal with uncertainty and risk in the 
opportunity recognition process. Table 5-7 summarises and compares the strategic actions 
that were used by both firms to deal with uncertainty and risk. These actions can be 
categorised into four approaches. First, adaptation through maintaining alternative plans, 
flexible operations, organising and strategic planning, and ensuring operational and strategic 
hedging. Second, reconfiguration in terms of employing entrepreneurial judgement and 
managerial experience, considering all available options, diversifying investments and 
scaling up projects. Third, data collection and analysis through obtaining and accessing new 
information, conducting pilots and experiments and employing what if analysis. Finally, 
collaboration in term of involving all concerned parties, integrating all strategic units and 
coordinating among all departments. It is evident that the MNE extensively employed data 
collection and analysis tools and collaboration compared to the indigenous firm. This implies 
that the MNE attempted to overcome its market knowledge disadvantage through investing 
in market intelligence. 
Table 5-7: Strategic Actions that were Used to Deal with Uncertainty and Risk in Opportunity 
Identification 




Alternative plans X X 
Organisational and strategic plan flexibility   X X 
Operational flexibility X X 
Operational and strategic heading X X 
Reconfiguration  
Entrepreneurial judgement and managerial experience  X X 
Considering all available options X X 
Investment diversification X  
Scaling up  X 
Data collection and analysis 
Data and information collection X X 
Piloting, experimentation and learning  X 
“What if” analysis  X 
Collaboration 








B- Opportunity Discovery 
A comparison of the two firms results reveals that both discovered business 
opportunities through identifying market gaps and then introducing a new product and/or 
stimulating a demand for existing products. Both firms also emphasised that staff discover 
unnoticed opportunities either accidentally through their entrepreneurial alertness or 
deliberately through systematic search. The two firms also used similar information 
collection methods, sources and channels that help them in the opportunity discovery 
process. These information-related methods and channels can be in the form of market 
scanning, external (i.e. customers, suppliers, and dealers) feedback, benchmarking with 
other operators, and exploring neighbouring markets. The indigenous firm also participated 
in international telecom conferences to learn from the experience of others and meet 
consultants and vendors, and the MNE focused on market intelligence, internal (i.e. staff and 
team) feedback and communicating with customers via social media. 
There were generic characteristics of opportunity discovery in most cases, some 
similar to the generic characteristics of opportunity recognition (see Table 5-6) plus other 
characteristics such as dealing with barriers and problems as a challenge, and understanding 
market changes in different ways. The entrepreneurs who discovered opportunities also had 
bisociative thinking (Koestler, 1964), advanced level of linking and analysing of variables 
and changes, a high level of entrepreneurial alertness and good systematic search skills. 
The two firms to some extent applied similar actions to deal with, mitigate, or 
overcome risk in the opportunity discovery process These actions can be grouped into four 
tactics: data collection and research, adaptation, collaboration, and scaling up (see Table 
5-8). 
Table 5-8: Strategic Actions that were Used to Deal with Risk in Opportunity Discovery 
Strategic actions The indigenous 
firm 
The MNE 
Data collection and research 
Conducting exploratory research X X 
Collecting the timely and relevant data and information  X 
Conducting experimentations X X 
Using different types of data analysis tools  X 
Adaptation 
Proposing different scenarios, and operational and strategic plans X X 




Table 5-8: (Continued) 
Collaboration 
Transferring and sharing knowledge and experience  X X 
Consulting local and international experts X  
Employing managers’ knowledge and heuristic  X X 
Learning from prior experience  X 
Scaling up 
Starting with small projects X  
Source: Author 
C- Opportunity Creation 
It was apparent that the MNE adopted opportunity creation, which facilitated its 
digitalisation project and market penetration. On the other hand, opportunity creation was 
very limited and rare in the indigenous firm. The firm tended to sustain a proven business 
model, which still generated a reasonable profit. 
A common way to create opportunity adopted by the two firms was transferring new 
technologies and products from other markets and/or designing completely new products 
and processes, and then stimulating a demand for them. The MNE also created an 
opportunity through entering a new market (i.e. the GS). Two main sources opportunity 
applied to both cases: (1) internally, through staff’s ideas, proposals and initiatives, and (2) 
externally, through business partners and customers’ suggestions. The MNE further 
identified opportunities by reviewing international, regional reports and those from other 
operators. 
Steps in the opportunity creation process were largely the same between the two 
firms, although the MNE took a few extra steps. Table 5-9 summarises and compares the 
steps of the opportunity creation process adopted by both cases. Both firms found that it was 
very difficult to have a clear vision at the beginning of the opportunity creation process, but 
it became clearer with further progress and development of the opportunity. The indigenous 
firm also emphasised that opportunity creation depends on individual entrepreneurs who had 
different beliefs, backgrounds and perspectives. This implies that the opportunity creation 







Table 5-9: Steps in the Opportunity Creation Process 
Step The indigenous 
firm 
The MNE 
Initial idea(s) imagination and formulation X X 
Initial idea(s) development X X 
Rethinking and modification to reach mature idea(s)  X 
Mature idea(s) sharing with concerned parties X X 
Feedback and further development X X 
Solid idea development X X 
Applicability and feasibility measurement  X 
Evaluation and feedback  X 
Experimentation and modelling X X 
Limited market trial and feedback X X 
Product modification and gradual market expansion X X 
Source: Author 
The indigenous firm and the MNE employed broadly similar actions to deal with, 
mitigate, or overcome uncertainty in the process of creating opportunity within the 
Palestinian mobile phone market. These actions could be clustered into five approaches: data 
collection, collaboration, adaptation, reconfiguration, and alignment (see Table 5-10).  
Table 5-10: Strategic Actions that were Used to Deal with Uncertainty in the Opportunity Creation 
Process 




Experimentation X X 
Collecting available data and information X X 
Short- and long-term estimation  X 
Collaboration 
Collective work, and knowledge and experience sharing X  
Concerned party’s involvement X  
Adaptation 
Putting alternative plans X X 
Finding alternative solutions  X 
Flexibility, adaptability and suitability  X 
Accepting uncertainty and changes  X 
Alignment 
Logic of causation  X 
Logic of appropriateness  X 
Effectuation  X 
Compatibility between the products, company and market X X 
Benefits maximisation X X 






Table 5-10: (Continued) 
Reconfiguration 
Creativity, innovation, and problem–solving heuristics  X 
Critical thinking X X 
Business scaling strategy X X 
Logical thinking and reasonable justification X X 
Source: Author 
In short, these results show that both the indigenous firm and the MNE frequently 
identified business opportunities through opportunity recognition and discovery, but the 
MNE also used opportunity creation. A number of respondents offered an explanation for a 
more frequent opportunity identification in the MNE because it adopted a digitalisation 
strategy, which required creating further opportunities within this uncertain context, while 
the indigenous firm focused on its core traditional business. 
5.3.2.2 Opportunity Development 
The two firms indicated that the opportunity development process starts with the 
emergence of simple and initial ideas from individuals or teams within the company or its 
business partners and suppliers. They also agreed on many steps in the development process. 
However, the MNE took additional steps in the process and had a specialised committee – 
called the Commercial Activity Team (CAT) - which facilitates the opportunity development 
process and evaluates any potential opportunity. Table 5-11 summarises and compares the 
steps in the opportunity development process adopted by both cases. 
Table 5-11: Steps in the Opportunity Development Process 
Steps The indigenous 
firm 
The MNE 
Data and information collection X X 
Initial idea(s) sharing with direct manager  X 
Initial idea(s) modifications X X 
Clear idea(s) development X X 
Business case and technical study preparation X X 
Initial evaluation and feedback X X 
CAT shares and discusses the business case and technical report 
with concerned departments 
 X 
Solid opportunity(ies) development X X 
Opportunity(ies) evaluation and approval X X 





The indigenous firm and the MNE emphasised that the opportunity development 
process is a dynamic and iterative one. It may happen many times and could raise some new 
opportunities related to the existing products or create completely new products. The factors 
highlighted by the indigenous firm and the MNE, respectively, are summarised in Table 5-
12, grouped into two types: internal/organisational and external factors (see Table 5-12). 
Table 5-12: Factors that Facilitate the Opportunity Development Process 




Availability of required capabilities and resources  X X 
Availability of relevant prior knowledge and experience in 
developing commercial opportunities in this uncertain context 
X X 
High sensitivity and ability to deal with market’s changes X X 
Strategic fit  X 
Inter-departmental integration  X 
External factors 
Accessibility of sufficient and relevant information  X X 
Market readiness X X 
Social networks X X 
Local community acceptance of product X  
Availability of vendors or contractors (i.e. third party) X X 
Source: Author 
5.3.2.3 Opportunity Evaluation 
The two firms emphasised that opportunity evaluation involved cognitive 
judgements (subjective interpretations) derived from the manager’s vision of the opportunity 
beside a general evaluation framework. The evaluation process passed from one managerial 
level to the next when the opportunity was found to be attractive for the firm. This staged 
assessment process facilitated a precise evaluation for each stage and enabled sufficient 
feedback collection for further steps before reaching the implementation stage.  
It appears that criteria for the opportunity evaluation were similar for the two firms. 
In opportunity evaluation, the indigenous firm and the MNE considered a multi-dimensional 
opportunity attractiveness construct that consists of gain estimation, loss estimation, 
perceived desirability, and perceived feasibility. They also shared many components in their 
opportunity assessment plan, but the MNE additionally has exit plans (see Table 5-13). The 
relative newcomer MNE provider had a more detailed opportunity plan in order to bridge its 




indigenous firm however were familiar with the local context and see themselves as experts 
who have enough ability to assess and exploit opportunities without exit plans. 
Table 5-13: The Main Components of an Opportunity Assessment Plan 
Components The indigenous firm The MNE 
Opportunity description X X 
Market structure and mechanism X X 
Feasibility study X X 
The required resources and capabilities X X 
Execution plan X X 
Resources allocation plan X X 
Exit plan  X 
Monitoring procedures and plans X X 
Source: Author 
5.3.2.4 Entrepreneurial Action 
In both firms, the managers reported that, after opportunity evaluation, their 
entrepreneurial action was not limited to immediate opportunity exploitation, but they 
considered other options, if exploitation was infeasible. The managers identified and/or 
created interrelated activities and sometimes sequential decisions in order to determine 
whether action on the identified opportunity should be exploited or not. Entrepreneurial 
action therefore involved diverse options (including exploitation) and even a deliberate 
decision not to pursue an opportunity. It is for this reason that this study conceptualises 
‘entrepreneurial action’ as a set of actions rather than a single action. This conceptualisation 
can accommodate these different actions. 
In relation to opportunity exploitation, both cases emphasised that the managers of 
both firms recognised the uncertain environment as a challenge but uncertainty could be an 
inhibitor and a motivator. The firms also identified many similar factors that positively 
affected the opportunity exploitation. However, the indigenous firm and the MNE separately 
identified further factors (see Table 5-14). These enabling factors were categorised into three 







Table 5-14: Factors that Positively Affect Opportunity Exploitation 




Availability of experienced and skilled managers and staff X X 
Mutual trust and confidence among staff X X 
Managers’ familiarity with uncertainty X X 
Willingness of the management to bear uncertainty  X X 
A collaborative corporate culture  X 
Availability of the required resources and capabilities X X 
Strategic fit  X 
Governance institutions 
Support from stakeholders  X 
Support of the Board of Management (BoM)  X 
Return on investment X X 
External factors 
Market readiness X X 
Availability and accessibility of supporting information  X X 
Limited options/opportunities in the Palestinian market (i.e. 
intensive rivalry) 
 X 
Good relationships with governmental bodies X  
Source: Author 
A common way of opportunity exploitation process was adopted by both firms as 
follows: (1) coordination and involvement of all concerned departments, (2) preparation of 
implementation and resources allocation plans, and exit strategy, (3) execution of all 
required managerial and technical functions by each department, (4) according to the type 
of opportunity, the company either implements its project fully or scales it up, and (5) 
receiving continuous feedback on improvements. 
Overall, the findings of both case studies offered evidence of the possibility of both 
motivating and inhibitory impacts of uncertainty on entrepreneurial opportunity-related 
processes. The next section, therefore, will present cross-case findings that are related to 




5.4 Uncertainty and Entrepreneurial Processes, Action, and 
Opportunities 
5.4.1 Environmental Uncertainty 
Respondents from both the indigenous firm and the MNE reported that they 
experienced state, effect, and response uncertainty (Milliken, 1987; see 4.4.1 and 4.8.1) in 
the turbulent country and industry environment in Palestine. The managers of both firms 
shared the same perception of high state uncertainty in a Palestinian environment plagued 
by political instability and violent conflict.  
However, the findings revealed that the perception of effect and response uncertainty 
could vary. In the case of high perceived effect or response uncertainty, there was a complete 
lack of control and knowledge of the impact of state uncertainty on the firm and how it could 
react. At an intermediate level of effect or response uncertainty, respondents indicated their 
attempts to make judgements and/or predictions, with varying levels of confidence in them. 
Low levels were observed when interviewees reported their ability to identify the likely 
effects of state uncertainty and actions to deal with them. 
It is evident that the two firms adopted ‘different routes to the same outcome’ when 
they perceived different levels of effect and response uncertainties. The indigenous firm 
depended on its better local knowledge and experience, political embeddedness and 
extensive industry experience, boosting their ability to identify possible solutions, design 
applicable plans and manage uncertainty. The MNE, however, invested in market 
intelligence capabilities, employed proactive market scanning tools and transferred the 
experience of other operators in its group. These strategies fostered their ability to collect 
available information about potential options, mitigate its local knowledge disadvantage and 
expand its common, corporate knowledge base that could ultimately facilitate the 






5.4.2 The Effect of Uncertainty on Entrepreneurial Processes, Action, 
and Opportunities 
The analysis of both firms revealed that the three types of uncertainty had positive 
and negative impacts on opportunity identification and exploitation. This dual impact was 
largely attributed to how the managers perceived these types of uncertainty. For further 
details about the dual impact of state, effect and response of uncertainty on opportunity 
identification and exploitation, see 4.4.2 and 4.8.2. 
The investigation of opportunity exploitation in the face of uncertainty at an 
aggregate level suggested a tentative pattern. This pattern of the firms’ response to 
uncertainty was described by the network director of the MNE as a shift of managers from 
a ‘challenging’ to a ‘panic’ zone. 
In the first zone, managers viewed uncertainty as a challenge. Here, managers might 
perceive difficulties and feel frustrated, but they had the required confidence and positive 
energy to do their best to exploit the opportunity, as emphasised by the marketing director 
of the MNE. He distinctly explained that ‘Generally, we try to continue in our operations 
and do not reach the frustration stage. If we are still working in a challenging area and do 
not reach the frustration area, we do our best to implement our projects and develop new 
products’ (W09). 
Nevertheless, when the uncertainty reached a level where the managers felt unable 
to control and handle, it turned into a disincentive. In this panic zone, the uncertainty became 
so overwhelming that the managers experienced stress, exhaustion and fear. They were 
discouraged and/or unable to act further and could choose to abandon or postpone 
opportunity exploitation. This study labels this phenomenon as ‘uncertainty overload’ but 
this phenomenon needs further investigation may be through quantitative studies that may 
result in a graphical representation. This will be discussed at 7.5. 
In the end, it is clear from both cases that the psychological factors and the attributes 
of managers, especially emotions, may play a substantial role in determining (hindering 
and/or motivating) entrepreneurial processes and action, and so the next section focuses on 




5.4.3 The Effect of Emotions on Entrepreneurial Action 
The findings of both cases demonstrated that the individual and external 
environments work mutually and there is no clear-cut distinction between them. This means 
managers’ perceptions of uncertainty may be individual and judgemental. The analysis 
emphasised the importance of psychology and attributes of the managers in interpreting and 
judging uncertainty. 
With the attributes of managers, the two firms stressed that uncertainty was 
responsible for creating some positive outcomes, especially when the uncertainty was 
connected to generally positive events. The desire for achievement, self-efficacy, 
willingness to bear uncertainty and resilience/perseverance were identified as important 
attributes of the managers that positively affect the manager’s perception of uncertainty, 
ultimately leading to opportunity identification and exploitation. For further explanations 
and examples about these attributes, see 4.4.3 and 4.8.3. 
The cross-case findings further showed that some negative emotions such as fear of 
failure, stress and anger were reported to generate an ambiguous impact (incentive and 
deterrence) on entrepreneurial processes and action. The analysis demonstrated that fear 
prompted a high level of interest and curiosity, and motivated a greater striving for success, 
all positively associated with an entrepreneur’s persistence in pursuing further exploration 
or opportunity exploitation. In contrast, an increase in perceived uncertainty also led to a 
pessimistic or even fearful approach, favouring easier and readily identifiable opportunities, 
decreasing exploration and becoming less proactive.  
It also transpired that managers who perceived stress as a challenge were more likely 
to discover alternative ways to overcome it. However, higher levels of uncertainty and stress 
hindered information processing and reduced motivation, which may negatively affect the 
decisions of managers to engage in opportunity identification and/or exploitation. As with 
fear, the responses revealed that anger related to an increase in perceived uncertainty 
triggered a need for more effort and actions in order to attain a project’s goals. On the other 
hand, further increases in perceived uncertainty inhibited investigatory behaviour and 




Besides the institutional environment, it is also evident that the types of opportunity 
played an important role in shaping entrepreneurial processes and action. The next section 
discusses the impact of types of opportunity on opportunity-related processes and action.   
5.4.4 Types of Opportunity and Their Impact on Entrepreneurial 
Processes and Action 
The cross-case analysis revealed that the two firms identified four types of 
opportunity: problem-solving, introduction of products and services, technology transfer, 
and daily business transactions/deals. However, the MNE identified three further types of 
opportunity: new market entry, digitalisation, and boundary-spanning. These additional 
types of opportunity facilitated the accomplishment of the firm’s objectives (e.g. 
digitalisation, development and penetration of the Palestinian mobile phone market). 
The indigenous firm and the MNE agreed that prior knowledge and experience may 
help, to some extent, in identifying, developing and exploiting a tacit opportunity through 
market scanning, discovery, consultation and/or exploratory research. They also agreed that 
prior knowledge and experience may facilitate, to great extent, a codified opportunity 
identification, development, and exploitation (i.e. fast execution) process through using 
focused/specialised search. A lack of prior knowledge and experience with a codified 
opportunity could require further investments in opportunity-related processes and action 
through using exploratory research and experimentation. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter presented a cross-case analysis of findings, showing that the indigenous 
firm and the MNE operated in an obstructive, challenging and uncertain business 
environment with a lot of institutional barriers and voids beside permanent conflict and 
violence that exacerbate the uncertainty. The findings revealed broadly similar patterns of 
disbenefits and benefits as a consequence of barriers and voids, strategic responses, and 
antecedents of entrepreneurial processes and action. They also showed broadly similar 
entrepreneurial processes and action. However, some differences were identified, especially 
in the identification process.  
The results emphasised that the uncertain Palestinian market may be an incentive and 




uncertainty may be individual and subjective, with ambiguous outcomes. The findings 
showed evidence of the negative impact of extreme uncertainty on opportunity identification 
and exploitation, but some positive impacts were noted too. A turning point, a maximum 
was found, whereby the positive responses of firms to aggregate uncertainty may turn 
neutral, or even negative. 
The findings provided evidence that the psychology and attributes of managers, 
especially emotions, may play substantial role in hindering and/or motivating the 
opportunity-related processes and action. In addition to the institutional environment and 
psychology of entrepreneur, the types of opportunity played a crucial role in the 
entrepreneurial processes and action. The next chapter will discuss these findings in the light 
















Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the thesis findings, considering them in the context of the 
extant literature in order to concur with, extend or challenge extant knowledge in the domain, 
and to address the primary research questions. Some findings (e.g. the benefits of 
institutional challenges, and the role of emotions in entrepreneurial action) were surprising, 
and they will be discussed under the four original research questions. The discussion 
therefore is divided into three main sections: institutional challenges and obstacles, 
entrepreneurial processes and action, and uncertainty and its impact on opportunity-related 
processes and action. 
6.2 Institutional Challenges and Obstacles 
This section discusses the findings related to research questions (1) and (2), 
pertaining to institutional challenges and obstacles.  
RQ (1) What are the main institutional barriers and voids faced by Palestinian 
mobile phone operators? 
There was clear evidence of a changeable, obstructive and underdeveloped 
Palestinian institutional environment with numerous institutional barriers and voids as 
reported by interviewees, see Tables 5-1 and 5-2. Previous entrepreneurship studies have 
produced different categories of institutional barriers (c.f. Aidis, 2005; Doern & Goss, 2011; 
Rahman et al., 2017; Robson & Obeng, 2008). All of these studies were largely focused on 
detailed levels of categorisation for institutional barriers rather than consolidating them into 
the two main types of barrier. These correspond with the widely-adopted classification of 
North (1990), Peng et al. (2009) and Peng (2016) of formal and informal institutions. With 
its IBV approach, this study simply disaggregates such institutional challenges into formal 
and informal institutional constraints (Peng, 2000) and institutional voids (Khanna et al., 
2005; Khanna & Palepu, 2010).  
The findings emphasised that perceived institutional barriers and voids varied for the 
same operator within the same country, i.e. the WB and GS, and for the two companies 




indicated that institutional barriers may vary greatly from one region to another and even 
from time to time within the same country. Specifically, formal and informal barriers cited 
by the indigenous first mover were very different from those cited by the newcomer MNE 
in this study.  
The MNE faced not only violence, voids and institutional barriers, but also the 
‘liability of foreignness’ (Rugman & Verbeke, 2007), its associated uncertainties plus the 
fact that these institutional challenges usually discriminate against new entrants (Chang & 
Wu, 2014; Tran, 2019). These findings corroborate those of Doh et al.  (2017) that foreign 
firms may incur additional costs of absent institutions in emerging economies. With such 
bolstering of incumbent firms in mind, it may also be noted that most studies of institutional 
barriers, voids and conflicts to date have not focused on MNEs, with a few exceptions (e.g. 
Parente et al., 2019).  
This study further revealed how the two case study firms interpreted institutional 
barriers and voids - in terms of benefits and disbenefits - and made responses to sustain and 
develop its business in this extreme environment. These findings were unexpected; 
therefore, this section discusses the findings related to the main benefits and disbenefits of 
institutional barriers and voids. 
The prevalence of institutional barriers and voids generates various disbenefits for 
the two firms (see Table 5-3 and 5-4). These findings are in agreement with a long-standing 
assumption in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Banalieva et al., 2015; Bylund & 
McCaffery, 2017; Ge et al., 2019) that a well-functioning institutional environment will 
facilitate entrepreneurship, while a weak one will hamper it. These barriers and voids 
constituted an important limitation for the growth and quality of business initiatives 
(Krasniqi & Desai, 2016). They also exacerbated uncertainty such that it impeded 
commercial goal achievement due to reluctance to act and other barriers such as higher 
transaction costs (Bylund & McCaffery, 2017).  
On the other hand, the malfunction or absence of developed institutions benefited the 
two firms in terms of promoting creativity, innovation, managerial efficiency and 
effectiveness (see Table 5-3 and 5-4). These findings correspond with those of Doh et al. 
(2017), Claire et al. (2019), Sydow et al. (2020) and Zhou (2013, 2017) that institutional 




pose for firms in emerging economies. Moulick et al. (2019, p. 7) reported that severe voids 
did not hold back the entrepreneurs but, rather, encouraged them to ‘bloom where planted’. 
The analysis here provided evidence that even the most extreme institutional barriers 
and voids may generate significant benefits as well as disbenefits. The possibility arises, 
therefore, that institutional barriers and voids may have an ambiguous impact, offering both 
opportunities and challenges. The current study moved beyond the predominant view in the 
literature that mainly considers the detrimental impact of institutional challenges, and instead 
acknowledged their positive outcomes too. 
In the face of this potentially dual impact of institutional barriers and voids, a detailed 
account of how the two case study firms acted to convert some disbenefits into benefits and 
advantages was unveiled.  Thus, the study provides fine-grained answers to the second 
research question: RQ (2) How do firms respond to institutional barriers and voids?  
While the findings showed a great degree of similarity of responses to the 
institutional barriers and voids (Table 5-5), they also indicated that the newcomer MNE 
employed a wider range of tactics in order to catch up and bridge its performance gap with 
the indigenous firm. This explains that facing weak institutions, only new entrants with 
sufficiently high productivity and profitability are able to survive (Tran, 2019). To 
compensate for their survival disadvantage, I think new entrants must not only have higher 
productivity than incumbents as suggested by Chang and Wu (2014), but should also achieve 
higher entrepreneurial profitability (Tran & Santarelli, 2014). The foreignness of the MNE 
(e.g. weaker local knowledge, embeddedness and connections) also added further challenges 
to survival in the market, which promoted a need for developing strategies (e.g. political 
connections) to surmount low legitimacy in terms of local influence (Bucheli & Salvaj, 
2018). 
This study also identified the three strategic responses that the two firms adopted in 
common to deal with barriers and voids, i.e. acceptance, adaptation and influence. These 
were largely in line with the extant literature (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Oliver, 1991; 
Regnér & Edman, 2014) with only minor deviations. However, this study offered in addition 
a list of specific tactics in respect to each of them (Figure 6-1). The two firms responded 
deliberately to challenges, and these findings suggest viewing institutional challenges not 
only as constraints (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Meyer et al., 2009; Oliveira et al., 2018), but also 




2020). The positive outcomes resulting from strategic responses to institutional barriers and 
voids in this extremely uncertain Palestinian environment imply the capacity of many firms 
to respond positively to less uncertain environments elsewhere.   
I reckon that firms may need to use simultaneously and flexibly an ambidextrous 
combination of strategic responses (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) to survive and grow in 
complex and unstable institutional environments (Berglund et al., 2020; Bylund & 
McCaffrey, 2017; Lampert et al., 2020; Regnér & Edman, 2014). A key feature of all three 
responses was that they were conscious strategic choices (Peng et al., 2009), even the passive 
Figure 6-1: Strategies and Tactics of Responding to Institutional Barriers and Voids 
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Compliance (Oliver, 
1991) 
Patience / a wait-and-
see strategy (Courtney 





















approach (Pinkham & 
Peng, 2017) 
 




Bricolage (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005) 
 
Prospecting (Welter & 









A network-based strategy 
(Peng, 2003; Welter & 
Smallbone, 2011) 
 
Linking of interests between 
the state and firm (Child et al., 
2012) 
 










Political influence tactics 
(Oliver, 1991; Ramamurti, 
2005) 
 
Bargaining (Oliver, 1991) 
 











practices (Pinkham & Peng, 
2017; Tracey & Phillips, 2011) 
 
Institutional brokering 





act of accepting existing institutions. These choices were contingent upon institutional 
conditions as well as firm-specific factors (Regnér & Edman, 2014). These findings provide 
further insights into how firms can strategize their interaction with institutions to achieve 
specific business goals (Alvarez & Porac, 2020; Peng et al., 2009), and correspond with the 
IBV in acknowledging the mutual interaction between firms and their institutional 
environment (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Yiu et al., 2014).  
Overall, this study generated thick descriptions of firms’ different responses to 
institutions, directly answering the call for further research on how firms/entrepreneurs 
interact with their broader institutional environments (Bjerregaard & Lauring, 2012; Hwang 
& Powell, 2005; Phillips & Tracey, 2007). The next section will discuss the findings that in 
relation to entrepreneurial opportunity-related processes and action.  
6.3 Entrepreneurial Processes and Action 
This section discusses the findings related to research questions (3) and (4), 
concerning entrepreneurial processes and action. 
RQ (3) What are the antecedents of entrepreneurial processes and action in an 
extremely uncertain environment at a firm-level?   
This study has identified seven prominent influences on entrepreneurial processes 
and action (summarised in Figure 6-2), which were largely in accord with the extant 
entrepreneurship literature, but it also added substance to, and advanced a better 
understanding of, some of these factors such as prior knowledge, social networks, systematic 
search and types of opportunity. 
The findings revealed that prior knowledge provided managers with the capacity to 
identify, develop and exploit certain opportunities. Prior knowledge increases the ability to 
think in a more intuitive way, improves information processing efficiency, and recognises 
important connections between concepts (Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005). This could increase 
ones ability to identify more innovative, and a greater number of, opportunities. On the other 
hand, the findings showed that the value of prior knowledge depreciated quickly in an 
extremely uncertain environment. The analysis established that an extensive dependence on 
prior knowledge increased a certain familiarity bias and bad experience effects. Based on 




entrepreneurs’ experience may create a set of decision-making biases, such as over-
confidence and a familiarity bias that may impede their ability to identify innovative 
opportunities (Ucbasaran et al., 2009). Managers may be also inclined to pay more attention 
to, and bet on, opportunities and decisions with which they are most familiar, thus generating 
decisions that may not promote economic value, and reducing diversity of opportunities. 
This expectation reconciles with a dominant logic perspective (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) and 
the findings of Garbuio et al. (2011), which emphasised that decision makers’ familiarity 
with the situation at hand has an impact on their preferences for alternative courses of action. 
Heath and Tversky (1991) also reported that people prefer to bet on their vague beliefs in 
situations where they feel especially competent and knowledgeable but prefer to gamble 
when they do not feel competent or knowledgeable. 
The investigation of the indigenous firm and the MNE here provided evidence that 
both weak and strong ties were required to help firms to access valuable information and a 
wide range of tangible and intangible resources that facilitated entrepreneurial processes and 
action (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003; Hmieleski et al., 2015; Rowley et al., 2000; Wuebker et 
al., 2015). Krackhardt (1992, p. 218) pointed to ‘the strength of strong ties in cases of severe 
change and uncertainty’. Stam et al. (2014) also emphasised that strong ties are more 
strongly related to the performance of firms in emerging economies. This result may be 
explained by the fact that the reliance on strong ties reduces risk and uncertainty through 
trustful, resilient, and easily accessible relationships (Meuleman et al., 2010). This finding 
challenges the traditional view within the entrepreneurship literature that strong ties are less 
valuable than weak ties (c.f. Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Ardichvili et al., 2003; Granovetter, 
1973; Hills et al., 1997). In sum, I believe that both strong and weak ties are useful and 
contribute to a higher tendency to engage in entrepreneurial processes and action, although 
they are beneficial in different ways and in different contexts (i.e. discovery and creation). 
Therefore, the ideal entrepreneurial network includes a unique mix of strong and weak 
relationships (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Leyden & Link, 2015; Uzzi, 1997).  
This study showed that entrepreneurial alertness was enhanced/complemented by 
constrained, systematic search in facilitating entrepreneurial processes and action (Murphy, 
2011). The findings explained that managers/staff identified opportunities serendipitously 
through high levels of entrepreneurial alertness as well as deliberately through systematic 
search. These results are in line with those of Fiet (2007) and Zahra et al. (2009) that a 




and/or promote opportunity discovery. Depending only on alertness has some limitations, 
e.g. offering practically no guidance to entrepreneurs and considering only discovery rather 
than wealth creation (Baumol, 1993; Fiet, 2007; Ricketts, 1993). This study moved beyond 
these primary limitations of alertness, and instead, argued that systematic search is not 
always the opposite of alertness but may be complementary. 
The findings provided evidence that types of opportunity played an important role in 
shaping entrepreneurial processes and action. These results reflect those of Dahlqvist and 
Wiklund (2012) who also found that opportunity variations may affect measures of 
opportunity and entrepreneurial processes parameters. Ardichvili et al. (2003) further 
emphasised that the process of opportunity development may vary among different types of 
opportunity. The analysis here also showed that firms identified, developed and exploited 
different types of opportunity (i.e. opportunities vary in their origin, kind and degree of 
development, e.g. innovative and reproducing) (Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009). These 
types correspond with Smith et al. (2009), who proposed codified and tacit opportunities.  
While a codified opportunity is more likely to focus on imitated or moderate improvements 
of products or organising methods, a tacit opportunity is more likely to focus on major 
improvements or innovations of products or organising methods. 
The study found that prior knowledge and experience helped, to some extent, in 
identifying, developing and exploiting a tacit opportunity through market scanning, 
discovery, consultation and/or exploratory research (Chandra et al., 2009). This result 
corresponds with Smith et al. (2009), who suggested that the relative tacitness of an 
opportunity may conceal it from prospective entrepreneurs who have no prior knowledge, 
making it more difficult to identify, develop and exploit. However, a prospective 
entrepreneur equipped with prior knowledge is more likely to overcome these challenges 
and be more competent in identifying the opportunity. On the other hand, the case findings 
here showed that prior knowledge and experience facilitated, to great extent, identifying, 
developing and exploiting a codified opportunity through employing a focused and/or 
specialised search (Chandra et al., 2009). These findings concur with Smith et al. (2009), 
who explained that the nature of the codified opportunity may facilitate the entrepreneurial 
processes through using a systematic search for such opportunities. 
The findings also revealed that the MNE operator identified further types of 




and newness. This finding supports Dahlqvist and Wiklund (2012), who explained that firms 
may create newness in a specific market through geographical expansion by an existing firm 
into an existing localised market and/or taking an existing product or business concept into 
localised markets, which can also constitute innovation. 
Figure 6-2 summarises the antecedents of core entrepreneurial processes and action 
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This study adopts the IBV and a subjectivist view of entrepreneurship, with the aim 
of providing insights into entrepreneurial processes and action within a turbulent 
environment. Thus, the study offers substantial findings in relation to the fourth research 
question:  
RQ (4) How are opportunities identified, developed, evaluated, and exploited within 
an extremely uncertain business environment at a firm-level? 
This study has identified three standard processes, widely recognised (see Figure 6-
2), namely opportunity identification, development, and evaluation, and provided a thick 
description for each. The current study added a fourth process, which better explained what 
and how ‘entrepreneurial action’ is determined in an uncertain business environment. 
1- Opportunity Identification 
The current study reported ‘opportunity identification’, which may result from 
opportunity recognition, discovery and creation, or from any combination thereof. This 
suggestion integrates different views of opportunity-related processes. One view sees 
opportunity-related processes was viewed as cognitive, involving mental simulation, 
counterfactual thinking, heuristics-based logic, and effectuation (Baron, 2004; Gaglio & 
Katz, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2001). Another view, with a discovery perspective, assumed that an 
opportunity is something identified in a moment of insight as a result of accidental discovery 
and entrepreneurial alertness and/or developed over time as a result of systematic search 
(Bhave, 1994; Fiet, 2007; Kirzner, 1979; Long & McMullan, 1984). A third view, a 
creativity perspective, suggested an opportunity-related process involving creativity or even 
the special case of problem-solving (Dimov, 2007; Hansen & Hills, 2004; Harper, 2008; 
Schumpeter, 1934). 
The results showed that opportunity recognition rested on subjective perceptions and 
an interpretation of objective realities (Dutta & Crossan, 2005; Grégoire et al., 2010b). 
Entrepreneurs’ backgrounds and know-how, as well as the business and general 
environment, influenced the opportunity recognition process (Gaglio & Taub, 1992; Long 
& McMullan, 1984). The two firms recognised/observed a potential opportunity through 
using current information and/or obtaining new information (Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Shane, 
2003). Entrepreneurs then formed beliefs regarding whether an opportunity existed, and then 




evidence that the MNE was in need to develop their research and knowledge transfer 
capabilities through creating a platform for local knowledge communication, expanding 
their corporate common knowledge base and exploiting the full value of local knowledge 
(Li et al., 2016). 
The analysis reported that exogenous shocks (e.g. external environment changes) 
created competitive imperfections that constituted opportunities (i.e. Kirznerian 
opportunity), which required only access to current rather than new information (c.f. Alvarez 
& Barney, 2007; Shane, 2003). The findings also suggested that entrepreneurs discover 
unnoticed opportunities either accidentally through their entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 
1979, 1985, 1997) or deliberately through systematic search (Fiet et al., 2005; Zahra et al., 
2009). The findings of the current study support Alvarez and Barney (2007), who 
emphasised that the ability of entrepreneurs to discover opportunities depends on their 
subjective perceptions (Kirzner, 1979), cognitive abilities (Baron, 2004), capacity for 
bisociative thinking (Koestler, 1964; Ko & Butler, 2006), openness to new options 
(Burmeister & Schade, 2007) and prior knowledge. Any of these characteristics, or any 
combination of them, might lead some entrepreneurs to notice and see hitherto unexploited 
opportunities created by exogenous shocks (Arentz et al., 2013). 
The analysis revealed that the firms created opportunity through responding to 
environmental changes (Shane, 2003) or not waiting for these changes, and instead, acting 
to form opportunities that could not have been known without their actions (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2007; see also Miller, 2007). Each of these suggestions correspond with findings 
from the MNE case study. However, this finding contrasts with the findings from the 
indigenous firm, which showed that the first mover firm tended to sustain a proven business 
model that still generates a reasonable profit. I agree with Tran (2019) who offered an 
explanation that may clarify this result and argued that weak institutions provide survival 
advantages for incumbent firms, which prevent them from experiencing the Schumpeterian 
‘creative destruction’ process but may motivate new entrants to innovate and drive 
innovative changes to be able to survive.  
The results also indicated that firms found difficulty in establishing a clear vision at 
the beginning of the opportunity creation process, but this became clearer with development 
of the opportunity. This result may be explained by the fact that opportunities cannot be 




iterative process of action and reaction (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). The opportunity creation 
process was path dependent (i.e. based on different approaches, beliefs, backgrounds) and 
may result in heterogenous outcomes (Alvarez et al., 2013). 
2- Opportunity Development 
The analysis indicated that the initially identified opportunities were further 
developed in dynamic and iterative process to reach their final form (Ardichvili et al., 2003; 
Dimov, 2007). The concretisation and realisation of an opportunity idea was an interactive 
and gradual process (Johanson & Vahlne, 2006). These results seem to be consistent with 
other research which found that development process implies extensive proactive and 
reactive efforts (Pavia, 1991) and feedback-driven reactions (Grimes, 2018) in order to 
accomplish an entire economic activity. The findings also emphasised the importance of 
establishing linkage with multiple stakeholders to acquire the information needed to 
successfully develop a new opportunity it to market (Dutta & Crossan, 2005) since their 
feedback guided the firm’s decisions and actions (Dutta & Crossan, 2005) and reduced the 
uncertainty inherent to novel opportunities (Ravasi & Turati, 2005). 
This study has identified generic steps in the opportunity development process (see 
Table 5-11), which were mainly corroborate Lumpkin and Lichtenstein’s (2005) creativity-
based model of opportunity development in the context of corporate entrepreneurship. This 
process could be summarised in steps ‘through which insights are contemplated, new 
information is collected and considered, and knowledge is created over time’ (Lumpkin & 
Lichtenstein, 2005, p. 457). The current study also highlighted internal and external factors 
that may facilitate the opportunity development process (see Table 5-12), which largely 
echoed the factors identified by prior studies. These factors could be broadly categorised as 
human capital factors (c.f. Tegtmeier & Leger-Jarniou, 2017; Ucbasaran & Westhead, 2002; 
Westhead et al., 2009) and social capital factors (c.f. Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Kogut et al., 
1993; Sanz-Velasco, 2006; Tegtmeier & Leger-Jarniou, 2017). Based on my understanding, 
I infer that opportunity development was a dynamic social process (Dimov, 2007), therefore, 
the attributes of the entrepreneurs and their interaction with their broader environment 
significantly influenced opportunity development, and I suggest that reactions to external 





3- Opportunity Evaluation 
This study reported that entrepreneurs consistently used rules to systematically 
evaluate opportunities (Wood & Williams, 2014), but they also relied on their subjective 
judgements regarding different characteristics of an identified opportunity (Gruber et al., 
2015). Evaluation was about visualising and predicting the future to determine whether the 
idea can form the basis for a profitable and sustainable opportunity (Nielsen et al., 2012). 
These results corroborate those of Barreto (2012) and Grégoire et al. (2011) that opportunity 
assessment is best understood as cognitive judgements derived from the entrepreneur’s 
vision of the opportunity and thus is subjective interpretations of what exogenous 
information means for a possible course of action. 
The analysis demonstrated that firms employed a stage-gate assessment process in 
order to systematically evaluate each development step and sufficiently acquire workable 
feedback for further steps (Ardichvili et al., 2003). This result is consistent with a rule-based 
reasoning mechanism (Williams & Wood, 2015) that allows individuals to organise 
information and frame decision problems by deliberately engaging in mental simulations of 
cause and effect relationships. The findings further emphasised that these mental simulations 
were derived from one’s knowledge base and were used to conduct formal analyses and 
make probabilistic projections about the future (Smith & DeCoster, 1998). 
The current study also acknowledged the importance of distinguishing between the 
different informational settings that entrepreneurs may find themselves in, when evaluating 
discovered and/or created opportunities. These results are in accord with studies indicating 
that opportunities identified through discovery are considered objective (Alvarez & Barney, 
2007) and entrepreneurs are considered to either have critical information on the major 
dimensions of specific opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) or can search to obtain 
missing pieces of information (Fiet, 2007), so entrepreneurs expand limited cognitive or 
analytical efforts when imposing their opportunity template(s) on opportunity-related 
information (Barreto, 2012). This finding also agrees with the findings of other studies (e.g 
Alvarez et al., 2013) in assuming that business opportunities, in uncertain settings, are 
created based on social interaction and an entrepreneur’s informational setting is 
characterised by missing and equivocal information, but over time further information is 
obtained, an entrepreneur therefore will continuously make conscious or subconscious 




opportunity attributes and individual differences directly influenced perceptions of 
entrepreneurs in judging whether introducing a new product or service to the market was 
desirable and feasible (Scheaf et al., 2020).  
4- Entrepreneurial Action 
Conceiving of entrepreneurial action as a set of actions rather than a single action 
(Shephard, 2015), this study contended that action was ranged from opportunity exploitation 
to entrepreneurial inaction (i.e. deliberate decisions not to pursue a perceived opportunity; 
Wood et al., 2017). This finding broadly supports the notion that limiting entrepreneurship 
scholars’ focus and frameworks to immediate opportunity exploitation as a final stage of 
entrepreneurial processes is restrictive and not consistent with the diversity of human 
behaviour in nearly all spheres of human activity (Lerner et al., 2018), including 
entrepreneurship (Shephard, 2015). Therefore, we cannot be sure if immediate opportunity 
exploitation is an appropriate and effective decision in all contexts or strictly under 
uncertainty because uncertainty may be negatively related to entrepreneurial action, 
particularly opportunity exploitation (McKelvie et al., 2011) and thus, may positively charge 
inaction decisions (Wood et al., 2017). Further findings regarding the influence of 
uncertainty on entrepreneurial action will be discussed in the next section.  
The analysis explained that opportunity exploitation was required to realise the 
economic value of an opportunity, and this process involved the actual opportunity pursuit 
in the form of action such as the assembly of resources required to develop a new product 
or service offering (Autio et al, 2013; Webb et al., 2009).  This study also has identified the 
internal factors, governance institutions and external factors that positively affected 
opportunity exploitation within an uncertain environment (see Table 5-14), which were 
broadly in line with prior studies (c.f. Choi & Shepherd, 2004; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; 
Wood & Pearson, 2009; Webb et al., 2009). Based on my understanding of the two case 
study firms, I believe that opportunity exploitation was possible even in the Palestinian 
extreme uncertain context, but the two firms invested heavily in their data collection and 
analysis capabilities, developed their managerial capacity, gained greater support from 
stakeholders and established strong ties with local community and business partners. The 
next section will discuss the findings that are related to uncertainty and its impact on 





6.4 Uncertainty and Entrepreneurial Processes and Action 
This section is an extension of the fourth research question referred to in 6.3 above, 
focusing on the discussion of the findings related to the influence of uncertainty on 
entrepreneurial processes and action. 
The state, effect and response uncertainty perceived by the two case firms was clearly 
differentiated (Ashill & Jobber, 2010) and this supports calls for a more nuanced 
understanding of the role of uncertainty in entrepreneurship (Jiang & Tornikoski, 2019; 
Packard et al., 2017; Townsend, et al., 2018). The analysis demonstrated the impact of a 
turbulent Palestinian institutional environment, which involved universally high state 
uncertainty, which interacted with effect and response uncertainties. These three types of 
uncertainty together influenced opportunity identification and exploitation (Bylund & 
McCaffrey, 2017; McKelvie et al., 2011). I think that differentiating among these three types 
of ‘perceived environmental uncertainty’ may help to clarify some of the inconsistent results 
reported in past research (Milliken,1987) whereby each type of uncertainty has implications 
for sense making, and ultimate behaviour. However, this study further suggested that the 
three types of uncertainty may be conceptually distinct although empirically related (Ashill 
& Jobber, 2010). 
The findings also provided evidence of the importance of types and levels of 
uncertainty in motivating and obstructing opportunity identification and exploitation 
(McKelvie et al., 2011). Recognising the existence of several different types of perceived 
environmental uncertainty and understanding their interaction may be useful in clarifying 
the nature of the expected relationship between environmental volatility and perceptions of 
‘environmental uncertainty’. The investigation of the indigenous and MNE operators here 
reported that all types of uncertainty may have a dual impact on a decision. The findings 
challenge the general perspective in the extant literature, which generally assumes that 
higher levels of uncertainty obstruct opportunity identification and exploitation (Bylund & 
McCaffrey, 2017; Kirzner, 1979; Luthans & Ibraveva, 2006; Mahnke et al., 2007; Manolova 
et al., 2008). Specifically, this binary impact on opportunity identification and exploitation 
was mainly attributed to state uncertainty, but also may be dependent on the different 
perceptions of the other two types of uncertainty (effect and response). Based on these 
findings, I can understand that the fact that environmental changes (state uncertainty) were 




predictability of an event or change may increase the salience of the effect and response 
types of uncertainty (Milliken, 1987). Based on the analysis above, this study therefore 
tentatively proposes the following:  
Proposition 1: Extreme state uncertainty may be negatively or positively associated 
with opportunity identification and exploitation based on the perceived levels of effect and 
response uncertainty. 
The study further suggested that the boundaries between external and individual 
environments are not distinct; therefore, managers and their environments interact 
reciprocally (Bechky, 2011; Gruber et al., 2015; Smallbone & Welter, 2001). The findings 
provided evidence of relationship between the ‘objective characteristics’ of the environment 
and ‘perceptions of uncertainty’. Perceptions vary as a function of contextual factors and 
individual attributes (Milliken, 1987). I infer that how managers perceived their business 
and external environments, and their emotions and attributes, were at the core of attitude 
formation and behaviour in the identification and exploitation processes. 
Building on this overall understanding, this study further proposed that the 
psychology and attributes of the entrepreneurs, especially emotions, may play a crucial role 
in determining entrepreneurial action in extremely uncertain environments. This suggestion 
was somewhat surprising, this section therefore discusses the findings pertaining to the 
influence of emotions on entrepreneurial action. 
The findings identified some key individual attributes and emotions that affected 
opportunity identification and exploitation, e.g. a need for achievement, self-efficacy and a 
willingness to bear uncertainty. These results are in line with those of Cardon et al. (2009), 
Frese and Gienlnik (2014) and Rai (2008) that these attributes are typically associated with 
positive entrepreneurial outcomes in turbulent environments and differentiate entrepreneurs 
from their peers. Indeed, these personal qualities are said to enhance an entrepreneur’s 
willingness to take initiatives, tolerate uncertainty, be persistent in the face of challenge, and 
act with daring and energy (Foo, 2011; Holland & Shepherd, 2013; Miller, 2015; Shepherd 
et al., 2020). 
The results also revealed that, apart from the potentially detrimental influence of 
excessive uncertainty on the stamina of managers in the form of exhaustion (Murnieks et al., 
2020), uncertainty developed their resilience and perseverance, which boosted their ability 




opportunities (Shepherd et al., 2020). In addition, I believe that perseverance may need to 
go beyond resilience in the sense of stamina and commitment to a strategy or project, or 
beyond going ‘on with life’ (Bullough et al., 2014, p. 474).  
Besides individual traits, this study also emphasised the role of emotions as an 
influence on opportunity exploitation (Cardon et al., 2012; Kollmann et al., 2017). Previous 
findings have identified the role of negative emotions, e.g. fear of failure, stress and anger, 
in motivating or deterring entrepreneurial action, but the findings here emphasised their 
ambiguous impact (Cacciotti et al., 2016, 2020; So et al., 2015). Individuals experiencing 
fear perceived high outcome uncertainty and limited personal control over outcomes, so 
fearful individuals may make relatively pessimistic risk assessments (Ivanova et al., 2018; 
Kollmann et al., 2017; Li, 2011; Welpe et al., 2012). In contrast, anger was associated with 
high certainty and individual control, and therefore angry individuals may make relatively 
optimistic risk assessments (Foo, 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Welpe et al., 2012). As 
noted in this study, mixed and conflicting negative emotions may be associated with 
different cognitive appraisals, so it may not matter whether conflicting reactions are positive 
or negative. Thus, for some entrepreneurs, emotions may have a positive impact, for others 
negative (Podoynitsyna et al., 2012; So et al., 2015). Based on these results, I suggest that 
not only may specific emotions (e.g. anger and fear) be delineated, but their intensity (e.g. 
low, moderate, high) may also be considered (Coget et al., 2011). 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter discussed the findings of the current study in relation to the existing 
literature and addressed research questions. The findings show that the firms operated in an 
obstructive, challenging and extremely uncertain business environment, but that even the 
most extreme institutional barriers and voids may generate significant benefits as well as 
disbenefits. While the analysis inevitably found evidence of negative reactions, the two firms 
also employ three strategic responses to deal with barriers and voids: acceptance, adaptation 
and influence (Figure 6-1).  
This study identified the antecedents of entrepreneurial processes and action (Figure 
6-2) and reported that the entrepreneurial processes consisted of three widely-recognised 
processes: opportunity identification, development and evaluation. Entrepreneurial action 




This study confirms that the three types of uncertainty (state, effect and response) - 
each individually and collectively -  are a two-sided coin (i.e. a source of positive and 
negative impact) for opportunity identification and exploitation. The role of individual 
attributes and emotions (particularly negative emotions) in shaping the influence of 
uncertainty is underlined. The next chapter will summarise the major findings and discuss 

















Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises major findings based upon the four primary research 
questions. It also discusses the study’s theoretical and practical implications, highlights 
limitations and suggests directions for a future research agenda. 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
The study concludes that the Palestinian mobile phone operators constantly faced 
different institutional challenges and extreme uncertainty. In this extremely negative 
environment chosen to bias the study in favour of negative responses, it was no surprise to 
find evidence of the negative impact of institutional barriers and voids, but they also 
generated positive impacts. The indigenous firm and MNE interpreted such barriers and 
voids in terms of benefits and disbenefits and employed three types of strategic response to 
them: acceptance, adaptation and influence.  
In the uncertain Palestinian market, prior knowledge of market may provide 
managers with the capacity to identify, develop and exploit opportunities, but an extensive 
dependence on prior knowledge may have negative impacts. Moreover, both strong and 
weak ties were sources of important sources of information and resources to facilitate 
entrepreneurial processes and actions in such a turbulent environment. Entrepreneurial 
alertness may also be complemented by systematic search in promoting opportunity 
identification. In an extremely uncertain Palestinian environment, the two firms used all 
opportunity identification options (recognition, discovery and creation) and construct 
sequences for different types of actions, beyond immediate opportunity exploitation.  
The study suggests that the three types of uncertainty (state, effect and response) - 
each individually and collectively - can indeed be a source of both positive and negative 
impacts for entrepreneurial processes and action. The aggregate level of uncertainty may 
motivate entrepreneurial processes and action, particularly opportunity exploitation, to a 
maximum level, beyond which any further increase in uncertainty may be associated with 




emotions and personal attributes of the entrepreneurs/managers may exert on entrepreneurial 
action in this hostile business environment. 
7.3 Implications for Theory  
This study claims to make a theoretical contribution to both entrepreneurship and 
IBV by investigating whether the indigenous and MNE operators in the Palestinian mobile 
phone sector perceived institutional barriers and voids in extremely uncertain environments 
as disincentives and/or opportunities. This study treated institutional barriers and voids and 
uncertainty separately, but evidence from the two-case studies shows that they were related, 
and reported a similarly ambiguous relation.  
Two claimed contributions of this study to the IBV about the ‘co-evolutionary’ 
relationship between institutions and actors (i.e. firms) are outlined below: 
(a) The findings may contribute to the IBV and institutional void literatures by 
confirming an ambiguous effect - as benefits and disbenefits - of the most 
extreme institutional barriers and voids on the indigenous and MNE operators. 
This finding partly contradicts the main argument of the literature, which 
suggests that institutional barriers and voids pose only deleterious effects and 
severe obstacles for firms. It also suggests a need to fundamentally re-evaluate 
the assumption that institutional challenges have a primarily negative impact 
(Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Meyer et al., 2009; Oliveria et al., 2018). The indigenous 
firm and the MNE responded purposefully and dynamically to challenges, and 
these findings suggest viewing institutional challenges not only as constraints, 
but also as ‘opportunity spaces’ for agency (Doh et al., 2017; Mair & Marti, 2009; 
McKague et al., 2015; Moulick et al., 2019; Sydow et al., 2020). The positive 
strategic responses to institutional barriers and voids in this most hostile 
environment may also imply the capacity of many firms to respond positively to 
less uncertain environments elsewhere. 
(a) This study claims to contribute to the IBV literature through identifying three 
strategic responses which an indigenous firm and an MNE deployed to navigate 
and shape their institutional environment: acceptance, adaptation, and influence. 
Each of these responses corresponded to some extent with earlier 




‘acquiescence’ concept in Oliver (1991) and corresponds with ‘acceptance’ in 
Khana & Palepu (2010). ‘Adaptation’ also broadly coincides with that concept 
in Gao et al. (2017, p. 29-30) whereby ‘... firms can adapt to changing 
environments across time by changing, organising, and recombining resources, 
capabilities, and routines’. ‘Influence’ broadly (but not exactly) corresponds with 
‘manipulation’ in Oliver (1991). Although this study claims no major original 
contribution in terms of concepts, the blend of these three concepts in a logical 
sequence of firms’ efforts in coping and/or dealing with prevailing institutional 
conditions is novel in that they cover the stages of strategic response observed. 
The findings also tentatively suggest that firms can employ ambidextrous 
combinations of strategic responses, not only to accept, but also to influence, 
these barriers and voids. 
This thesis has developed a framework that may serve as a springboard for advancing 
our understanding of the complexity related to, and antecedents of, entrepreneurial processes 
and action within uncertain business environment, as explained below: 
(b) This research proposes a contingency and dynamic view to predict and explain 
how uncertainty affects entrepreneurial processes and action, depending on 
individual differences (individual attributes, prior knowledge), social networks, 
institutional environment and types of opportunity. Individual attributes of 
entrepreneurs (Shane & Nicolaou, 2015; Baron 2006, 2008) and their prior 
knowledge (Baron and Ensley, 2006; Haynie et al., 2009) may influence 
opportunity-related cognitions and the success of entrepreneurial processes and 
action. Nonetheless, higher levels of prior knowledge do not automatically 
necessitate an engagement in entrepreneurial processes and action within the 
Palestinian uncertain business environment, as higher levels of uncertainty may 
devalue prior knowledge. A higher dependency on prior knowledge may also 
generate a familiarity bias and bad experience effects. This study is consistent 
with the notion of Ardichvili et al. (2003) and Smith et al. (2009) that the 
characteristics of opportunities (tacitness and codification) themselves may 
influence the willingness of entrepreneurs to identify and exploit them. This 
research takes a step toward a greater understanding of how the variance in the 




prior knowledge and experience (i.e. discovery and search in the opportunity 
identification processes). 
(c) This study bridges two contrasting views regarding the importance of weak ties 
(Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Ardichvili et al., 2003) and strong ties (Elfring & 
Hulsink, 2003; Hmieleski et al., 2015) in facilitating entrepreneurial processes 
and action. The findings provide evidence that is partially consistent with the 
prevailing view (i.e. the importance of weak ties), revealing the importance of 
mixing weak and strong ties in the Palestinian uncertain business environment 
(Leyden & Link, 2015). Weak ties may play a role in spanning structural holes, 
connecting different knowledge networks and introducing firms to new types of 
market knowledge, which can lead to opportunity identification. Strong ties may 
also play a crucial role in disseminating information, entering a network and 
passing on information to others who may be better equipped to use it, which 
may facilitate entrepreneurial processes and action. 
(d) The study provides a means of reconciling the theoretical perspectives of 
systematic search (Fiet et al. 2005; Fiet, 2007; Zahra et al., 2009) and 
serendipity/entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1973, 1979) that may otherwise 
be viewed as competing. Some entrepreneurship scholars (e.g. Gaglio & Katz, 
2001; Kirzner, 1973, 1979) rely upon a narrow perspective of entrepreneurial 
alertness and ignore systematic search as an influential factor on entrepreneurial 
processes and action. However, this thesis offers a greater understanding of the 
relationship between alertness and search through confirming that systematic 
search may enhance/supplement entrepreneurial alertness in facilitating 
entrepreneurial processes and action within the Palestinian uncertain context.  
At a detailed level, this study may provide new or clearer interpretations of 
entrepreneurial processes and action in an extremely uncertain environment. Four claimed 
contributions of this research are explained below: 
(a) This study reveals that initial perceptions of opportunities were often 
rudimentary, and that most opportunities were developed - both before and after 
- opportunity exploitation. The findings suggest that opportunity (particularly 
created opportunity) needs an iterative and interactive development process 




stage in terms of ‘opportunity development’ and considering it as an 
interdependent process that takes place in all entrepreneurial processes. This 
conception tolerates the views of both opportunity discovery and creation and 
posits that entrepreneurs may act before they have a comprehensive perception 
of an opportunity (Ardichvili et al., 2003). These results challenge a constrained 
perspective of opportunity identification (e.g. Kirzner, 1973) that considers 
opportunity development to be part of it. They also advance existing 
understandings of the opportunity development process by suggesting an 
appropriate conception, especially in conditions of high uncertainty. This 
conceptualisation takes into account behavioural aspects and processes under the 
influence of prior knowledge, resources and context, and provides an improved 
basis for entrepreneurial learning and adaptation (c.f. Sanz-Velasco, 2006).  
(b) This study is consistent with Shepherd (2015) and Wiklund et al. (2018) in 
conceptualising entrepreneurial action as a number of activities (may be 
interrelated or sequential) rather than a one-off event or act. It suggests that 
entrepreneurial action can be identified as an action path such as mode-of-
exploitation or activity pattern, referring to such things as the intensity and 
sequence of different types of actions. This study is consistent with the view of 
Choi and Shepherd (2004) that opportunity exploitation is a necessary step in the 
entrepreneurial processes to realise economic values, but it also suggests that 
firms may take reasoned actions, beyond opportunity exploitation. Taking 
different actions after opportunity evaluation in the Palestinian extremely 
uncertain environment implies the difficulty and complexity of exploiting 
opportunities, but also the possibility of the capacity of many firms to take 
entrepreneurial action and exploit opportunities in less uncertain environments 
elsewhere.  
(c) This study bridges two contradictory views regarding whether uncertainty 
negatively impedes or positively stimulates entrepreneurial processes and action. 
The findings provide evidence to challenge a ‘barrier’ view of uncertainty that is 
‘detrimental to entrepreneurial action’ in entrepreneurship studies (McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006: p.135; also c.f. Shepherd et al., 2015; Kuechle et al., 2016) by 
confirming its ambiguous impact (incentive and/or disincentive). The study 




depending on a subjectivist and perceptual view of uncertainty (Duncan, 1972; 
Milliken, 1987; Rindova & Courtney, 2020), and on different conditions of 
uncertainty. Even extremely high levels of uncertainty (as in Palestine) do not 
automatically necessitate negative responses and may be overcome, and a 
‘barrier’ view of uncertainty is too simplistic.  
(d) This thesis also claims to add value to existing empirical research in the field of 
entrepreneurship by emphasising the subjective effects of emotions, together 
with the attributes of entrepreneurs, on entrepreneurial processes and action. 
Enriching inconsistent findings in the literature on the role of negative emotions, 
e.g. fear of failure, stress and anger, in motivating or deterring entrepreneurial 
action, the results show their positive and negative impacts on opportunity 
exploitation. Rather than studying participants experiencing one emotion (as in 
Foo, 2011), this study investigated how mixed and conflicting emotions may 
influence entrepreneurial processes and action. Therefore, this study teases out 
the main and interactive impacts of cognition and emotions on entrepreneurial 
processes and action in the Palestinian highly uncertain business environment. 
This explains that an entrepreneur who identifies a business opportunity can 
experience a blend of different emotions at any one time. However, the 
predominance and strength/intensity of one emotion over another may drive 
action, so it is important to distinguish which types of emotion are dominant and 
which are in conflict (Podoynitsyna et al., 2012). 
7.4 Implications for Practitioners 
The study claims to convey three messages - that may be applied elsewhere - for 
business practitioners operating in uncertain institutional environments. These practical 
implications are discussed as follows:  
(a) The study shows that firms may need to effectively apply different strategic 
responses to address the diverse institutional barriers and voids simultaneously. 
Situations change frequently in uncertain business environments; therefore, 
managers may need to key their firms agile and flexible. They may also need to 
develop deep understanding of their local environments. For this purpose, they 




knowledge and to develop an extensive information network that can help keep 
up with market changes to inform the formulation of strategic responses. In 
particular, managers of MNEs may find it useful to hire local staff to get local 
knowledge. They may also develop strategically interconnected mechanisms that 
facilitate the continual orchestration of local and international knowledge 
interaction. In uncertain circumstances, firms may need to establish broad 
business collaborations and intensive network building with a variety of local 
organisations and individuals and be proactive to survive and grow in their 
business environments. In order to cope with uncertainty, managers may be 
cautious against over-dependence on their prior knowledge and experience that 
may lead to familiarity bias in decision-making processes. 
(b) Managers may need to be aware of different informational settings that may find 
themselves in when engaging with entrepreneurial processes and action, which 
directly influence their perceptions in judging the situation. They may therefore 
consider all options of opportunity identification (recognition, discovery and 
creation) and different cognitive models for entrepreneurial action (c.f. Arikan et 
al., 2020; Read et al., 2011; Alvarez & Barney, 2007). This differentiation and 
understanding may help in planning and selecting/designing appropriate strategic 
actions to deal with risk and/or uncertainty at each step of entrepreneurial 
processes and action. Moreover, managers may need to learn quickly how they 
may deal with uncertainty since firms are developed and/or operated in the face 
of great uncertainty even in a well-developed environment. For example, the 
COVID-19 pandemic created great uncertainty even for incumbent firms in 
developed economies with relatively well-established institutions. Some firms 
also exploited new opportunities (Alvarez & Porac, 2020). 
(c) Managers may need to be aware of the psychological changes in themselves and 
in their subordinates in the face of uncertainty. This may require them to consider 
how their individual cognitive evaluations and emotions (positive and negative) 
may systematically influence their own decision-making, and their leadership 
and management of subordinates in such situations. Managers may need to use 
some tactics to reduce the cognitive load of information processing in decision-
making and avoid/delay the reaching of the turning point of a positive to a 




projects, deeply understand the team’s capabilities and limitations to avoid 
pushing them from the ‘challenging’ to the ‘panic’ zone, establish a constructive 
feedback channel between managers and their subordinates, build trust and 
resilience within the team, and simplify strategies. Firms also may supplement 
their business planning and entrepreneurship trainings with material that 
addresses self-regulation, emotion and cognition awareness. 
7.5 Limitations and Future Research 
Though this research may claim several important contributions, these contributions 
must be considered in the context of their potential limitations. The caution in making 
generalisations to other countries and sectors is clearly relevant in the context of two case 
studies from Palestine. The study uses qualitative methods and two cases that could be 
replicated with a larger sample, different methods (e.g. quantitative), different sectors, 
different national contexts, and across similar industries in different countries, which may 
enhance our understanding of whether firms facing institutional challenges and high 
uncertainty from different settings perceive and respond to them differently or follow the 
same pattern. 
A number of key areas, beyond the scope of the present work, remain to be examined 
as explained below: 
(a) There is a need for more research and theoretical investigation into how 
institutional barriers and voids can be a source of advantage (Doh et al., 2017; 
Mckague et al., 2015). This suggests that future research may address new 
research questions, e.g. under what circumstances may institutional barriers and 
voids create competitive advantages; how can firms exploit these advantages; 
and what resources and capabilities are needed to exploit them?  
(b) This study is consistent with the suggestion of Alvarez et al. (2017), Arikan et al. 
(2020), Berglund et al. (2020) and Shepherd (2015) to consider a more interactive 
perspective of entrepreneurial behaviour as a result of the interplay between 
objective opportunity characteristics, subjective evaluations of these objectives 
by entrepreneurs, and their emotional interference. Accordingly, this research 
provides a foundation for future research to identify the interaction of opportunity 




(c) This study provides evidence to provisionally contest an over-simplistic linear 
view in assessing the influence of uncertainty on entrepreneurial action, 
particularly opportunity exploitation (i.e. the higher amount of uncertainty the 
stronger the negative effect). Uncertainty is nuanced, and the intensity of 
uncertainty may play an influential role in generating and deterring 
entrepreneurial action, especially opportunity exploitation (Fisher et al., 2020; 
McKelvie et al., 2011). This study therefore corresponds with the recent calls for 
a more nuanced view of uncertainty (Ramogluo & Tsang, 2016; Townsend et al., 
2018) or a better notion of uncertainty in entrepreneurship theory (Packard et al., 
2017). This current study acknowledges its limitation in producing a graphical 
representation of the relation between aggregate level of uncertainty and 
entrepreneurial action (particularly opportunity exploitation), it therefore 
suggests that further longitudinal and quantitative empirical research are required 
to investigate the uncertainty overload phenomenon and develop a model to find 
the pattern, e.g. whether it has an inverted-U or S- (sigmoid) shape. Replicating 
this study may be fruitful, hopefully amplifying this phenomenon and elaborating 
on the ability of firms to exploit any positive impact of uncertainty. 
(d) This study concurs with Baron et al. (2012), Foo et al. (2009) and Shepherd 
(2015) that future research should further examine the effects of emotions in 
entrepreneurship, especially negative emotions, and how they affect perceptions 
of uncertainty. It also suggests that future entrepreneurship research may 
necessarily need to differentiate emotions in terms of their valence, their 
motivational tone and their underlying cognitive evaluations since this distinction 
has so far not been rigorously considered in entrepreneurship research. This 
distinction may help future research to investigate the direct and indirect 









Appendix (A): An Interview Guide 
1. The researcher sent an acknowledgement email to the interviewees, thanking them for their 
cooperation and for agreeing to be part of the research and explaining what he expects from them and 
informed them of his data collection plan and protocol, and any further steps. 
2. Two days before the Skype interview, the researcher sent a reminder email to the interviewees based 
on their scheduled appointment. This email enclosed the Plain Language Statement (i.e. a brief 
description of the research and how the researcher will use their responses to ensure confidentiality) 
and the Consent Form (i.e. their acceptance to be a part of this study).  
3. The interview questions were sent to the interviewee beforehand the interview when s/he asked for 
this.  
4. After the interviewees’ consent, all the interviews were recorded via voice digital recorders (2 voice 
recorders), and these audio recordings were only accessed by the researcher and used to transcribe the 
interviews. 
5. At the beginning of the interview, the researcher introduced himself and presented a simple and 
precise briefing about the research topic. He tried to inject some elements of humour in the 
conversation to reduce any tension, asked the interviewee to send him the consent form if they had 
not done so, and informed them about what he expected from them during the interview. Then, the 
researcher asked them to briefly tell him about themselves (their education, experience in the sector, 
and experience in the company) to build better rapport (i.e. create a climate of trust and 
understanding). 
6. During the interview, the researcher asked (15) main broad, open-ended questions to encourage the 
interviewees to express their experiences and opinions. He did not stick to the interview schedule or 
the order of the questions and did not interrupt. If an interesting point was made, the researcher took 
a note and followed it up at an appropriate point. Moreover, he tried to prompt the interviewee by 
indicating that he wanted to hear more, the researcher was perfectly happy for them to take their time 
and consider what they were saying. Sometimes he asked them to be more precise and to define the 
words or terms they are using. 
7. The researcher asked the interviewees all the questions and the majority of them answered these 
questions, but some of the interviewees did not answer some questions, as these questions did not 
relate either to their experience or positions. 
8. At the end of the interview, the researcher asked about anything he felt had been left out. He also 
asked the interviewees if there was anything else, they would like to say. The researcher thanked them 
for their time and efforts and told them that he would send them the interview’s transcripts to make 
any comments or add further information. 
9. The researcher emailed the interviewees both the Arabic and English transcripts of interviews. Most 
of the participants were generally happy with the drafts but wanted minor amendments. The researcher 




Appendix (B): An Interview Questions 
Profile of informant 
 Position 
 Education  
 Work experience in the industry 
 Work experience in the company 
 
Main Questions 
1- What are the main institutional challenges and obstacles that your company faces? 
 Do you face the same institutional barriers in the WB and GS? How could this affect your company 
operations? 
2- Can you prioritise these institutional barriers and voids according to the extent of their impact 
on your company’s operations?  
 The three most important institutional obstacles to the business that have led to the abandonment of 
projects or have led to innovative actions to get around the barriers. 
3- How do these three institutional challenges affect your company’s operations? Give some 
examples.  
4- From your point of view, do you consider these challenges and obstacles as incentives or 
disincentives to work in this uncertain business environment? Why? 
 Can you give me pairs of projects, one that was strangled by institutional barriers, the other stimulated 
by them? 
 Did any project or product take advantage of barriers? If yes, can you describe this project/product? 
5- Do firm resources play an essential role in the entrepreneurial processes, and could they 
surmount institutional barriers? If yes, how? Give some examples! 
6- Does culture affect your perception of opportunity identification, development, and 
exploitation, and access to resources? 
7- Do informal institutions substitute or complement changes in the formal institutional 
environment? How?  
8- How does your company deal with institutional barriers? Can you explain some strategies and 
responses used by your firm to deal with institutional contradictions? 
9- How do your company deal with institutional voids? Can you explain some actionable 
responses? 
 Do you think that institutional barriers and voids could generate/create any monopolistic 
advantages/opportunities for your firm? 
10- What are the necessary factors influencing the success of core entrepreneurial processes and 
action?  
11- Can you explain the core entrepreneurial processes in your company? In detail, explain each of 
the following processes:  
 Opportunity identification 
- How does your company identify business opportunities?  
A- Recognition:  
- Do you think that entrepreneurs are different or similar in the opportunity recognition process? 
Why?  





- How does opportunity discovery start?  
- Are entrepreneurs who discover opportunities significantly different from others in their abilities? 
If yes, what are these capabilities?     
- Do you think that opportunity is a result of accidental discovery and entrepreneurial alertness or 
a systematic search or are they enacted and constructed in the present? 
- How does your company deal with risk in opportunity discovery? 
C- Creation: 
- How does opportunity creation start?  
- Do you have a clear idea or vision before starting the opportunity creation process? If yes, how 
do you have it? If no, why?  
- How does your company deal with uncertainty in the opportunity creation process? 
 Opportunity Development 
- How does opportunity development start? When?  
- Is opportunity development affected by any factors? If yes, what are these factors? 
 Opportunity Evaluation 
- What are the main indicators used by your firm in opportunity evaluation decision-making 
process? 
- Does your company use the same evaluation procedures for all types of opportunities? Why? 
What are these procedures? 
- In your company, what are the components of the opportunity assessment plan? 
12- How does the type of opportunity affect the entrepreneurial processes in your company? 
13- How does the turbulent environment (with institutional barriers and voids) affect the 
entrepreneurial processes in your company? 
 Do you categorise/classify uncertain contexts? If yes, what are these categories? 
 How do you evaluate uncertain contexts? How do you deal/mitigate/reduce uncertainty?  
 Do you think that uncertain context could inhibit/raise/create entrepreneurial opportunities? If 
yes, how?  
 How do you deal with/respond to uncertainty? Do you accept uncertain context? If yes, to which 
level? And how does this work? 
14- How does the turbulent environment (with institutional barriers and voids) affect 
entrepreneurial action in your company?  
 What choices does your company make after evaluation?  
 How does your company exploit the opportunities? Explain the process. Give some examples.  
 Does uncertainty inhibit or motivate your company to exploit the opportunity? 
 What are the major factors that could affect opportunity exploitation?  
 Does type of uncertainty play a role in inhibiting or motivating opportunity exploitation? Explain 
and give examples. 
 Do negative emotions contribute to either ability or inability to make an entrepreneurial action? 
If yes, explain how? 
15- How do you describe your company regarding the following: organisational form, leadership, 
decision making process, human resource practices, strategy, finance, marketing, and 







Appendix (C): An Example of One of the Interview Scripts 
 
Interviewer: What are the main institutional challenges and obstacles that your company faces? 
Interviewee: 
 The presence of unauthorized, illegal, and widespread commercial activities by Israeli mobile operators 
in the Palestinian market, especially in the WB. The Israeli market is saturated and there is a very 
intensive price war among 8 Israeli mobile operators, therefore, they are attracting Palestinian 
customers as they provide 3G and 4G services, which are not granted to the Palestinian mobile 
operators. (500,000 SIM cards for the Israeli operators, around 17% of the Palestinian market).  
 The lack of spectrum and frequencies granted to the Palestinian operators. The Israeli government, 
rather than the PNA, controls frequencies. Therefore, our company was granted 5 MHz dedicated and 
5 MHz shared with the Israeli operators. However, the smallest Israeli operator is granted at least 20 
MHz dedicated.  
 The PNA does not have control over area (C), so traffickers are still able to smuggle the Israeli 
operators’ SIM cards to the Palestinian market. Moreover, the PNA does not have any enforcement 
power to prevent illegal Israeli mobile operators to work in the Palestinian territories and the Israeli 
government recently subsidised the Israeli operators by 40 million NIS, i.e. $ 12 million, to cover the 
Israeli settlements and the majority of the WB for military purposes. 
 The technology gap between the Israeli and Palestinian operators. The Israeli operators have been 
granted 3G frequencies (2004) and 4G (2014) and the Israeli government proposed, and tried to impose. 
that the Palestinian operators buy 3G services from the Israeli operators and operate their 3G services 
through roaming over the Israeli networks in order to increase the dependency of the Palestinian 
operators on the Israeli operators; however, the Palestinian operators have been granted only 3G 
frequencies after 10 years of negotiation (2018) and only in the WB not in the GS. The 2G and 3G 
frequencies granted are insufficient to provide good quality services to our customers (3 million 
customers in WB and GS). 
 The company operates two different networks in the same market, 3G network in WB and 2G Network 
in GS.  
 Israel’s control of ports and crossings, and a very lengthy and inefficient process for importing 
telecommunications equipment. All sites, towers, transmissions, spare parts, SIM cards, scratch cards 
and handsets should go through extra and complicated security checks which could be last for a few 
months, maybe years, or sometimes the Israeli government does not approve at all. For example, the 
Israeli government does not approve any more transmissions after they approved two transmissions in 
1998, one for WB and one for GS. Also, they seized an operating system in the airport and held it until 
it was not usable and we paid extra costs for Ericsson to update this system. 
 The company operates a 2G network in GS which is one of few countries that operate 2G networks, 
therefore, we have to pay high fees for a special support agreement from Ericsson and they told us that 
they will not be able to support our network after 2020.  
 The fragmentation of Palestinian cities and towns. There is a lack of a direct connection between 
Palestinian territories and we cannot link our infrastructure in WB and GS. There are strong Israeli 
restrictions in releasing permits to move equipment within Area C, build transmissions in the WB and 
GS, allow infrastructure deployment, and allow the installation of microwave links. 
 Power cuts for around 20 hours per day in GS.  
 
Interviewer: Do you face the same institutional barriers in the WB and GS? How could this affect your 
company operations? 
Interviewee:  
 No, we are facing a more complicated and uncertain institutional environment in GS. There are more 
restrictions on importing telecommunication equipment and spare parts. For example, the Israeli 
Interview ID  J01 
Interview Date and Time  02/09/2018 at 10:00 & 03/09/2018 at 17:00 
Company  XXXXXX 
Interviewee Name XXXXXX 
Position Marketing Director 
Education BSc in Computer Engineering 
Work experience in the industry 20 years 




government does not allow us to operate 3G services in GS and import the fleet management service’s 
equipment and spare parts. In addition, the power cuts last for around 20 hours per day.  
 We consider GS as a completely different market as it has many different externalities (unstable 
political situation, a very bad economy and unemployment, siege etc.).   
Interviewer: Can you prioritise these institutional barriers and voids according to the extent of their impact 
on your company’s operations? 
Interviewee:   
 Israel prevents the entry of transmissions: We hired a data centre for transmissions in London and 
Amman, and our engineers designed a system to link these transmissions and the networks in WB and 
GS (i.e. body). This solution was an innovative idea and our vendor (i.e. Ericsson) was afraid and did 
not expect that system to work, but we operate our networks and operations based on this system. 
 Power cuts in GS: We installed generators for around 550 sites (i.e. towers) in GS, and we recently 
installed a solar energy system. This new system reduces the operating costs and is environmentally 
friendly.  
 Israel imposes more restrictions on the entry of scratch cards: We converted our top-up system from 
scratch cards to 100% online top-up system.  
 The fragmentation of Palestinian cities and towns: we reached an agreement with some Israeli operators 
to provide our customers with a ‘National Roaming’ service.   
Interviewer: How do these three institutional challenges affect your company’s operations? Give some 
examples. 
Interviewee:   
 In 2005, Israel prevented the entry of SIM cards and we were not able to attract any new customers for 
around 2 years. (We stopped some commercial activities) 
 Very high operating and capital expenses for operating and maintaining our network in GS due to the 
extra investment in generators and solar energy system, and fuel costs.  
 We cannot expand our networks or attract more customers due to the limited frequencies granted.  
 Very intensive competition in the Palestinian market as we are competing with a legal Palestinian 
operator and 8 illegal Israeli operators. 
 In the 2014 war on GS, Israel demolished around 20 of  our company’s sites that were placed on some 
targeted buildings. These were unexpected extra costs.  
Interviewer: From your point of view, do you consider these challenges and obstacles as incentives or 
disincentives to work in this uncertain business environment? Why? 
Interviewee:   
 There is no alternative to working in this complicated and challenging business environment. Therefore, 
these obstacles can be considered incentives rather than barriers.  
 Although these challenges increase expenses, our company has been able to compete and has already 
competed with Israeli companies that existed primarily in the Palestinian market before our launch. 
 The company tries to find a solution for each obstacle, especially those imposed by the Israeli 
government.  
 
Interviewer: Can you give me pairs of projects, one that was strangled by institutional barriers, the other 
stimulated by them? 
Interviewee:   
 Transmissions are placed in London and Amman: When our customer base reached 100, 000 customers, 
Israel tried to destroy our company through preventing the entry of new transmissions to WB and GS. 
Now, our customer base is 3 million customers. 
 3G services: The Israeli government tried to ensure that the Palestinian operators buy 3G services from 
the Israeli operators and operate their 3G services through roaming over the Israeli networks, but after 
around 10 years of negotiation, we provide 3G services in WB and we generate very good revenues 
from these services.  
 For example, the 3G project was strangled for 10 years, and expanding their network has been 
strangled due to the limited frequencies. 
 
Interviewer: Did any project or product take advantage of barriers? If yes, can you describe this 
project/product? 
Interviewee:   
 In 1996, our company was the only company that applied to the auction of the mobile phone sector 




more than 8 years without any legal competitors (i.e. Palestinian operators). Any new auction needs 
Israeli approval to grant PNA new frequencies for the new operators.  
 Traffic service: This service helps our customer to know the status of road and Israeli checkpoints 
between the fragmented Palestinian cities and towns.  
Interviewer: Do your firm’s resources play an essential role in the entrepreneurial processes, and could 
they surmount institutional barriers? If yes, how? Give some examples! 
Interviewee:   
 Yes, resources play a very important role especially human resources (i.e. staff) and access to the 
information about the market and our competitors to overcome some of these obstacles. 
 Our company managers play a very important role in allocating and recombining the available resources 
either to achieve more efficient and effective operations or to create new products.   
 Our strong financial position and physical resources help in overcoming some barriers, but this does 
not work in all cases.   
  Our company launched an employment programme for new graduates called ‘Go Professional’ in order 
to provide the company with new blood, bring and create new ideas, and keep up with any changes in 
the Palestinian community and the field of technology which raise some new opportunities to our 
company.  
Interviewer: Does culture affect your perception of opportunity identification, development, and 
exploitation, and access to resources? 
Interviewee:   
 Our culture motivates us to identify more opportunities and provide more services to our customers. 
For example, the Palestinian community is religious-oriented; this creates the need to provide some 
services like time of prayers, greetings in feasts (i.e. Eid) and pilgrimage, and the direction of Qibla. 
 The Palestinian community is educated and very appreciative, and they compare our services and 
products with the Israeli operators; this encourages us to provide high quality services and new services.  
Interviewer: Do informal institutions substitute or complement changes in the formal institutional 
environment? How?  
Interviewee:   
 The informal institutions could complement rather than substitute. We employ our social networks and 
partnerships to solve some problems and overcome some barriers.  
 For example, we collaborate with the Palestinian Society for Consumer Protection and the movements 
for boycott of Israeli products to prevent the spread and penetration of the Israeli operators’ SIM cards 
in the Palestinian territories. 
Interviewer: How does your company deal with institutional barriers? Can you explain some strategies and 
responses used by your firm to deal with institutional contradictions? 
Interviewee:   
 Our company is considered active in dealing with these institutional barriers. We try to find a solution, 
and alternative solutions, for all problems and barriers that we are facing.  
 In 1999, our company replaced the digital phone system, which was used by the Israeli operators, with 
GSM system, and we were able to completely end the existence of Israeli operators’ SIM cards in the 
Palestinian market. But, the Israeli operators started again to work in the Palestinian market and they 
attracted Palestinian customers due to the technology gap.  
 Through the Palestinian Ministry of Telecom and Information Technology (MTIT), we negotiated with 
the Israeli government for around 10 years to get 3G frequencies. 
 We placed our transmissions in London and Amman after the prevention of transmissions from entering 
the WB and GS.  
 We converted our top-up system from scratch cards to an online system.  
 We collaborate with the Palestinian MTIT, Palestinian Society for Consumer Protection and the 
movements for boycott of Israeli products to prevent the spread and penetration of the Israeli operators’ 
SIM cards in the Palestinian territories. 
 We stock large quantities of SIM cards.  
 We installed a solar energy system to overcome the power cuts problem.  
 We contract local suppliers, especially in GS, to overcome some difficulties in importing the handsets. 
 We sent many letters to the Palestinian Prime Minister, Minister of Telecom and Information 
Technology, and Minister of Finance about the illegal operations of Israeli operators, in order to make 
a pressure.  
 We collaborate with the local community to raise the awareness of the Palestinian customers about the 




 We lobbied, with many international organisational, for Israel to grant us 3G frequencies and now we 
are lobbying to get 4G frequencies.  
Interviewer: How does your company deal with institutional voids? Can you explain some actionable 
responses? 
Interviewee:   
 We built the Palestinian telecommunication infrastructure.  
 We invested in, and helped, many local contractors to develop their capabilities to help us with 
installation and maintenance of our sites and networks.  
 We encouraged many local media companies to start their operations and develop themselves through 
long-term contracts.  
 We depend on our social networks to solve many problems and overcome many obstacles and barriers.  
 We are trying to align our interests with the PNA’s interests especially regarding the presence and 
spread of Israeli operators’ SIM cards and operations.   
 
Interviewer: Do you think that institutional barriers and voids could generate/create any monopolistic 
advantages/opportunities for your firm? 
Interviewee: Of course, yes. The existence of institutional barriers and voids generates some opportunities 
and advantages, but it’s very costly to either exploit these voids or overcome these barriers.  
Interviewer: What are the necessary factors influencing the success of core entrepreneurial processes and 
action? 
Interviewee:   
 Personal traits: The majority of our directors and managers were employees at lower level management, 
and they got the experience in the mobile phone sector in our company. They got promoted because 
they are risk-takers, innovative, imaginative, open to new ideas, and leaders. 
 Prior knowledge: Our company was the first Palestinian mobile phone operator in the Palestinian 
market and there was no previous experience in this industry, therefore, we have been encouraging 
innovation and creativity in dealing with many issues and obstacles. Now, we are experts in managing 
the Palestinian market and mobile phone sector, which helps us in developing more efficient and 
effective operations, identifying more opportunities, and providing more new products and services.  
 Social Networks: They are very important, especially in the Palestinian context. They help us to identify 
the market’s needs and access to many resources. 
 Entrepreneurial alertness: This is a differentiator among employees.  Employees with a high level of 
alertness are more able to assess the exceptional situations, more sensitive to the market’s changes, 
have a wide vision, have a good ability to link events and variables, and are faster in identifying 
opportunities in the markets. We conduct regular market scanning, through an international consulting 
company, but some employees discover some unexpected opportunities.  
 Systematic search: We conduct some systematic searches in the market to encourage more consumption 
of data (i.e. internet). Also, we established an innovation centre that provides many facilities to our 
employees and many applications developers, to identify more opportunities in the market. For 
example, we developed ‘X Company Applications Store (JAS)’ and we urge applications developers to 
join us in this store to create more opportunities for using data. 
 External environment: A more stable environment could be easier for execution and exploitation of 
opportunity, but more dynamic and changing environment could be very good environment for 
innovation and raise some new opportunities, especially for entrepreneurial firms.  
 Type of opportunity: When the market’s demand and supply exist and it is clear how to link them, this 
is the easiest opportunity to be identified and exploited. However, the more complicated the situation, 
the more efforts and costs needed (i.e. more risk-taking).  
Interviewer: Can you explain the core entrepreneurial processes in your company? 
Interviewer: How does your company identify business opportunities?  
Interviewee: We identify business opportunities in different ways: (1) We conduct regular market scanning 
to monitor the market’s changes and identify any gaps in the market, mainly customers’ needs. (2) We 
receive feedbacks and suggestions from our customers and dealers. (3) We attend many international 
telecom conferences. (4) We explore the services and products of other mobile phone operators in the region 
(i.e. Middle East). (5) We transfer some technologies and services from other countries and markets to the 
Palestinian markets. (6) We design completely new products or services to the market and create the 
customers’ needs. 





Interviewee: Opportunity recognition is the easiest case of opportunity identification. However, 
entrepreneurs who recognise the opportunities are different from each other. They have the ability to monitor 
and notice any changes in the market. They are very sensitive to the market’s changes and dynamics and 
know how to benefit from them. 
 
Interviewer: How does your company deal with uncertainty and risk in opportunity recognition? 
Interviewee: 
 We make a plan, but we take into consideration a certain level of risk or uncertainty. 
 We make emergency plans. (Many alternative plans).  
 We designed special offers for GS due to the bad economic situation (adaptation and flexibility).  
 We are very flexible, try to minimise the impact of any changes in the market on our company, and 
ensure the continuity of the services we provide.  
 We make some assumptions, in order to deal with this context. 
 We don’t change our strategic plans completely.  
Interviewer: How does opportunity discovery start? 
Interviewee: 
 The company gets the idea from different sources: (1) conducting focus groups in order to identify the 
customers’ needs, (2) asking our current customers about their opinion if we would like to launch any 
new services or products, (3) conducting market surveys and outgoing calls, (4) analysing the current 
usage of our customers in order to identify their needs and design suitable offers for them (i.e. voice 
calls, internet, messages etc.), (5) exploring the services and products of other mobile phone operators 
in the region (i.e. Middle East) through reviewing Arab Advisor Group reports about their experience, 
especially new products and services, (6) participating in  many international telecom conferences, in 
order to learn from others’ experience, and meet new consultants and vendors.  
 This helps us to either identify the market’s needs and meet them with our services or introduce a new 
product or service and create the need in the market. This process could happen many times before 
reaching this stage.  
 
Interviewer: Are entrepreneurs who discover opportunities are significantly different from others in their 
abilities? If yes, what are these capabilities? 
Interviewee: 
 Yes, they have a more advanced understanding of the market than entrepreneurs who recognise 
opportunities.  
 They are critical thinkers, have an advanced level of linking causes and effects. 
 They have a high level of entrepreneurial alertness and good systematic search skills.  
 
Interviewer: Do you think that opportunity is a result of accidental discovery and entrepreneurial alertness 
or a systematic search or being enacted and constructed in the present?  
Interviewee: Opportunity could be a result of both accidental discovery and systematic search. 
 
Interviewer: How does your company deal with risk in opportunity discovery? 
Interviewee: 
 Exploratory research in order to collect more data and information.  
 Consulting either local consultants and experts or international consultants 
 Our experience plays a very important role in dealing with this complicated market.   
Interviewer: How does opportunity creation start? 
Interviewee: 
 It starts internally in the company and we conduct many trials to reach a certain level of maturity of the 
idea.  
 We share our thoughts with other employees or managers in order to develop the idea. Hence, many 
changes could take a place.  
 We conduct some experiments or design models for this product or service.  
 We use it internally then start externally with a limited number of customers. 
 For example, our company created the mobile phone industry in Palestine. We built the telecom 
infrastructure and we created commercial services and products everywhere in the Palestinian 
territories.  





Interviewer: Do you have a clear idea or vision before starting the opportunity creation process? If yes, 
how do you get it? If no, why? 
Interviewee: No, it is very difficult to have a clear vision from the beginning. The idea will be more clear 
and solid as the creation process progresses. 
 
Interviewer: How does your company deal with uncertainty in the opportunity creation process? 
Interviewee: 
 Creativity and flexibility  
 Collective work (i.e. team-work). We encourage any employee to share their ideas with others.  
 Collecting data and information about the opportunity and market as much as we can.  
 We share our road map with other segments and stakeholders to know their opinion.  
 We depend on our judgments and experience.  
 We define causes and effects in order to control the process. 
 We try to use the most appropriate way to deal with the source of uncertainty. 
 Experimentation.  
Interviewer: How does opportunity development start? When? 
Interviewee: 
 The opportunity development process starts from the beginning (i.e. initial idea), as we ask the idea’s 
owner to prepare a business case to explain their ideas, nature of product or service, the market’s needs 
and competition status. For example, when we identified a fleet management service opportunity, we 
asked the owner of the idea to prepare a business case which provides us with all the required 
information about the market’s needs, vendors, costs, product, competitors and other operators’ 
experience if this product provided by any of them.  
 In the development process, the initial idea could be adjusted many times, create complementary 
services (i.e. opportunities) to fill some gaps that are discovered in the market, either for the same 
customers (target segment) or a new segment (customers), or maybe lead to completely new 
opportunities. For example, we collaborated with a local taxi company and designed a taxi application 
for people’s rides, but after that we noticed some customers needed to ship some stuff or stock from 
one place to another, so we added a new service.  
 Another example, we designed a selling system to connect our system with the dealers, called ‘Lukra’, 
to only sell post-paid lines or SIM cards. But we developed this system to allow our dealers to sell 
Value Added Services (VAS), order SIM cards from our stores, and order top-up credit.  
 We designed a ‘My Account’ application, mainly for making enquiries about customers’ programmes 
and their bills. But we developed this application to allow our customers to buy new lines, top-up their 
current lines or pay their bills.  
 
Interviewer: Is opportunity development affected by any factors? If yes, what are these factors? 
Interviewee: The development process is affected by some factors such as the ability of our company to 
collect sufficient information about the external environment, our capabilities to understand the market and 
its needs, our experience in developing commercial opportunities in this complicated and uncertain context, 
our relationships with the vendors, our staff capabilities and skills, and the extent to which the market is 
ready for these products and services.    
Interviewer: What are the main indicators used by your firm in the opportunity evaluation decision-making 
process? 
Interviewee: 
 Feasibility analysis (Revenues and Costs) 
 Attractiveness 
 Market’s needs 
 The availability of the company resources and capabilities to exploit this opportunity.  
 The suitability of this product or service (i.e. opportunity) with the company’s products and services 
profile.  
 
Interviewer: Does your company use the same evaluation procedures for all types of opportunities? Why? 
What are these procedures? 
Interviewee: Around (90%) of our opportunities are evaluated with the same procedures and according to 
the main indicators. The evaluation is a stage/step evaluation process in order to precisely assess these 
opportunities and collect sufficient feedback to develop the opportunity. However, some opportunities 





Interviewer: In your company, what are the components of the opportunity assessment plan? 
Interviewee: 
 Opportunity and product (nature, functions, needs, specifications).  
 Market, segments (how this opportunity could affect other segments to avoid any contradiction), 
customers, competitors, vendors.  
 The benefits of this opportunity to the company (increase of either revenues or customer base), and how 
this opportunity is consistent with the company’s Road Map.  
 The resources and capabilities required to exploit this opportunity.  
 The execution plan and allocation of resources.  
Interviewer: How does the type of opportunity affect the entrepreneurial processes in your company? 
Interviewee: 
 If the market’s needs and the company’s capabilities are not clear, there is no opportunity. 
 If the market’s needs are not clear but the company’s capabilities are clear, there is an opportunity. 
However, the company should stimulate the need for their products. For example, we introduced 
Blackberry service to the Palestinian market when the customers did not know how to use or maximise 
their benefits from this service, but we raised their awareness about the importance of this service 
(Technology transfer).  Another example: we introduced a Fleet Management Service when the 
customers did not know the importance of this service, but we gave them 3-months free trial. Now this 
service has become the most demanded and is a primary service for the majority of companies and 
municipalities. Then, we added other functions such as measuring the level of fuel, tracking drivers, 
monitoring car speed, monitoring the temperature of freezers (sensors), and ensuring the movement of 
the concrete mixer operator.  
 If the market’s needs are clear and the company’s capabilities are not clear, there is an opportunity. 
However, we need to invest more in our company’s capabilities or ask for external consultation to solve 
this problem.  
  If the market’s needs and the company’s capabilities are clear, there is an opportunity and these are our 
normal and daily business transactions.  
 If the opportunity’s features are not clear and we do not have prior knowledge, there is no opportunity 
(lookover).  
 If the opportunity’s features are not clear, but we have prior knowledge, there is an opportunity and the 
best way to identify the opportunity is discovery. For example, smart meters services for measuring the 
consumption of electricity and water. Our company started this project with one municipality, as its 
features were not clear enough, then we started to work with other municipalities and the electricity 
company. (We aim to increase the dependency of our customers on the technology and Internet).  
 If the opportunity’s features are clear and we do not have prior knowledge, there is an opportunity and 
the best way to identify the opportunity is exploratory research and should be based on learning from 
the new opportunity to develop the company’s capabilities.  
 If the opportunity’s features are clear and we have prior knowledge, there is an opportunity and the best 
way to identify the opportunity is a systematic search in order to minimize the efforts, costs and time.  
Interviewer: How does the turbulent environment (with institutional barriers and voids) affect the 
entrepreneurial processes in your company? 
Interviewee: 
 This environment sometimes obstructs the emergence and development of opportunities (e.g. 3G 
project was strangled for 10 years, and expanding their network has been strangled due to the limited 
frequencies), but we overcome these obstacles, as we are dealing with this environment on a daily basis 
and we became experts in managing turbulent environment.  
 Also, the rapidly changing environment creates some opportunities, but the company should be more 
dynamic and flexible in order to identify and exploit these opportunities and generate a good profit. 
Indeed, this challenging environment encourages us to be innovative and creative in order to solve these 
problems.  
Interviewer: Do you categorise/classify uncertain contexts? If yes, what are these categories? 
Interviewee: 
 Yes, we classify uncertain contexts according to the causes of this case of uncertainty. Sometimes, we 
can collect some data about the reasons for uncertainty, which helps in dealing with it. 
 The causes of uncertainty could be (1) the external environment, e.g. political instability, economic 
situation, Israel’s policies, and how these changes could affect our company. (2) Changes in the 





Interviewer: How do you evaluate uncertain contexts? How do you deal/mitigate/reduce uncertainty? 
Interviewee: 
 We collect data (i.e. available data) as much as we can.  
 We make our plans, but we take into consideration the uncertainty.  
 We make many alternative plans in order to deal with uncertainty.  
 For example, the Israeli government promised to grant us 3G frequencies in 2010 and we were preparing 
for this in our road map, but we were making alternative plans for 2G services, such as additional SMS 
and VAS, which were exploited to the maximum. In addition, our company engineers developed 2G 
frequencies from GPRS to Edge frequencies in order to improve the quality and speed of the internet 
as an alternative solution to the delay in granting 3G frequencies.   
  
Interviewer: Do you think that uncertain context could inhibit/increase/create entrepreneurial 
opportunities? If yes, how?  
Interviewee: Generally, uncertain context inhibits opportunities. But the rapid changes also create some 
opportunities for dynamic entrepreneurial firms. Therefore, our company tries to participate in creating a 
technological environment, which will help us in creating more opportunities in the Palestinian market. 
 
Interviewer: What are the rational responses to uncertainty? Do you accept an uncertain context? If yes, to 
which level? And how does this work? 
Interviewee: 
 We collect data (i.e. available data) as much as we can in order to reach a reasonable level of certainty.  
 Generally, we accept and operate in the uncertain context. If the uncertainty could lead to the stoppage 
of the company’s operations, we work with any level of uncertainty. But, if we are making a decision 
regarding a new product or project, in this case, it will depend on the size of investment (high investment 
requires a greater level of certainty).  
Interviewer: How does the turbulent environment (with institutional barriers and voids) affect 
entrepreneurial action in your company?  
Interviewee: In most cases, this environment drives us to be more innovative and creative to overcome 
these barriers or exploit these voids. But it may inhibit us from exploitation in some cases (e.g. Mobile 
payment and online payment cannot be implemented due to the lack of regulations and rules to regulate the 
Palestinian market). 
 
Interviewer: What are your company’s options after evaluation? 
Interviewee: 
 Execution and exploitation, if the company has the required resources and capabilities. 
 Development of the company’s capabilities and resources if needed.  
 Collecting more information and data to reach a reasonable level of clarity, not full clarity.  
 
Interviewer: How does your company exploit the opportunities? Explain the process. Give some examples. 
Interviewee: Once the exploitation decision has been made, we coordinate with all departments concerned 
in order to plan for execution. Then we prepare the plan that explains the allocation of resources and staff. 
In some opportunities we go directly to the market and provide the product or service. However, in the case 
of opportunities where we are not certain about their impact and the reaction of the market, we start either 
by small-scale projects or experiments, then we go to the market. 
 
Interviewer: Does uncertainty inhibit or motivate your company to exploit the opportunity? 
Interviewee: Uncertainty plays both roles, so it could inhibit and motivate our company to exploit the 
opportunity. But we deal with this uncertain environment as a challenge and we try to employ our experience 
and our well-qualified team to work in this context, in order to prove themselves. 
Interviewer: What are the major factors that could affect opportunity exploitation? 
Interviewee: 
 Accessibility of the information 
 External environment stability  
 Managers’ and staff’s experience 
 Company’s and staff’s capabilities 
 The relationships with our vendors and local community.  




Interviewer: Does the type of uncertainty play a role in inhibiting or motivating opportunity exploitation? 
Explain and give examples? 
Interviewee: 
 Yes, the type and cause of uncertainty play a role in inhibiting or motivating us to exploit the 
opportunities.  
 We deal with the uncertainty according to its causes.   
 We assume a certain level of uncertainty in the Palestinian market.  
 Our experience in the company, industry and Palestinian context, as well as our judgment, play a very 
important role to overcome uncertainty and convert barriers to opportunities.  
 We consider the uncertainty as a challenge rather than a barrier, therefore we work to succeed.  
 We have a high willingness to take risks and uncertainties.  
 All of our directors and staff are Palestinians and they are familiar with this complicated and uncertain 
market.  
 
Interviewer: Do negative emotions contribute to either ability or inability to make an entrepreneurial 
action? If yes, explain how? 
Interviewee: 
 Some negative emotions contribute to the ability of our staff to make an entrepreneurial action.   
 Fear of failure: ‘We work to succeed and there is no space for failure’. Fear of failure encourages us to 
be more innovative and creative to find many alternatives in order to overcome all barriers.  
 Self-esteem: Our self-esteem and trust in other staff increase our ability to perform very difficult tasks 
in this environment. Our experience and culture of persistence help a lot in challenging these barriers.  
 Resilience: the accumulation of experience over years of work helps us to make decisions in this 
environment.  
 Stress: We deal with the causes of this stress and we consider it a challenge, which helps us to act 
entrepreneurially.  
Interviewer: How do you describe your company regarding the following: organisational form, leadership, 
decision making process, human resource practices, strategy, finance, marketing, and sustaining competitive 
advantages? 
Interviewee: 
 Organisational form: Our organisational structure is very dynamic and flexible, and we make some 
changes based on the changes in the market.  
 Leadership: They are experts in the mobile phone industry, and they have charismatic characteristics 
that enable them to encourage teamwork and motivate staff.   
 Decision making process: It’s based on data analysis models of the market if the data is available, if 
not, it’s based on our experience and judgments in cases of ambiguity and uncertainty.  
 HR practices: Generally, we recruit new graduates through Go Professional and look for candidates 
who are creative, flexible and able to work in this complicated market. However, some positions require 
an expert or specialists like engineers.  
 Strategy: We have broad strategies and guidelines. These strategies are flexible and have few details. 
We allow staff at lower levels to set out their operational plans according to the changes in the market.  
 Finance: We have a good cash flow, but sometimes especially for large projects e.g. 3G project, we 
borrow some money from banks.  
 Marketing: We are very open to new ideas and very flexible, so we make broad, general marketing 
strategies and we allow our team to contribute their marketing and promotional ideas and some suitable 
procedures to keep up with the market’s changes.  
 Sustaining competitive advantages: our competitive advantages include our experience in the 
Palestinian market, a large customer base, well-qualified Palestinian staff and high quality services. But 
we need to improve and maintain our competitive advantages through creating some barriers for our 







Appendix (D): Antecedents of Entrepreneurial Processes and 




 ‘Openness to new ideas, thinking out of the box, acceptance of risk more than others, 
optimism, smartness, creativity, and dealing with obstacles as challenges are 
important characteristics of entrepreneurs’ (J02) 
 ‘The greater willingness to bear risks, openness to new ideas, optimism, 
determination to succeed, and skills, but within the company’s plans, lead to more 
successful entrepreneurial processes’ (J11) 
Prior 
knowledge 
 ‘University majors and previous experience are very important, but in our case we 
started from scratch and built up very good experience as it was very difficult to 
recruit international experts and consultants. Now, we are experts in managing the 
Palestinian market and mobile phone sector which helps us in identifying more 
opportunities and providing more new products and services’(J03)  
 ‘… In some cases the previous experience could be a barrier. For example, the 
managers’ bad experience could affect their way of thinking and they assume that 
they already tried this solution and it did not work … Moreover, some managers may 
deal the same way they did in previous opportunities, with different types of 
opportunity that need different thinking and procedures. They may also ignore some 
opportunities because of their belief that they will not succeed’ (J10) 
Social 
networks 
 ‘Our strong relations with the local community, staff, customers, vendors and dealers 
help us in identifying new opportunities and facilitate the execution process …’ (J11) 
 ‘Social networks are very important, especially in the Palestinian context. They help 
us to solve many problems, identify the market’s needs and access many resources 
and segments’ (J06) 
Entrepreneurial 
alertness 
 ‘… Employees with a high level of alertness are more likely to assess the exceptional 
situations and be more sensitive to the market’s changes … in identifying 
opportunities ... employees discover some unexpected opportunities’ (J01) 
 ‘Employees with a high level of alertness are more able to identify opportunities in 
the markets. But the position of entrepreneur in the company plays an important role 
in convincing others in the company and exploiting the opportunity’ (J09) 
Systematic 
search 
 ‘We conduct some systematic search in the market to encourage more consumption 
of data (i.e. internet). We also established an innovation centre that provides many 
facilities for our employees and other applications developers to identify more 
opportunities in the market …’ (J01) 
 ‘We use systematic search when searching for specific opportunities (information is 




 ‘A more stable environment could be easier for execution and exploitation of 
opportunity, but we are working in an extremely uncertain environment and we are 
dealing with it as a challenge. Our company is still working in this context and 
creating room for more opportunities’ (J03, J06)   
 ‘This uncertain environment could both facilitate and inhibit the success of 
entrepreneurial process and action ... Indeed, the external environment in Palestine 
is incapable of facilitating the execution of entrepreneurial opportunities’(J09) 
Type of 
opportunity 
 ‘… the level of clarity of these opportunities related to the level of risk and success, 
which affects our perception of risks, costs and returns. Therefore, we cannot 
generalise one identification, development and evaluation procedure to all types of 
opportunities as it varies from one context to another (risk or uncertain context, 
stable or unstable)’ (J03) 
 ‘When the market’s demand and supply exist and it is clear how to link them, this is 
the easiest opportunity to identify and exploit, … and can be easily imitated by our 
competitors. However, the less clear the features of the opportunities and the more 
complicated the situation, the more efforts and costs needed ... For example, … this 
project was not clear and took a long time to be approved, but now this service 





Appendix (E):  A Codebook of Levels of Uncertainty 
Level Word or Phrase 
High A very complicated, difficult, hard, ambiguous, difficulty, inability to 
anticipate/predict, cannot easily, is not easy, cannot deliberately plan, often does not 
work, often cannot do.  
Intermediate Still able, to some extent able, try, usually does work, sometimes does not work.  
Low Can easily, deal with, try always to expect, is able, have the capacity, help us to, can.  
Source: Author 
    
Appendix (F) - Quotations on Levels of Uncertainty Types from 




 ‘We have to identify the changes and their impact on our company …, which is not an 
easy task’ (J02) 
 ‘We try to predict if this uncertainty affects our company or not and how, but we often 
cannot do’ (J04) 
Intermediate 
level 
 ‘We made some assumptions in order to estimate the impact of these rapid and 
continuous changes and fluctuations on our company’ (J11) 
 ‘We are able, to some extent, to predict the influence of this uncertain environment on 
our company and operations’ (J02) 
Low level 
 ‘We try always to anticipate how the changes in the main external environment factors 
could affect our company’ (J08) 
Response uncertainty 
High level 
 ‘We try to estimate the reaction of our stakeholders …, but this is a very hard mission. 
This prevents us from designing our campaigns and planning our options to act against 
these reactions’ (J04) 
Intermediate 
level 
 ‘We try to understand how these changes influence the Palestinian markets, ... We were 
sometimes, to some extent, able to identify and design different options to deal with the 
situation’ (J08) 
Low level 
 ‘We are dealing with this environment on a daily basis and we became experts in 
estimating changes and managing this turbulent environment’ (J01) 
 ‘Our experience in the Palestinian market helps us to identify the causes of the 
uncertainty and find appropriate solutions, as we evaluate these uncertainties and 
accordingly define different solutions or prevention measures’ (J10) 
 ' After around 20 years of working in the Palestinian market, we are experts in 
managing the Palestinian market and mobile phone sector which help us in identifying 
sources of uncertainty and designing appropriate strategies to deal with this ever-
changing environment’ (J03)  
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 ‘Whenever an employee is more creative, open to new ideas, a risk-taker, optimistic, 
willing to work and succeed, and a fast implementer, then the more s/he is able to 
identify and exploit new opportunities …’ (W04) 
Prior 
knowledge 
 ‘The prior knowledge of the market and its structure, customers’ needs and network 
and sites installation were essential. But the inability of recruiting international 
experts to Palestine forced us to build our knowledge and experience from scratch, 
and in this case previous knowledge and experience is not that important …’ (W04) 
 ‘It depends on the type of opportunity. Some types of opportunity need previous 
knowledge (around 20%), and other types don’t need prior knowledge, especially 
those related to creativity, opportunity and product creation, and new projects 
(around 80%) …’ (W06) 
Social 
networks 
 ‘Our stronger relations between our company and local communities, companies, 
vendors and the international community (external relations), and the stronger 
relations among our staff (internal relations) increase our ability to identify new 
opportunities and access many resources and information’ (W04)  
 ‘…  there are strong relations between managers and our staff, and we adopt an open 
door policy. Moreover, we have strong relationships with our dealers and suppliers, 
close relationship with our customers, and participatory relationships with the other 
operators in the group. All of these networks increase the possibility of success in 
identifying, developing and exploiting new opportunities’ (W09) 
Entrepreneurial 
alertness 
 ‘The high level of alertness helps our company to discover more opportunities that 
we may be unaware of …’ (W01) 
 ‘We have to always keep our eyes open on the market to identify new opportunities. 
There are some people who really are born with a high level of alertness, but we can 
also train some people to develop their entrepreneurial alertness capabilities’ (W04) 
Systematic 
search 
 ‘Systematic search is essential to work in the market. We have to conduct research 
to investigate the procedures of marketing and promoting for specific products (i.e. 
opportunities) and collect enough data and information about the market, how to 
approach and reach our customers or potential customers, and how to identify, 
develop and exploit this opportunity’ (W04)  
 ‘Our company encourages the staff to search in the Palestinian market as well as in 
regional and international markets. For example, we conduct research about the 
services provided by operators in the Jordanian, Egyptian, Japanese and Algerian 
markets … etc’ (W06) 
Institutional 
environment 
 ‘Whenever the external environment is more stable, then the implementation will be 
easier. However, the unstable and changing environments still generate some 
opportunities…’ (W05) 
 ‘The Palestinian context is very changeable and unexpected … this environment 
could generate some opportunities, but it hinders the implementation process (i.e. 
makes it more complicated) due to the difficulty of anticipating the market and its 
changes’ (W09) 
 ‘The turbulent environment is considered a problem and a barrier for bureaucratic 
companies, but in our case, we deal with this environment as a challenge … this 
creates some opportunities’ (W04) 
Type of 
opportunity 
 ‘There are some opportunities that are planned and have clear characteristics, which 
are usually easy to discover and exploit; and there are some opportunities that are 
unplanned and have unclear characteristics, which are harder to identify and exploit 
...’ (W04) 
  ‘Whenever the characteristics of the opportunity are clear, then the identification 
and exploitation will be easier, and we “as management” need this type of 
opportunity to realise a short-term success. But this does not mean that the ambiguity 
of the opportunity’s characteristics could prevent our company from identifying and 
exploiting this type of opportunity in order to achieve long-term objectives’ (W05) 








 ‘We also cannot easily predict how these changes in external and business 
environments could affect our company’ (W04) 
 ‘The risk department tries to anticipate the influence of any changes in the external or 
business environment on our company. Indeed, this task is very complicated in the 
Palestinian market’ (W09) 
Intermediate 
level 
 ‘… If the causes are related to the Palestinian side, even if there are many challenges, 
there is often collaboration and we can to some extent estimate the influence of changes 
and find solutions’ (W11) 
 ‘I see that the institutional and market changes moderately affect our company’ (W06) 
Low level 
 ‘The committee is able to analyse the market and the internal environment of the 
company (operational, commercial, and technical), and how the market’s changes 
could affect our company’ (W10) 
 'We invested in our market intelligence capabilities to access relevant information, and 
the risk department is responsible for analysing situations. This helps us to estimate 




 ‘We, at a strategic level, cannot deliberately identify and plan our options and 
solutions in face of the rapid changes in the Palestinian market’ (W05) 
Intermediate 
level 
 ‘The risk management department always tries to forecast the market changes … This 
usually does work, but sometimes it does not, as we cannot access some information 
specially related to politics, which may hinder us from identifying the possible options 
and developing feasible plans’ (W09) 
Low level 
 ‘Staff, at the operational level, can easily deal with this uncertain context and daily 
changes’ (W05) 
 ‘We have a risk management department responsible for collecting the available data 
and information …, which helps us to design suitable strategies and procedures to deal 
with uncertainties’ (W01, W06) 
 ‘Despite the high uncertainty that we are facing in the Palestinian market, we have the 
capacity for finding alternative solutions and designing feasible and applicable plans 
to thrive on these uncertainties through employing our market intelligence programme 
and transferring the experience of other operators in our group’ (W10) 
 ‘We need to reach the relevant information about all issues that could affect the 
company’s operations in Palestine to overcome our local knowledge disadvantage. 
Therefore, we conduct research to collect local information about political, social and 
economic changes in order to make some judgements/predictions for a certain period 
of time that could help us to properly plan for the market, either commercial, financial, 
or investment plans’ (W02) 
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